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PREFACE
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine all 
aspects of the relations between France and the United States 
from the Spanish-American War until the second Hague Confer­
ence, During these years there was a general improvement 
in relations, with the greatest change taking place around 
the turn of the century. There were many reasons for this 
development: they include the efforts of important indivi­
duals, economic matters, cultural traditions, public opinion, 
imperial ambitions and historical circumstances. It is 
impossible to measure the exact relationship of these varia­
bles, but the most important consideration seems to revolve 
around the fact that neither nation presented any real threat 
to the vital interests or security of the other.
From my point of view, the material in this study is 
worthwhile for at least three reasons. In the first place, 
while there exists a vast literature on various phases of the 
history of Franco-American relations, at this time there is no 
substantial work devoted to the years between the Franco- 
Prussian War and World War I, Secondly, the relationship of 
the two countries has been crucially important throughout the 
twentieth century, and it remains as significant today as ever
iii
before in the past. Of course, knowledge of Franco-American 
relations of seventy years ago does not alone provide a 
basis for understanding the situation of today, but it does 
provide a perspective that is helpful. Thirdly, from a 
study of the bilateral relations of the two powers there is 
a great deal that can be learned about the international 
situation at a very important time. Although Franco-American 
relations did not constitute one of the major questions of 
international diplomacy, in many ways they influenced and 
reflected some important developments of the larger picture. 
In the research for the dissertation I have used a wide 
variety of original sources, A glance at the bibliography 
will reveal that I have not been able to use the archives of 
the Quai d*Orsay, On several matters, especially the Moroc­
can crisis, the published volumes of the Documents diploma­
tiques français have been very helpful. For the subject of 
the reaction of the French Government to the Spanish-American 
War, Ernest R, May's Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of
America as a Great Power quotes a number of important docu­
ments from the French archives. Also I have made extensive 
use of Le Temps, a newspaper which almost always contained 
the government's position on foreign affairs.
Many librarians, archivists and others have helped me 
in different ways, I would like to express my appreciation 
especially to Dr, Russell Buhite, who initially stimulated 
ray interest in American diplomatic history and who directed
iv
the dissertation; to the history department of the University 
of Oklahoma, for providing a research grant; and to my wife, 
who supported me for a year so that I could devote my energies 
to research and writing.
FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, I898-I907
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth century there was a recognition 
in both France and the United States that the diplomatic 
relations between the two countries would be increasingly 
important in the years ahead. When in 1897 President William 
McKinley had to choose the first Ambassador to go to Paris, 
he was anxious to select a man with both talent and prestige, 
McKinley decided upon General Horace Porter, a former aide- 
de-camp to General Grant during the Civil War. Porter was a 
prominent railroad executive, and he was fluent in the use 
of the French language. In presenting Porter with his 
appointment, McKinley told him that the international situa­
tion was rapidly changing and that it would be necessary for 
the American Ambassador in France to demonstrate "tact, dis­
tinction and force of character."^ But McKinley added: "I
Elsie Porter Meade and Henry Pearson, An American 
Soldier: Horace Porter, (New York: Frederick A, Stokes, 1927), 
p. 170. This work by Porter's daughter is not especially 
scholarly, but it records many personal incidents, and it 
contains many unpublished diplomatic despatches.
2doubt very much whether you will have much to do in Paris 
because our relations are very friendly and seem to be grow­
ing in quite fertile soil."2 At about the same time the 
French Government also had to find a suitable diplomat to 
go to Washington as the first French Ambassador in the 
United States, In January, 1898, it was decided that M,
Jules Gambon was the wisest choice, Gambon was a veteran 
diplomat, having served as the head of the French delegation 
in Morocco and as the Governor-General of Algeria, When he 
talked to the French Foreign Minister, M, Gabriel Hanotaux, 
about the assignment, Gambon expressed the desire to be 
nearer Paris, and he protested that he did not speak English, 
Hanotaux insisted that Gambon go to Washington, and he said: 
"Take M, Thiebaut with you; he speaks English perfectly,
By 1898 Franco-American relations already had a long 
and varied history, Gabriel Hanotaux, who was a capable 
historian despite his busy public career, wrote that geogra­
phical circumstances had made it inevitable that the two 
nations would have a special importance for each other, 
Hanotaux's argument was that the busy harbors of Bordeaux, 
Nantes, Brest and Le Havre face the American continent and 
are America's shortest routes to the European mainland,^
^Recorded in the New York Herald. July 30, I9 0 5,
O \
-'Quoted in Genevieve Tabouis, The Life of Jules Gambon, 
(London: Jonathan Gape, 1938), p, 82,
h ,
Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivantet en Amérique du 
Nord, (Paris: Librairie Hachette et cie, I91 3), p, 139,
3During the American Revolution, Prance had dome to the aid 
of the thirteen colonies in the attempt to weaken Great 
Britain. Ever since, the memory of the alliance of 1778 
has had great sentimental value in France and the United 
States. In both nations it has long been a cliche to say 
that France was the first ally of the United States, and 
this general idea has been restated time and time again at 
diplomatic receptions. Yet the relations between the two 
countries were far from friendly during much of the nine­
teenth century.5 There was a major diplomatic crisis when 
Napoleon III attempted to establish a French sphere of in­
fluence in Mexico at the time of the Civil War, The House 
of Representatives adopted a resolution against the venture 
in 1864, and Secretary of State William Seward warned France 
that the congressional action represented the sentiment of 
the entire American people.^ As a result of Napoleon's 
blunder, during the war of I87O-I87I the majority of Ameri­
cans sypathized with Germany and believed that France was 
the aggressor.?
^This is the thesis in Henry Blumenthal, A Reapprisal 
of Franco-American Relations. 1830-1871. (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959). Also see Clara 
Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment Toward 
Germany, 1670-1914. (Boston: Cornhill Pub. Co.. 1923). t>. viii.
^Count Egon Caesar Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of 
Mexico, trans. by Catherine Philips, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1938), Vol. I, pp. 410-1.
?Schieber, Transformation, pp. 36-7.
Il
Following the Franco-German War, many influential 
Frenchmen realized the future importance of the United 
States. For this reason they were anxious to do everything 
possible to improve their image in the country. This, of 
course, was the motivation for the presentation of the 
Statue of Liberty in 1884. This symbolic action probably 
was of little importance, but only five years later there 
was a dangerous controversy between Germany and the United 
States as a result of conflicting ambitions in the Samoan 
Islands. The American press suddenly became anti-German, 
and the American public began to look more favorably upon 
the French position in the world.® By I898 there had not 
been a complete diplomatic revolution, but American-French 
relations were much more amiable than they had been during 
the days of the Second Empire.
Any examination of world diplomacy at the turn of the 
century must emphasize European imperialism. The high point 
of the competition for territory and influence came during 
the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Professor William Langer, 
who has studied the subject in some detail, concludes that 
during this score of years "it was taken for granted that 
the world was marked out by providence for exploitation by 
the European white man and that the principle of every man
®Ibid.. p. 40.
for himself and the Devil take the hindmost was the natural
9
law," France had a long tradition of imperialism, and her 
colonial empire was the second largest in the world. The 
United States was one of the last of the powers to enter 
the colonial race, but after the Spanish-American War, she 
too exerted a world influence and controlled a large empire.
It is important to note that imperialism, in its diverse 
forms, was an integral part of the foreign policies of both 
France and the United States, More than perhaps anything 
else, this fact had a profound impact on the diplomatic 
relations of the two countries whenever they came in contact. 
Just after World War I historian Louis Madelin wrote* 
"Our race is e x p a n s i v e , A t  the turn of the century this 
was a common assumption among Frenchmen, and with some 
r e a s o n , A f t e r  the Napoleonic wars France had been left 
without any external empire. But in the 1830's Louis-Philippe 
began the new French empire when he conquered Algeria, Under 
the leadership of Napoleon III France took possession of
^William L, Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890- 
1902. (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1956), pp. 797» 6?, 787-8.
l^Louis Madelin, L'expansion française de la Syrie au 
Rhin. (Paris* Pion-Nourrit, 1918), p, 5» A good summary of
Vi r w i i  a l i  esTn i es 4 m  H “H  a  v»! a  a  Q  A  4 T # i i + 4  A aFrench colonialism is in Charles Seignobos, L'evolution de 
la 3® République, 1875-1915. (Paris* Librairie Hachette, 
1921), pp, 326 ff.
President Charles de Gaulle, born in 1890, writes in 
his memoirs that "France cannot be France without greatness," 
Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre* l'appel, 1940-1942, 
(Paris* Pion, 195^)i PP» 1-2, Mémoires de guerre* le salut, 
1944-1946. (Montreal* Le Cercle du Livre de France, I960), 
pp, 750 ff.
6Cochin China, and following the fiasco of the Franco-Prussian 
War, France was able to maintain control over her colonies. 
Books, especially Paul Leroy-Beaulieu*s De la colonisation 
Chez les peuples modernes and Paul Gaffarel's Les colonies 
françaises, were widely read and stimulated interest in 
c o l o n i z a t i o n . 12 France's most dynamic expansion took place 
under the leadership of M. Jules Ferry, who was premier 
during the years 1880-1881 and 1883-188$. Ferry was willing 
to accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and he co-operated 
with Bismarck in order to secure France's territorial aggran­
dizement. Under his premiership the French occupied Tunis, 
entered Tonkin and Madagascar, and penetrated the regibns 
of Niger and the Congo. Despite much opposition, the con­
solidation and enlargement of the French Empire continued 
until the first World War. In I908 Archibald Cary Coolidge, 
a noted Harvard historian, observed that "France is a world 
power, with a territory and a population larger than those 
of the Union, a great army and navy, and extraordinary 
wealth, and, in spite of the assertations of hostile critics, 
her natural genius seems far from exhausted."13
The story of American imperialism was quite different 
from that of France. Before the Civil War the United States
12paul Leroy-Beaulieu, De la colonisation chez les 
peuples modernes. (Paris 1 Guillaumin et cie., 1&74).^ Paul 
Gaffarel, Les colonies françaises. (Paris; G, Baillière, 
1880).
l^Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a 
World Power, (New York; The Macmillan Co., I9 08), p. 19$.
7had been expansive, but territorial growth had been in the 
direction of the relatively unsettled areas of the western 
American continent. There had been great interest in Asian 
trade, but with few exceptions, there had been almost no 
interest in the establishment of colonies. In 186? The 
United States purchased Alaska from Russia and took posses­
sion of the uninhabited Midway Islands, Secretary of State 
William Seward and a few other expansionists urged that the 
Hawaiian Islands should also be annexed, but Congress did 
not sympathize with the p r o p o s a l , jt was during the 
Samoan controversy of the late 1880*s that the American 
Government first competed with the European powers for for­
eign colonies, and at the Berlin Conference of 1889 the 
United States accepted a tripartite protectorate of the 
islands. During the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895 
the Department of State, with the approval of President 
Grover Cleveland, directly challenged European ambitions in 
South America, and Secretary of State Richard Olney warned 
the British Government that America's "infinite resources 
combined with its isolated position render it master of the 
situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all 
other p o w e r s T h e  French Government understood perfectly
See Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia; A 
Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Ref­
erence to China. Japan and Korea in the 19th Century. (New 
York: The Macmillan Co,, 1922), pp, 416, 3^7-50» 454-59*
^^Richard Olney to Thomas Bayard, July 20, 1895, Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UMted States. 1895, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), p, 55Ô, Hence- 
forth this source is to be cited as PR,
8that the American Republic was rapidly becoming a major 
force in world politics, and at the Quai d*Orsay there was 
little satisfaction with this new reality. But if French 
leaders were suspicious of American imperialism, they had 
few fears that it would be a dangerous threat to the vital 
interests of France.
America's phenomenal growth after the Civil War 
attracted a great deal of attention in France. Especially 
thbre was much interest in America's economic expansion.
M. Emile Levasseur, a distinguished economist at the Collage 
de France in Paris, devoted a major part of his time to the 
study of this subject. In the 1890's Levasseur wrote 
L'agriculture aux Etats-Unis and L'ouvrier américain. 
Levasseur was impressed with what he saw. Although he 
believed that the United States had a comparative advantage 
over Europe because of her greater natural resources, he 
was also convinced that American ingenuity was partly re­
sponsible for the amazing economic expansion. He wrotet 
"The genius of enterprise, which manifests itself in the 
multiplicity of inventions, and in the daring with which the 
captains of industry undertake new ventures and capital 
supports them, is undeniable."^7 Other French economists
Emile Levasseur. L'agriculture aux Etats-Unis. (Paris; 
Secretariat de la société d'economie sociale, 109^), L'ouvrier 
américain, (Paris; L. Larose, 1898).
l^Quoted in S. N. D. North, "Levasseur's American 
Workingman," Political Science Quarterly. XIII (June, I898),
pp. 321-3 .
9were convinced that American economic competition posed a
major threat to Europe. Paul de Bousiers warned in an
article in La Revue de Paris that American commerce was
"becoming more and more menacing for the economy of the old 
1 Rw o r l d . S i m i l a r  fears were expressed in Paul Leroy-Beau- 
lieu's Les Etats-Unis au XX® siècle,^9 Many Frenchmen hoped 
that Prance might be able to learn from the American exper­
ience. Auguste earlier and Henri Gaullieur were two politi­
cal scientists who argued that their countrymen should imitate 
some of the techniques of American industry and commerce.^0
The United States has always been a subject of fascina­
tion for French novelists and journalists, and this was 
especially true in the second half of the nineteenth century.21 
M. Paul Bourget was a distinguished novelist who saturated 
his works with materiâl relating to the United States, and
IBpaul de Rousiers, "La marine marchande aux Etats- 
Unis," La Revue de Paris, VI (November 1, 1901), p. 146.
l^Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Etats-Unis au XX® siècle, 
(ParisI A, Colin, I9 0 9).
ZOAuguste earlier. La Republique américaine 1 Etats- 
Unis, 4 vols., (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, I890). Henri 
Gaullieur, Etudes américaines. (Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit et 
cie, 1891).
21por an annotated list of travel accounts see Frank 
Monaghan, French Travelers in the United States, 1765-1932, 
(New York: Antiquarian Press Ltd,, I9 6 1). The best study of 
the reception of American literature in France for the period 
is Cyrille Arnavon, Les lettres américaines devant la cri­
tique française. 1887-1917. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
10
his views were typical of many Frenchmen of his day. Bourget 
presented types in his novels, and in Une idylle tragique 
the American type was a self-made millionaire. In the work 
one Frenchman exclaimed: “The Americans and I can not 
understand each other» The excessive energy of those people 
fatigues me.“22 In 1895 Bourget visited the United States 
for nine months, and he wrote of his impressions of the trip 
in Outre-Mer. Bourget was ambivalant in his attitude toward 
American culture. He admired the system of political demo­
cracy, and he wrote that in the United States he was able 
to “truly breathe the air of liberty at every minute,"23 
But he was astonished by the concern for time and efficiency 
in the country, and he feared that the human spirit was 
crushed by so much material wealth. In his conclusion 
Bourget wrote that the dominant American traits were the 
following:
Her incoherence and her haste; the brutality of the 
streets in her large cities; the excess of modern 
life accompanied by a lack of equlibirium and taste; 
the artificial tension of her culture which gives 
America’s women, like her flowers, the haste of the 
green house; her abundant energy which creates fero­
cious competition between business men; the corruption
22paul Bourget, Une idylle tragique. (Paris: Alphonse 
Lemerre, I896), Vol. I, p. 283. An American woman is 
described as “an energetic and self-assured person who is 
accustomed from childhood to govern herself and who has no 
concern for social convention," Ibid., pp. 9-10,
23paul Bourget, Outre-Mer: notes sur 1*Amérique, (Paris: 
Librairie Pion, 1895), Vol. II, pp. 320, 3II.
11
of her police and her politiciansj her absense of 
relaxation and time-consuming pleasures,
American novelist- Mark Twain, believed that Outre-Mer was 
a misrepresentation of American society. In his criticism 
of the book Twain wrote * ”I wish M, Bourget had read more 
of our novels before he came. It is the only way to thor­
oughly understand a people. When I found I was coming to 
Paris, I read la Terre,
If the French tended to have a stereotyped conception 
of the United States, the same thing can be said for American 
ideas about Prance, In his excellent book, France and Amer­
ican Culture, Professor Howard M, Jones concludes that 
Americans had three images in regard to France in the mid­
nineteenth century. First, in the popular mind, France was 
associated with the movements of Catholicism, deism and 
irréligion, and since America was predominantly Protestant, 
there was some prejudice and suspicion toward French religion. 
Secondly, French culture was associated with a high develop­
ment in art, literature, philosophy and the theater. For 
this reason there was a certain prestige attached to French 
perfumes, wines and fashions, and the French language was 
more popular than any other foreign language. Thirdly, in 
the United States there was the widespread conviction that
2^Ibid,, Vol. II, pp, 326, 315-6 .
25Mark Twain, "What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us," North 
American Review, CIX (January, I895), p. 62,
12
French political institutions were unstable, and that the 
typical Frenchman was easily attracted to anarchy and revolu­
tionary movements. In short, in the American self-image the 
typical American was stable, hard-working and honest in 
contrast to the Frenchman who spent him time dancing, drink­
ing wine, accumulating mistresses and participating in
revolutions.26
In general, Jones's analysis of an earlier period 
seems to be an accurate description of American opinion at 
the turn of the century. The influential Harvard historian, 
Archibald Cary Coolidge, believed that there was a basic 
difference in the cultural patterns of France and the United 
States. Coolidge maintained that to the Frenchman, the word 
civilization implied accomplishments in art and literature, 
while to the American the term meant "efficient telephone 
service and improved p l u m b i n g . " ^ 7  Coolidge pointed out that 
"it is not an uncommon belief in the United States that 
France is politically and morally decadent." He did not 
agree with this judgment, and he wrote that it was based on 
"doubts as to the stability of the government, on the fact 
that the population is stationary, and still more on the 
impression of moral corruption modern French literature
Howard Mumford Jones, America and French Culture. 
1750-1848. (Montreal: Louis Carrier & Co., 1928), pp. 562-72.
^^Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World 
Power. (New York; The Macmillan Co., 1900), pp. 194-5.
13
serves to spread a b r o a d . "^8 y/hen Hughes le Roux, a literary 
critic, was a visiting lecturer in the United States, he 
complained that "the American public has come to regard 
modern French novels as immoral productions of the worse 
kind."29 Many Americans believed that arrogance was a typi­
cal French characteristic. Alice Porter, the daughter of 
the American Ambassador in Paris, noted that often the 
French were condescending to American visitors. She reported 
that it was not uncommon for Frenchmen to ask her: "Why
should we travel? Everyone comes to Paris. If your country 
has beauty in it, why do you Americans risk your lives to 
cross the ocean each year."30
Despite the large French colonial empire, many Ameri­
cans were convinced that France ws,s on the decline. Brooks 
Adams wrote in 1900 that "gangrene is devouring all the 
Latin races. The aggressive energy of France is, perhaps, 
dead."3^ Theodore Roosevelt had a similar point of view in 
the late nineteenth century. In 1897 he wrote: "There seems
to be some ground for believing that France is decadent. In 
France, as in the later Roman world, population is decreasing,
28lbid.. p. 194.
29g?he Nation. L3CXXV (September 28, 190?)» p. 273.
30jjeade and Pearson, Soldier, p. 189.
3lBrooks Adams, America*a Economic Supremacy. (New 
York: Harper & Brothers Pub., 19OO), p. 70.
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and there is gross sensuality and licentiousness. France 
is following Spain in her downward c o u r s e . A s  Howard 
Jones argues, Pi*ance*s problems were often attributed to 
unstable political institutions. The Nation commented that 
"French cabinets are so chronically in unstable equilibrium 
that the wonder is, not that they fall, but that they sur­
vive,"33 In regard to anarchists and revolutionaries in 
France, an editorial in the Outlook remarked; "It seems 
incredible that France should produce such brutal agitators,"3^ 
Robert McCormick, who followed Porter as Ambassador to France, 
wrote in a despatch; "With the admiration and affection that 
I with all Americans have for France, I cannot but recognize 
that in a material sense Germany is her superior. The German 
is the strong, virile, progressive people on the continent,"35 
The most loyal supporters of France in the United States 
were those Americans whose ancestors had been French, At 
the turn of the century there were some ten million American 
citizens in this category. It is important to note that this 
was considerably less than the number of Americans whose
3^Roosevelt to Spring Rice, May 29t 1897, The Letters 
of Theodore Roosevelt, edited by Siting Morison and John Blum, 
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1955), Vol. I, p. 620,
33g?he Nation. LXXXV (November 16, 1905), p. 393.
3^The Outlook. LX (October 22, I898), p, 461,
35McCormick to Root, December 15, 1905, Records of the 
Department of State, Despatches from the United States Minis­
ters in France, Vol. 125. Henceforth this source will be 
cited as Despatches,
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ancestors had come from either Germany or England, and in 
addition to this, French immigrants tended to assimilate 
into the dominant society more rapidly than did German 
immigrants. Statistics for broad ethnic backgrounds are 
only approximate, but information is more accurate concerning 
immigrants and their immediate children. This smaller 
grouping is the more significant. In I900 there were some 
214,000 American citizens who were from France or whose 
parents were from France, At the same time there were over 
five million citizens who were from Germany or their parents 
were from that country, and almost two million citizens had 
this association with Great Britain,3^ But it is also signi­
ficant that in the late nineteenth century many French Cana­
dians from the province of Quebec moved into New England in 
search of greater economic opportunities. It is estimated 
that in I900 some 283,06? French Canadians were living in 
New England,37 in General they lived in French-speaking 
communities and maintained a survivance of the French cul­
tural tradition. Besides New England, the only other area 
in the United States to have a large concentration of French 
culture was southeastern Lousiana, Elsewhere those with
U.S., Bureau of the Census with the Co-operation of 
the Social Science Research Council, Historical Statistics 
of the United Statesx Colonial Times to 1957, (Washington; 
Government Printing Office, i9 6 0), p, 6 5,
37Gilles Paquet, ”L*emigration des Canadiens-Francais 
vers la Nouvelle-Angleterre, I870-I9IO1 prises de vue quan­
titatives," Recherches Sociographiques, V (September, 1964),
p. 328,
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French backgrounds had become absorbed into the mainstream 
of American life.
Many Frenchmen were distressed about the large number 
of Americans of French origin who had lost all identification 
with the French tradition. Ambassador Gambon took a special 
interest in all efforts to try to change this situation.
He believed that there should be a concerted effort of pro­
paganda to attract Americans of French ancestry. He hoped 
that there would be a massive publicity of French cultural 
achievements, Gambon urged the French Government to help 
finance such a project, with the explanation that it could
result in a positive advantage in international diplomacy,3®
/ /
Abbe Felix Klein, when visiting the United States, was upset 
when he found that few members of the second generation of 
French emigrants had any sentimental attachment for France,
He found one couple, both of whose parents had come from 
France, and neither of the two had any knowledge of the 
French language or the place of origin of his parents,39
The French language has long been a source of prestige 
for France, This was unmistakably true before the first 
World War, for until that time French was the recognized 
lingua franca of international diplomacy. It was assumed
^®Letters quoted in Tabouis, Gambon, pp, 114-5, The 
source is not made clear,
39pelix Klein, L*Amérique de demain, (Paris; Pion, 
Nourrit et cie, 1910), p, 64,
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that any diplomat would be able to communicate in the lan­
guage. At the Second Hague Conference of I9 0 7, for example, 
there were three hundred delegates from all over the world, 
and almost all of the delegates had a working knowledge of 
French,40 Almost without exception, the American diplomats, 
who appear in the following pages, were able to use the 
language. In 1924 James Brown Scott, an important advisor 
to the Department of State, wrote Le Français; langue diplo­
matique moderne in which he maintained that French would 
continue to be the standard language of international diplo-
/limacy. This was an assumption early in the twentieth cen­
tury. It is impossible to measure the extent to which the 
prestige of the language influenced the American conception 
of France, but certainly it is a factor which can not be 
completely ignored.
40observed in Paul d’Estournelies de Constant, America 
and Her Problems. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915). pp.
178-9.
4^James Brown Scott, Le Français: langue diplomatique 
moderne: étude critique de conciliation internationale, 
introduction by Nicholas Murry Butler, (Paris: A. Pedone, 
1924), This is not true since the second World War. At one 
diplomatic reception President de Gaulle was surprised that 
McGeorge Bundy was able to speak French fluently. Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House, (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1965), pp.
350-1.
CHAPTER II 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR— I
The war between Spain and the United States caused 
the greatest tension in Franco-American relations since the 
intervention of Napoleon III in Mexico,! Throughout the 
conflict the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen favored the 
cause of Spain, but despite considerable popular support for 
intervention, the French Government maintained a policy of 
strict neutrality,2 <phe swiftness of the American victory 
was the major factor which prevented more serious difficulties 
between France and the United States, At Paris there was 
some uneasiness at the appearance of America as a world 
power, but despite this, the French Government realistically
^This point has been emphasized in Charles W, Porter, 
The Career of Théophile Delcasse, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 193&), p. 119. Elsie Porter Meade and 
Henry Pearson, An American Soldier and Diplomat, (New York: 
Frederick A, Stokes, 192?), pp. 206-8, 219-20, Baron Pierre 
de Goubertin, "M, Delcasse: A Character Sketch," Fortnightly 
Review. Vol. LVII (January 1, 1902), p. 71,
2The neutrality of France is stressed in Garel Grander 
and William Livezey, The Philippines and the United States. 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,^1951). P* 15» Louis 
Le Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-americaine de 1898 
envisagee au point de vue du droit international public. 
(Paris: A, Pedone, I899), pp, 235-6,
18
19
accepted the development as a fact of international politics.
At the end of the nineteenth century France supported 
the Spanish Empire because of considerations of culture, 
finances and colonial interests. The cultural similarities 
0*" the two countries were obvious. Both nations communicated 
in the Latin language, and both were predominately Roman 
Catholic. In the area of finance, it was estimated that 
between three and five billion French francs were invested 
in Spain in various forms, from which French investors 
received an average annual return of five per cent. At 
least one and one-half billion francs were invested in 
Spanish Government bonds, and an equal sum was in Spanish 
railroad securities.3 This meant that a significant number 
of Frenchmen with financial power had vested interests in 
the future of the Spanish Empire, Faced with the antagonism 
of both England and Germany, Prance hoped to have the diplo­
matic support of Spain in her bid for colonial expansion, 
especially in regard to Morocco.^ Because of the facts of 
geography, the Spanish nation, despite instability and weak­
ness, was an important factor in Morocco's political and 
economic future.
^Porter to Sherman, August 19, 1897, Despatches, Vol. 
114, no 74. Also see Meade and Pearson, Soldier, p. 120,
^This interpretation is emphasized in Robert Neale, 
Great Britain and United States Expansion, I898-I9 0 0, (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, I9 6 6), p. 771 and 
Bertha Leaman, "The Influence of Domestic Policy on Foreign 
Affairs in France, I898-I9 0 5," Journal of Modern History, 
XIV, (December, 1942), pp. 449-301
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Pressure in America for intervention on the side of 
the Cuban revolutionaries existed from the moment of the 
outbreak of hostilities in February, 1895. The following 
year the Spanish Foreign Secretary, fearful of the possi­
bility of an American intervention, requested diplomatic 
support from the European powers. Gabriel Hanotaux, the 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not sympathize with 
the proposal at that time, despite the urging of several 
French officials. Hanotaux, however, did not want to appear 
to lead in the opposition to the Spanish request, and thus 
he encouraged Russia to help prevent any united European 
action. To the Russian Ambassador in Paris Hanotaux said
that he was convinced that "it would be imprudent for Europe
/
to engage in a Demarche that might set all America against 
h e r . "5 The Spanish Government, finding a lack of European 
interest, decided to withdraw her request for aid. Hanotaux 
was pleased, and he is reported to have said, "enfin c'est un 
incident clos."^ But later that year an editorial in Le Temps, 
a paper which generally reflected the government viewpoint, 
suggested that the European powers should join in the attempt 
to oppose American imperialism.?
^Hanotaux to Reverseaux, July 24, I896, Quoted in 
Ernest P. May, Imperial Democracy 1 the Emergence of America 
as a Great Power, (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, Inc.,
1961), p. 2041 and Orestes Ferrara, The Last Spanish Wan 
Revelations in Diplomacy. (New York: Paisley Press, 1937),
pp. 69-70.
^quoted in May, Democracy, p. 204.
?Le Temps, November 12, I896.
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In 1897 there was increased pressure on the American 
Government to help the Cubans dislodge the Spanish from the 
American hemisphere. The European powers looked uneasily 
at the activities of the New York Junta and the American 
"yellow press," As American intervention seemed more likely, 
Secretary Hanotaux became more receptive to the idea of a 
united European action in behalf of Spain. On the margin 
of a diplomatic despatch he wrote: "The United States at
this time are making many enemies, it is something to be 
watched. We could perhaps render a considerable service to 
Spain,"® Hanotaux instructed the French Minister in Madrid 
to express interest to the European diplomats but not to 
make any commitment to Spain,? In a memorandum Hanotaux 
indicated that he wanted to avoid "permanent commitment" 
but that he was "alert to the danger of seeing Spain, con­
vinced that she has nothing to expect from us, knock at 
other doors.10 By this, the shrewd Secretary meant that if 
there was to be a diplomatic advantage from close associa­
tion with Spain, he hoped that Prance would be the one to 
benefit. He realized that there was little hope for a joint 
European effort, for a few years earlier in relation to the
®îte.rgin on a letter from Patenotre to Hanotaux, Ma.y 
2 3, 1897, quoted in May, Democracy, p, 205.
?Hanotaux to Reverseaux, October 26, 1897, quoted in 
May, Democracy, p, 205.
l®Memorandum of October 28, 1897» quoted in May, 
Democracy, p, 205,
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Near Eastern question he had recognized the impotency of 
the Concert of Europe,
A major part of Hanotaux's foreign policy was the 
continuation of a strong Franco-Russian Alliance, and there­
fore the actions of France were influenced by the views of 
the government of Nicholas II. Hanotaux requested the 
Ambassador in St, Petersburg to determine the attitude of 
the Imperial Government in regard to the Cuban question. 
Russia, it was learned, was opposed to even a mild diplo­
matic statement in Spain's behalf. In seeking greater 
power in the Far East, Russia cared little for the welfare 
of Spain, and she did not want to disturb her relations with 
the United S t a t e s , T h i s  information dampened Hanotaux*s 
enthusiasm in the matter. When in December Spain formally 
asked if she could depend on France's participation in a 
joint demarche by the European powers, Hanotaux advised 
Spain not to encourage such a policy for it "could have only 
a purely Platonic character," He cautioned that such a move 
"might wound the pride and arouse the sensibilities of a 
Democracy so little accustomed to diplomatic forms and thus 
produce an effect contrary to the one hoped for,"^^ In this
llunsigned article by Hanotaux, "En Orient," La Revue 
de Paris, April 15» 1959» Vol. VI, pp. 449-461, Langer» 
Imperialism» pp. 162-4,
l^Hanotaux to Montebello, October 21, 18971 Montebello 
to Hanotaux, November 11, 1897» quoted in May, Democracy.
pp. 205—6 , 210—1,
l^Quoted in May, Democracy, p, 206, Prom the French 
archives, but the documentation is not clear.
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mood the Foreign Secretary wrote in a memoj "I am preoccu­
pied with the increased friction between Spain and the United 
States. Is there really nothing that can be done? The 
possibility of a war between the United States and Spain 
becomes probable and more and more dangerous
It should be emphasized that in urging support for 
Spain Hanotaux had in mind only a mild diplomatic statement 
combined perhaps with financial assistance.Never did he 
consider the possibility of a direct threat to the United 
States, and even less did he envision military assistance. 
Hanotaux hoped that a statement of support would add moral 
weight to the policy of Spain and cause the American Govern­
ment to reconsider its position. He believed that there was 
a harmony of interests in Spanish and French colonial expan­
sion, but the encouragement of the Spanish Empire was a very 
limited goal as far as he was concerned— a minor consideration 
in a large and intricate foreign policy. For such a limited 
goal the leader of the Quai d’Orsay was prepared to use only 
very limited means, and this was to remain the French policy 
throughout the Spanish-American conflict.
^^emorandum by Hanotaux, January 26, 1898, quoted in 
May, Democracy, p. 206,
l^on December 15» 1897» Hanotaux told Castillo» the 
Spanish Minister» that "any true intervention must be finan­
cial; from this point of view it might be possible to come 
to the aid of Spain," France, Ministère des affaires étran­
gères, Documents diplomatiques français. 1897, (Paris; Impri­
merie rationale, 1918), Vol. XIV^, p. 46, note 2. Henceforth 
this source shall be cited as DDF.
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The American Government was concerned with the posi­
tion of Prance in the Cuban question. This was especially 
true in January, 1897* when a British correspondent reported 
that France and Russia had promised to intervene in order 
to keep America from going to war.^^ Secretary of State, 
John Sherman, instructed General Horace Porter to investi­
gate the matter. Porter subsequently indicated that there 
was no reason to believe the British allegation. There was 
naturally much sympathy for Spain in France because of their 
“common Latin race," financial investments and similar colon­
ial ambitions, but Porter was convinced that the French Gov­
ernment had “no disposition in her present temper to enter 
any formal protest against such action as the United States 
may be compelled to take to put a stop to the disastrous 
Cuban war,“^7
The German Kaiser, William II, was the first European 
leader seriously to consider giving aid to Spain, To the 
French Ambassador in Berlin he expressed the opinion that 
Europe should act to “put a halt to the aggression of the 
United States,"^® When it came to action, however, the
l^London Times, January 7, 1897,
Importer to Sherman, July 13, 1897, Despatches, Vol. 
114, no, 35. Also letter of August 19, 1897, no, 74,
^®Statement to M, de Reverseaux on December 23, 1897, 
mentioned in DDF, XIV, p, 46, note 27. Also see Johannes 
Lepsius, ed.. Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, 
(Berlin, 1925), Vol. XV, no. 4llS, Henceforth this source 
shall be cited as GP,
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Kaiser was much more cautious than he was in his emotional 
outbursts. Bulow notified the Ambassador in Vienna that 
Germany hoped to support the Spanish Monarchy, but at the 
same time she did not want to provoke an anti-German reaction 
in the United States. The German Government would therefore 
be willing to take a formal stand in behalf of Spain only if 
Austria, Prance, England and Russia would also do s o . The 
Ambassador responded that he was convinced that the Austrian 
Government would be happy to join in opposing the "overseas 
covetousness" of the United States, but he could find no 
indications that Prance and Russia would consider such an 
action.20 Seeing that there was little chance of any united 
effort, the Wilhelmstrasse decided not to push the project. 
Bulow notified the German Ambassador in Madrid that Prance 
must take the lead in any action because of her close poli­
tical, commercial and geographical connections with Spain; 
Germany would be willing to support Prance's lead.21
In January, 1898, it was clear to all informed obser­
vers that there existed a major crisis in Spanish-American 
relations. In this tense situation Hanotaux had a long 
conversation with Leon Y. Castillo, the capable Spanish 
Ambassador to Prance. Castillo asked if the Prench
l^Bulow to Elenburg, September 29» 1897» GP, XV, pp. 3-4. 
2®Elenburg to Bulow, October 1, 1897» Ibid.. pp. 4-5. 
^^Bulow to Radowitz- Pobruary 15» 1898, Ibid..pp. 7-8.
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Government was prepared "to join with the other European 
powers in order to prevent an American intervention in the 
Cuban question, without military force but by diplomacy and 
counsel," But even in such a moderate request Hanotaux 
expressed the opinion that "the Republican Government would 
render Her Majesty a wise counsel in calling her attention 
to the difficulties in forming a common European policy,"
The only optimistic note in the conversation was Hanotaux*s 
observation that President McKinley had consistently opposed 
American intervention in the Cuban question.22 Castillo 
reported to his government that Spain had "the support of 
public opinion and the stock exchange, but that the help we 
can expect from the French Government is very small because 
of Prance's own difficulties with her colonies , , , and the 
care she must exercise , , , in regard to the United States,"23 
In Madrid the Austrian Minister, Count Dubsky, spoke 
to the Queen Regent of the possibility of a European Concert 
in behalf of Spain, and the Ambassadors of Germany and Italy 
appeared to sympathize with the idea, M, Patenotre, the 
French Ambassador, was convinced that none of the three 
powers were willing to go to this extreme, but that they were 
attempting to make it appear that inaction was due to the
22conversation of January 4, I898, DDF, XIV, p. 46, 
note 1.
23Quoted in Ferrara, Revelations, pp. 69-70, from the 
Spanish archives.
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indifference of Russia and France. Patenotre, as directed 
by Hanotaux, made it clear that France had no intention of 
using any force against the United States, but that she 
would only consider participation in a diplomatic statement. 
The Queen Regent and others in the Spanish Government had
A
hopes for the Dubsky proposal, and Patenotre complained,
"it has become rather difficult to explain the impossibility 
of a European intervention.Patenotre was able to talk 
frankly with the Spanish Colonial Secretary, Sigismondo 
Moret, who was the leading spokesman in Spain in behalf of 
an accommodation with the United States. The two men agreed 
that the wisest course of action for Spain was to attempt 
conciliation through the proposed Spanish-American treaty
of commerce. 25
Two incidents in February excited Americans and made 
war almost inevitable. First, the New York Journal published 
the private letter of Mr. Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister 
in the United States, which referred to McKinley as "weak 
and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd." A few days 
after this, on the evening of February 15. the battleship, 
the USS Maine, exploded in Havana harbor with a loss of 260
^Patenotre to Hanotaux, January 23, I898, DDF, XIV, 
no. 2 7, pp. 46-8. Patenotre describes Dubsky as "an inde­
pendent spirit in diplomacy," but it seems that Dubsky rep­
resented the views of Francis Joseph.
^^Patenotre to Hanotaux, February 6, I898, DDF, XIV, 
no. 4 3, pp. 74-6.
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American lives. The French press reflected an awareness of 
the seriousness of the situation but expressed the hope that 
war might yet be avoided. The Journal des debats dismissed 
the de Lome letter as a minor incident of a private nature 
and blamed the Maine disaster on the Cuban revolutionaries,
In the Revue des Deux Mondes Prangois Charmes charged that 
emotions were stirred in the United States because of "jingo­
ism" and the "yellow press," He claimed that Captain Charles 
Sigsbee of the Maine had "attested and recognized immediately 
the accidental character which had befallen his ship."2? 
Likewise, an editorial in Le Temps, a newspaper which gener­
ally reflected the views of the Quai d'Orsay, declared that 
"Cuba is a Royal morsel which tempts a people intoxicated 
with its own strength and convinced that the Monroe Doctrine 
is the Alpha and Omega of international law."28
French diplomatists throughout the world discussed 
the prospects for a Spanish-American war. In London on March 
16 the French Charge d'Affaires, M. G. Geoffray, told the 
British Undersecretary of State; "We consider that a war 
between Spain and the United States would be a major calam­
ity; with our colonies in the West Indies and in Guiana, we
2^Journal des débats, February 17, 1898, February 27,
1898.
27prangois Charmes, "Chronique de la Quinzaine,"
Revue des deux Mondes. March 1, 1898, Vol. CXLVI, pp. 232-3,
28
Le Temps. February 27, 1898.
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are not able to be disinterested in the question. on 
that same day in Paris Secretary Hanotaux had a long con­
ference with General Porter. Hanotaux said that France had 
a great deal of sympathy for Spain because of the "closeness 
of commercial relations." He expressed his conviction that 
Spain was attempting to "find a conclusion to the affair 
consistent with honor," but he stated that his government 
was determined to remain neutral in the matter. General 
Porter believed that President McKinley would be able to 
avoid war, despite the fact that "the independence of Cuba 
was a cause which inflamed all spirits in America." The 
next day the Spanish Ambassador, Castillo, told Hanotaux 
that above everything else Spain desired a peaceful settle­
ment, even if it meant giving up Cuba, In achieving the 
end, Spain would perhaps seek the good offices of "some 
friendly power."30
One of Hanotaux's major sources of information was the 
able French Ambassador in Washington, Jules Cambon. In 
report after report Cambon reported that the President did 
not want war but that he was pushed by Congress and the 
Jingoists. In regard to McKinley he asked, "Is there in 
Europe any statesman, who in daily contact with the passions
Z^Geoffray to Hanotaux, March 16, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV^, 
pp. 148-9.
30nanotaux to Jules Cambon, March 18, 1898, Ibid., 
no. 94, p. 156,
30
of Parliamentf would be able to keep a clear head for such 
a long time?" Cambon believed that the religious issue was 
an important matter in the pressure for war. Many Americans 
were convinced that "the Anglo-Saxons were God’s chosen 
people," and there were the "temples of the narrow pastors, 
accustomed to mock the infallibility of the Pope,"31 Cambon 
feared that England was taking advantage of the situation 
to improve her relations with America, To avoid war he 
suggested that France should use her influence to convince 
Spain to grant independence to Cuba, He was convinced that 
this was the only way that Spain could prevent an American
intervention. 32
On March 25 Hanotaux told a French reporter that the 
Cuban problem "is not our business, but that of Spain and 
the United States," He tended to confirm the rumors that 
France and England would offer mediation, but he emphasized 
France’s determination to maintain "the best and most cordial 
relations with both countries,33 The next day in the Chamber 
of Deputies a Socialist member attacked Hanotaux’s policy 
in the Cuban question. He declared* "France cannot remain
3^Cambon to Hanotaux, April 8, I8 9 8, DDF, Vol. XIV^, 
no, 142, pp, 214-5, Cambon to Hanotaux, March 8, I898, 
Ibid,, p, 126, note 1,
3^Cambon to Hanotaux, March 9, 1898, Ibid,, no, 75»
p, 129,
33i,ondon Times. March 26, I898, New York Herald, 
Paris Edition, March 25» I8 98, A clipping of the latter 
in Despatches» Vol. II6 ,
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indifferent to the Spanish-American conflict and the monstrous 
encroachment of the Anglo-Saxon race on the Latin race. It 
is the duty of Prance to approach the two nations with words 
of conciliation and peace." Hanotaux replied that France 
was determined to maintain friendly relations with both coun­
tries, With Spain there were "ancient and faithful relations, 
good neighborly feelings, affinities of race and interest," 
and the United States was "a powerful Republic, a sister of 
our own," It was therefore France’s hope that there would 
be "an equitable solution of the matter, wherein right, 
honor and liberty may be satisfied," But Hanotaux emphasized 
the fact that his government would not intervene unless it 
were with the consent of both governments. He said that if 
asked France would be willing to offer "impartial advice in 
arriving at a peaceful solution" but that "beyond this it is 
impossible to go," Following the speech Hanotaux*s policy 
was sustained by a vote of 289 to 101,
Americans were happy to have this public statement by 
the French Foreign Minister, especially as it had not been 
officially requested. An editorial in The Ration observed1 
"It is clear now, as it really has been all along to the 
discerning, that France will do nothing beyond expressing 
good wishes and sympathy,"35 General Porter expressed to
3^ashington Post, March 27, I898, Le Temps, March 26, 
I898, Summary of speech in DDF, Vol. XIV^, p, 181, note 1, 
Porter to Sherman, March 3I, I898, Despatches, Vol. II5 , 
no, 199.
35The Nation, March 31» 1898» Vol, LVI, p, 235»
32
Hanotaiix the appreciation of his government. Hanotaux assured 
him that "if the government of the United States judges it 
useful to seek our good offices to facilitate an arrangement 
or obtain counsel, we will gladly co-operate, but we will
do nothing m o r e , "36
Hanotaux*8 speech did not end efforts in Europe to 
find some way to come to the aid of Spain, The leading 
advocate of support was the dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, 
The aged Francis Joseph, convinced that the Monarchs were 
duty bound to support each other, wrote Nicholas II a per­
sonal letter in which he requested that Russia should join 
with the powers in a common demarche,37 The Austrian Minis­
ter in Paris told Hanotaux that Austria was prepared to take 
the initiative in either a military or a diplomatic inter­
vention if she "could count on the adherence of all European 
powers,"3® in Madrid Count Dubsky continued to try to con­
vince his colleagues that a joint action was practical.
Several influential Prench diplomatists favored giving Spain 
limited diplomatic support. In London the French Ambassador, 
Paul Cambon, inquired about the possibility of a joint
3%anotaux to the Ambassadors at Washington, Madrid, 
St, Petersburg, London and Vienna, March 31, I898, DDF, 
Vol. XIVl, no, 112, p, 181,
37paten&tre to Hanotaux, March 30, I898, DDF, Vol, 
Xivl, no, 108, p, 174,
38nanotaux to Patenotre, March 31, I898, Ibid,, no,
111, p, 180,
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declaration which would "avoid ar^rthing which might arouse 
the susceptibilities of the United States" and which would 
be "based on grounds of humanity and on the common interests 
of the powers in averting a conflict which might have deplor­
able consequences."39
In a last desperate effort Spain encouraged the powers 
to make any possible movement in her behalf, no matter how 
weak. On March 25 the Spanish Queen Regent appealed to the 
Russian Tzar, but because Russia had recently annexed Port 
Arthur, the appeal received no serious a t t e n t i o n , T h e  
following week Castillo informed Hanotaux that Spain hoped 
there would be some European demarche even if it were made 
without the unanimity of the powers, Hanotaux answered that 
France’s policy remained the same as explained in his speech 
of March 26, but that he would be open to two suggestions:
"to join in an action which would be unanimous and amicable 
to both Spain and the United States, and secondly, to accept 
any plan for mediation which might be requested by both 
nations," Spain, he cautioned, should not entirely reject 
any of the American demands, but she should "gain time by a 
conciliatory attitude in order to give McKinley the oppor­
tunity to resist the current of jingoism,
39poreign Office to Pauncefote, March 28, 1898, Neale, 
Expansion, p, 14,
®^B/Iay, Democracy, p, 211,
^Conversations reported in Hanotaux to Patenotre, 
March 31» 1898, DDF, Vol, XIV^, no. Ill, p, 180; Hanotaux 
to Montebello, April 4, 1898, Ibid,. no, 122, pp, 193-5»
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In this early period, as later during the war, the 
French press was far less neutral than was the government 
policy. The Journal des dehats declared that an American 
intervention would be "an act of international piracy" for 
there was "no principle of international law which permitted 
one country to interfere in the affairs of another under the 
pretext that civil war was being prolonged on the letter's 
t e r r i t o r y , A  later editorial in the same newspaper stated 
that the congressional pressure for war was "a monument of 
international bad faith,"^3 President McKinley's statements 
of Christian idealism were interpreted as "a sophistry in a 
sentimental form which is so naturally assumed by Americans, 
Charles Benoist in the Revue des deux mondes wrote that if 
war came, it would be the fault of the United States, who 
"invoked the name of 'humanity'" but failed "to act for 
conciliation and peace." Benoist feared that the hour had 
come when "M, Adam's prediction will be realized and the 
apple of Cuba, separated from the Spanish tree, will fall 
upon American ground," Unless the European powers intervene 
there "will be an invasion of the western hemisphere by 
Anglo-Saxon Americans,"^5
Journal des débats. March 7, I898,
43ibid.. April 15, I898.
^Ibid.. April 14, 1898.
^^Charles Benoist, "Chronique de la Quinzaine," Vol, 
CXLVI, April 15, I898, Revue des deux mondes, pp, 956, I5 8.
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Early in April Leo XIII took the leadership in the 
attempt to avoid war, for the Vatican was anxious that Catho­
lic Spain not lose her colonial empire. As instructed by 
the Pope, the popular Archbishop of Minnesota, John Ireland, 
visited McKinley and expressed the Vatican's desire for 
peace. McKinley replied that he shared this desire for 
peace, but that he needed help if he were to withstand the 
increasing strength of the jingoists. Archbishop Ireland 
then went to see Jules Cambon and asked if support for peace 
might be provided by a united statement by the major European 
powers. Ireland suggested that Spain should be given imme­
diate advice to make satisfaction for the Maine and to grant 
an armistice to the Cuban revolutionaries. Ambassador Cambon 
was pessimistic, for he feared that a simple diplomatic 
statement would have little effect on the American Congress. 
He nevertheless agreed to advise his government to follow 
the Archbishop's suggestion, and he immediately telegraphed 
the Quai d'Orsay that President McKinley would welcome a 
European statement favoring peace so long as it were not 
pro-Spanish. Cambon advised Hanotaux that there was a
possibility that a collective European demarche might make 
a "sensitive impression" on the American public.^7
^^Details of Ireland's efforts are in Cambon to Hanotaux, 
April 4, 1898, DDF, Vol. Xivl, no. 124, pp. 196-7. The New 
York Times reported that "there is reason to believe that the 
Pope's influences are being exerted more directly and with 
greater effect at Madrid than at Washington." April 5» 1898.
^7cambon to Hanotaux, April 3# 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV^, 
no, 121, p. 193'
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Hanotaux was encouraged to learn that the American 
president would not oppose a friendly diplomatic statement.
He immediately telegraphed the French Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg! "I desire to be informed as soon as possible 
the attitude of the Imperial Government concerning a possible 
intervention.”^® That same day the Russian Government replied 
that it would be willing to join in a public statement if it 
were unanimous. Learning of this policy change in St. 
Petersburg, Hanotaux authorized Ambassador Cambon to join 
with the representatives of Russia, Germany, England, Italy, 
and Aus tria -Hungary in a join;, statement "which would attempt 
to encourage in an amicable spirit the Federal Government to 
arrive at an entente with Spain." Hanotaux emphasized: "In
any case be careful that any demarche be neutral and disin­
terested, and avoid any wording which might be interpreted 
to mean that we wish to take the side of Spain.
On April 6 the six representatives at Washington 
assembled at the British Embassy and jointly drafted an 
appeal to the American Government. Before delivering the 
note the British and French Ambassadors met with Assistant 
Secretary of State William Day to discuss the wording.
^®Hanotaux to de Montbello, April 4, I8 9 8, Ibid.. 
no. 122, pp. 193-4.
^^Hanotaux to Cambon, April 4, I8 9 8, Ibid,. no. 125,
pp. 197-8 .
50Hanotaux to Cambon, April 4, I8 9 8, Ibid.. no. 125» 
T)X)e 197-8 . Cambon to Hanotaux, April 5, 1896. Ibid.. no.
1 2 9, pp. 202-3.
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Cambon noted that as Day read the statement he mumbled,
"good, very good,"51 Day did make several suggestions for 
changes which were u s e d , 52 The final form of the appeal was 
entirely friendly in tone; it merely expressed the pious 
desire that the United States would use moderation and show 
concern for "humanity at large," The following day the six 
diplomats went to the White House to deliver their message. 
In a short statement President McKinley declared that he 
shared the desire for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban 
problem and that he recognized "the good will which moti­
vates this amicable communication." But he added that the 
United States was determined to see a permanent end to the 
matter even if it required an American intervention. The 
delegation then visited Secretary of State Sherman, who also 
expressed appreciation for the demarche,53
Ambassador Cambon was convinced that the common state­
ment by the six powers had been wise "even if, it probably 
would have little effect," A manifestation for peace had 
been made so that "no one could accuse Europe of indifference 
or d i v i s i o n , T h e  British Ambassador was more optimistic.
51cambon to Hanotaux, April 6, 1898, DDF, Vol, XIV^, 
no, 136, pp, 208-9 ,
52campbell, Understanding, p, 32,
53cambon to Hanotaux, April 6, I898, DDF, Vol, XIV^, 
no, 136, pp, 208-9 ,
5^Cambon to Hanotaux, April 8, I898, Ibid,, no, 142, 
pp, 214-5,
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and he expressed the hope to his government that the action 
would have a "moderating influence" on American policy.55 
The London Times, on the other hand, feared that "the action 
of the European Legations has, in fact contributed,to 
strengthen rather than weaken the war party of the United 
States and the hamper the President's policy of moderation 
and r e s e r v e , "58 in hindsight, it appears that the appeal 
had little of either a positive or negative result. The 
historian Ernest May notes: "Few historians of the period
have even thought it worthwhile to mention the collective 
demarche in Washington, Despite its seeming consequences, 
this joint demarche represented Europe's one united response 
to the emergence of America as a power,"57
The Spanish Government on April 9 attempted to appease 
the United States by ordering a temporary suspension of 
military action in Cuba, Le Temps expressed the view that 
this action "removes from the Washington cabinet all the 
so-called humanitarian pretext for any indecent haste,"5®
But the Spanish concession did not have much effect on 
American policy. Two days after it was made President 
McKinley recommended to Congress that he be authorized to
55campbell, Understanding, p, 32, 
5®London Times, April 8, 1898, 
57jflay, Democracy, p, 181,
5®Le Temps, April 11, 1898.
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use armed forces to the extent that would be necessary to 
obtain a pacification of Cuba, On the day of McKinley's 
speech the Spanish Ambassador in Paris suggested to Hanotaux 
that the European powers should join in making a second 
appeal in Washington, Hanotaux was opposed to this idea.
He said that all of the powers except Austria-Hungary 
believed that a second demarche would be unwise. It was 
feared that "the effect would be to excite the passions 
of the American people, and perhaps to put an end to the 
struggle between the Congress and the President,"^9
In Washington on April 14 the representatives of the 
six powers met again at the British Embassy to discuss the 
possibility of a second diplomatic statement. The British 
Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, had already prepared a 
second draft note which expressed the hope that the United 
States would give proper attention to the latest Spanish 
concession. The representatives with one exception did not 
have permission from their governments to make a second 
appeal, and any action would therefore require approval from 
the six capitals. The representatives decided to recommend 
that an appeal would have additional moral weight if made 
directly by the Foreign Ministers of the respective govern­
ments, Jules Cambon was given the task of writing a telegram 
which would attempt to encourage the six governments In this
59perrera, Revelations, pp, 140, 148, Prom the 
Spanish archives.
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direction. Gambon's text was much more critical of the
American position than Pauncefote*s note. Among other things
Cambon stated*
The attitude of Congress, as well as the resolution 
that the House of Representatives approved yester­
day by a large majority, leaves little hope for 
peace . . . .  The memorandum by the Spanish Minister 
presented last Sunday appears to offer a base for 
a reasonable arrangement and eliminates all legiti­
mate causes for war . . . .  In these conditions, the 
representatives of the great powers in Washington 
estimate that their respective governments could 
well call the attention of the United States to 
the memorandum of the Spanish Minister and make 
it known that their approval would not be given 
to an armed intervention that appears to them 
to be entirely unjustified.
Austria-Hungary was the only nation enthusiastic to 
act upon the Cambon note. Emperor Francis Joseph would have 
been willing to appeal unilaterally to the United States, 
but the Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski, convinced him 
that any unilateral action could not help Spain and might 
harm Austria. The French Government did not especially 
favor Gambon's suggestions, but it was willing to go along 
if the action would be unanimous. Le Temps declared that 
"any nation which would assume by itself the responsibility 
of sustaining Spain and making itself an enemy of the United 
States would injure in a most serious way its most essential 
interests."61 The British Government cautiously agreed to
^®Cambon to Hanotaux, April 14, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIVl, 
no. 153f pp. 226-7. Also see Campbell, Understanding, p. 34. 
Ferrera is correct when he writes that the note was "a joint 
action by the representatives." Revelations, p. 146.
^^Le Temps. April 16, I898.
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support a second united statement, but Lord Balfour complained 
that the representatives in Washington "appear to wish to 
give the United States a lecture on international m o r a l i t y . "^2 
It was the German Government which blocked all possibility 
for a second appeal. The Kaiser wrote in a marginal note*
"I think it perfectly mistaken, pointless, and therefore 
harmful* we would badly damage our American relations.
Bulow informed Austria that Germany would not participate in 
any demarche, and Hanotaux immediately followed Germany's 
example.
Following the failure to obtain a second appeal,
Francis Joseph thanked France for her support in the effort.
He said that "only France has appeared as a sincere friend 
of Spain, and her support has succeeded in again joining the 
close relations between Austria and France."65 But in fact 
France had not pushed the proposal to the extent which this 
statement would indicate. Perhaps the Austrian Emperor was 
referring to the fact that Ambassador Cambon had written an 
anti-American statement, but more likely the expression of 
gratitude was nothing more than a diplomatic formality
62B.E.C. Dugsdale, Balfour, Vol. 1, p. 192.
63bu1ow to William, April 16, I8 9 8, GP, XV, no. 4l40, 
no. 4l4l.
64Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten 
Staaten in der Weltpolitik. (New York* The Macmillan Co., 
1935)» Vol. II, p. 1305» May, Democracy, p. 219.
65Reverseaux, Ambassador to Vienna, to Hanotaux, April 
1 9, 1898, DDF, Vol. Xivl, no. I6 5, p. 239.
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designed to improve Franco-Austrian relations. In any case, 
the demarche was not made because no European nation wanted 
to permanently damage its position with the United States.
As the historian Robert Neale was written: "It was chiefly
to the rivalries and ambitions of the European powers that 
America owed her freedom of a c t i o n . "&6
On April 19 the American Congress passed a joint reso­
lution that Cuba was independent. The resolution demanded 
that Spain withdraw from the island and authorized the 
President to use all force necessary to see that this was 
done. The next day the President signed the resolution and 
sent the Spanish Government a formal ultimatum which allowed 
only three days to comply with the American demand. The 
Queen Regent was not willing to capitulate in this fashion, 
and on April 21 the Spanish Government recalled the Spanish 
Minister from Washington,^7 President McKinley answered by 
withdrawing the American Minister from Madrid. In addition 
he proclaimed a blockade around the northern coast of Cuba.^8 
The American Congress on April 25 passed a decree that a state 
of war had existed since the time when Spain had severed her 
diplomatic relations with the United States.
^^Neale, Expansion, p. 213.
87woodford to Sherman, April 21, 1898, FR, 1898, p. 76?.
^^Proclamation of April 22, 1898, in A Compilation of 
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (New York: Bureau
of National Literature, 1911), Vol. XIV,pp. 6472-3»
CHAPTER III 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR— II
Without the benefit of diplomatic representation in 
Washington, it was necessary for Spain to seek the good 
offices of a neutral third party which would protect Spanish 
subjects and interests in the United States, Ambassador 
Cambon on April 22 notified Secretary Sherman that the 
diplomatic machinery of both France and Austria-Hungary had 
been assigned this task at the request of Spain, Austria 
was given charge of the Spanish archives in Washington, and 
Cambon was to have the major diplomatic burden for the dura­
tion of the conflict. Supervision of the Spanish Consular 
Service was divided between Prance and Aus tria-Hungary 
according to geographical location,^ The United States 
quickly gave "provisional acceptance" to the offer of the 
two countries to represent Spain, Sherman wrote Cambon that 
the arrangement would be used so long as it "contemplates 
only the friendly offices of yourself and your esteemed 
colleague,= ,"2
Gambon to Sherman, April 22, I8 98, FR, I89 8, p, 785, 
2sherman to Cambon, April 251 1898, FR, I898, pp,
786-7 .
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The selection of Jules Cambon as the key diplomatic 
representative was a happy choice, and a choice not made by 
accident. Cambon was recognized as one of the most able 
members of the French foreign service. He had many impor­
tant friends in America, and he enjoyed good relations with 
the McKinley administration. Yet Gambon's sympathies were 
definitely on the side of Spain— as demonstrated by his note 
of April 14, It is interesting that he was against France's 
assuming Spanish diplomacy during the conflict. Especially 
he advised against a combined responsibility with Austria- 
Hungary because of the fact that the two nations had "marched 
hand in hand to uphold Emperior Iteiximillan,"^ But after 
receiving official directions from Paris, Cambon exerted all 
of his capacities in behalf of the interests of Spain. 
Throughout the conflict he firmly upheld the Spanish position. 
The Department of State well understood that this was his 
job, and despite many differences, the relations between 
Cambon and American officials remained friendly, Elihu Root 
later referred to Cambon as the "ideal Ambassador" and the 
"sympathetic representative and defender of Spain,
3cambon to Hanotaux, May 6, I898, DDF, Vol. XIV^, 
no, 1 7 9f p. 2 6 3,
^Elihu Root, Miscellaneous Addresses, edited by Robert 
Bacon and James Scott, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1917),,PP* 143, 7, Delcasse ^ater praised Gambon's work. 
Ministère des affaires étrangères. Documents diplomatiques 1 
Négociations pour la paix entre l'Es-pagne et les Etets-Unis. 
(ParisI Imprimerie Nationale, 1898), August 13, I898, no. I6 ,
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There was never any doubt but that Prance would main­
tain an official position of neutrality during the conflict, 
and on April 2? an official proclamation of neutrality was 
issued. The declaration warned all French citizens to "re­
frain from all acts which, committed in violation of French 
or international law, could be considered as hostile to one 
of the parties or as contrary to a scrupulous neutrality." 
Frenchmen were forbidden to enroll in the armies of either 
belligerent; no ship of war was to be permitted to enter a 
French harbor for more than twenty-four hours except in the 
case of a forced delay; and no prizes of war were to be sold 
on French territory. Any person disobeying one of these 
restrictions would be acting contrary to the laws of France, 
and he would not be protected from punishment by the belli­
gerent.5 This declaration was typical of the declarations 
of the other powers, and it was routine in nature. Only 
Germany, who did not have a custom of making declarations of 
neutrality, failed to issue a similar statement.
Early in May the Spanish Government desperately attempted 
to convince one of the European powers to offer mediation 
to help end the war. The French Ambassador in Russia, M. 
Montbello, was convinced by his Spanish colleague that the 
idea was practical, and he suggested to Hanotaux that France 
could at least give President McKinley a secret offer of
^Journal Official. April 27, 1898. Porter to Day, 
April 27, 1898, FR, 1698, pp. 862-3.
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mediation. He believed that it might work because neither 
Spain or the United States had sufficient interests at 
stake to justify the expenses of a long war.6 Secretary 
Hanotaux was interested in the suggestion, but he believed 
that the idea was "premature.” He did go so far as to 
request the French Ambassador in Madrid to find out if the 
Spanish Government might be willing to make more concessions.7 
The Spanish Government had no new proposals to make, and 
Hanotaux quickly dropped the idea of mediation.® But in the 
press there were rumors of a possible united European effort 
at mediation. An American correspondent in Paris investigated 
the rumors and reported that they were unfounded. He wrote: 
"The powers have determined not to intervene until after a 
decisive blow, and then only if asked by one of the belli­
gerents. "9
General Porter maintained very close relations with 
Hanotaux, and he never doubted the latter*s determination to 
continue a policy of n e u t r a l i t y . I n  June Porter reported
^Montbello to Hanotaux, May 11, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV^, 
no. 188, pp. 279-81.
*7 A
'Hanotaux to Patenotre, May 12, 1898, Ibid.. no. 189,
pp. 281-2.
®Ibid.. p. 282, note 1.
^The Daily Chronicle. May 4, 1898, Clipping in Hay 
scrapbook.
lOsoth Porter and Hanotaux emphasized their personal 
friendship. See "Le General Porter et l'affaire de Cuba," 
a letter by Hanotaux written on July 2?» 1927, in Meade, 
Porter, pp. 202-3.
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in a despatch: "Spain has made most urgent efforts to have
the powers intervene in her behalf but in this part of Europe 
there is no such thing seriously contemplated, and she now 
seems to have abandoned all hope in that direction.
Porter expressed faith in Hanotaux's promise that "the 
policy of his country was definitely settled to observe a 
strict and impartial neutrality."12 jn late June the 
government of which Hanotaux was a member was forced to 
resign, and the direction of the Quai d*Orsay was turned 
over to Théophile Delcasse, a former disciple of Gambetta 
and an admirer of the American form of government. Shortly 
after the change in power. Porter had a frank discussion 
with Delcasse. According to Porter the new Foreign Minister 
"said very emphatically that it would be his purpose to 
observe the strictest and most impartial neutrality in the 
present war." In addition he expressed the hope that his 
relations with the American Ambassador would be "frank, 
intimate and cordial."13 Delcasse always acted in confor­
mity with this stated purpose, and it is clear that the
llporter to Hitchcock, Ambassador to Russia, June 25. 
1898, Porter Papers, Box 3.
^^Porter to Day, June 29, 1898, Despatches, Vol. Il6, 
no. 284.
13porter to Day, July 5i 1898, Ibid.. no. 290. Day 
again asked Porter to investigate the reports of a possible 
offer at mediation. Day to Porter, July 14, I898, Records of 
the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions: France,
pp. 69-7 0. Henceforth this source shall be cited as Instruc­
tions.
48
shift from Hanotaiix to Delcasse did not have any significant 
effect on French policy in regard to the Spanish-American 
war.l^
The financial closeness of France and Spain presented 
the most potentially dangerous situation in Franco-American 
relations. To finance the war it was necessary for Spain 
to rely on foreign loans, and the greater part of these loans 
came from France. In May Spain borrowed forty million 
francs from the Banque de Paris and was attempting to make 
another loan of 250 million f r a n c s . G e n e r a l  Porter did 
all that he could to see that French leaders realized the 
American objection to such a loan, but American military 
success eliminated the problem. By July it was impossible 
for Spain to obtain a large loan in France. Happy with the 
development. Secretary Day wrote that this was one indication 
of the "ruined condition of Spain and of Spanish finances.
The American Government never objected to the Spanish loans, 
for it was well recognized that the floating of such loans 
was not against the accepted principles of international law. 
They were made by French individuals and never by the French
^^%ay. Democracy, p. 233»
^^Porter to Day, May 24, I898, Despatches, Vol. II6 , 
no. 2 57.
^^Day to Porter, July 5» 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24,
p. 61.
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Government, even though it was believed that early in the 
war the government encouraged the loans.17
Although neutral, the French Government was somewhat 
anxious at the prospects of the United States becoming a 
colonial power. Always the government tried to use a 
limited amount of influence to discourage American imperial­
ism, especially in regions near the French Empire, Neither 
the government nor the press was especially concerned about
IQ
the annexation of Hawaii. But the Canary Islands were 
another matter. In May, Cambon informed the foreign office 
of rumors that the United States was considering the annex­
ation of these islands. He pointed out that this move would 
"make vulnerable" the French possessions of North Africa 
and S e n e g a l . 19 The French Council of Ministers was suffi­
ciently concerned about the matter to send a squadron of 
war ships to the Canaries "with the mission to observe the 
events."29 In June the Washington Post suggested that the 
Canaries as well as the Balearic Islands should be made into 
American colonies, and Cambon informed Paris that this
17Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy 
of the Spanish-American War. (Baltimoret Johns Hopkins Press,
1906), pp. 215-6.
^®Elizabeth Brett White, American Opinion of France : 
From Lafayette to Poincare. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
192 7), p. 225.
l^Cambon to Hanotaux, May 6, DDF, Vol. XIV^, no. 179, 
p. 264,
20lbid., p. 298, note 3.
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newspaper generally supported the point of view of the 
administration,21 In an interview with McKinley Cambon 
expressed the conviction that all Europe would be "uncom­
fortable" if the United States acquired the islands. Cambon 
feared that this conversation would have little affect on 
American policy, for Americans were "indifferent to consi­
derations which dominate European relations,"22 The French 
Government never made a formal statement about the possible 
American acquisition of the Canaries, If the United States 
had decided to act in this direction it seems certain that 
there would have been no effective opposition from France, 
There was one basic reason for France's hesitancy to 
oppose directly the actions of the United States--the 
European colonial rivalry. In I898 France's major problem 
was with England in the upper Nile and in Morocco, France 
was nervous at the appearance of a rapprochement in American- 
British relations, and some Frenchmen even went so far as to 
suggest that there could be an alliance between the two 
Anglo-Saxon nations. But the leaders in the Quai d'Orsay 
did not ever seriously believe that this development was 
possible, 23 The greatest difficulty between France and
21
June
2%ashington Post, June 14-, I898, Cambon to Hanotaux, 
24, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV^, no, 240, pp, 354-5.
22Cambon to Delcasse, July 8, I898, DDF, Vol. XIV^, 
no, 249, p, 373.
23]way, Democracy, p, 233.
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England took place at the famous Pashoda crisis. From the 
time of Lord Kitchner's arrival at Pashoda in September 
until the retreat of General Marchand in November the two 
nations stood at the brink of war. In the year I898 it was 
obviously not in the interests of Prance to antagonize the 
United States. The diplomatic official, Maurice Paleologue, 
feared that there might be a war between Prance and England, 
and for this reason he was anxious to have better relations 
with the American Government. In his diary he complained* 
"Hanotaux seems to me to be too outspoken in favor of the 
Spanish p o s i t i o n . T h e  historian Christian Schefer makes 
a valid point when he writes that Prance wanted the friend­
ship of the United States as insurance against Britain.
Because of the subjective nature of international law 
the rights and duties of neutral powers is an area which is 
troublesome in every war. This was true in the Spanish- 
American war, but the best historical work of the subject 
concludes that "in general the war was noteworthy for the 
small degree of friction with n e u t r a l s , T h e  close Com­
mercial relations between Spain and France made it almost 
inevitable that the latter would have some disagreements
2^hWaurice Paleologue, Journal de l'affaire Dreyfus. 
1894-1899. (Paris* Librairie Pion, 1955), p. 9»
25christian Schefer, D'une guerre à l'autre, (Paris* 
Felix Alcan, 1920), pp, 229-30,
26Benton, Law, p. 218.
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with the United States. But these differences were never 
of great magnitude. The main reason for this was the short 
duration of the conflict. If it had dragged on for a num­
ber of years there would certainly have been many more 
unpleasant difficulties in Franco-American diplomacy.
When war was declared, France, being a commercial 
nation, was anxious to learn of America's policy in regard 
to the neutral powers. This was especially true in light 
of the fact that the United States was one of the few powers 
which had never ratified the Declaration of Paris of I856.
On April 26 President McKinley issued a proclamation notify­
ing the neutrals that the American Government would adhere 
to the Declaration of Paris during the conflict, McKinley's 
Proclamation obligated the United States to observe four 
important principles 1 1) the neutral flag covers the enemy's
goods except for articles of contraband; 2) neutral goods 
except for contraband, would not be subject to confiscation;
3) a blockade to be binding must be effective; and 4) the 
right of search would be exercised in conformity with the 
right of neutrals, and mail steamers would not be interferred 
with except "on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a vio­
lation of law in respect of contraband or blockade,"^7 During 
the course of the war each of these four principles was to
^^Proclamation in A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents. Vol. XIV^, pp, 6474-5. There are 
six articles in the proclamation.
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be important in interpreting the neutrality difficulties 
between France and the United States.
The first Franco-American disagreement concerning 
neutral rights resulted from the capture of the French mail 
vessel, the Lafayette. This packet boat left La Corogne on 
April 23 on its regular route to Havana Harbor. Since the 
proclamation of the blockade of Northern Cuba had been 
announced by McKinley only the day before, the captain of 
the Lafayette had not had the opportunity to learn of the 
existance of the blockade. The owner of the ship, antici­
pating the difficulty, asked Ambassador Cambon to request 
a special leave of entrance. On May 2 Cambon explained the 
situation to Secretary of State Day, and the latter tele­
graphed orders to Admiral Sampson to allow the vessel to 
enter port. But for some unknown reason the orders did not 
reach their destination. On May 6 the Lafayette was cap­
tured as a prize of war and taken to Key West to be s o l d . 28 
Ambassador Cambon was notified of the incident, and he imme­
diately demanded to the Secretary of State that the vessel 
be r e l e a s e d . 29 That same day orders were sent to Key West 
for the release. Because of this prompt release of the 
Lafayette the affair did not cause any great difficulty in
28cambon to Day, May 7» 1898, Records of the Department 
of State, Notes from the French Legation in the United States, 
Vol. 4l. Henceforth this source shall be cited as Notes.
29cambon to Day, May 6, I898, Ibid.,
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Franco-American relations, but it did create some irritation 
in France. Cambon wrote to Secretary Day that the incident 
had been "unfortunate** and that "it could have been falsely 
interpreted by the French Government," He advised that in 
the event of a similar situation the French Embassy should 
be notified more promptly of American intentions.3^
Greater difficulties arose with the capture of the 
Olinde Rodrigues on July 23• This mail steamer was taken 
as a prize of war nine miles from San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
while on its regular route from Port-au-Prince to Le Havre, 
France. Cambon protested this seizure as "arbitrary" and in 
violation of the principles of McKinley's proclamation on 
neutral r i g h t s . B u t  as it turned out the matter was quite 
complex. The Olinde Rodrigues left Le Havre on June 16 on 
its regular voyage, and eleven days later McKinley announced 
the blockade of San Juan, Puerto Rico, On July 4 the vessel 
failed somehow to meet the American blockade and entered the 
San Juan port. The next day, as the steamer left port, she 
was stopped by an American man of war. Because of the cir­
cumstances, the Olinde Rodrigues was not captured, but the 
American captain entered an official warning of the blockade 
on her log book. When, on July 23, the same vessel was 
headed in the direction of San Juan it was assumed that she
3®Cambon to Day, May 9 ,  1 8 9 8 ,  Ibid.. 
3^Cambon to Day, July 25, 1 8 9 8 ,  Ibid.
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was attempting to run the blockade, and she was seized as a 
prize of war and taken to Charlestown, South Carolina, The 
legality of the capture was a matter to be decided by prize 
courts, which in America are the regular federal courts.
The fate of the Olinde Rodrigues was decided on the 
basis of two legal principles: the "effectiveness” of the
blockade and the "intent to enter" of the blockade runner.
The District Court in Charlestown first decided that the 
blockade of one warship was ineffective and therefore not 
binding. The intentions of the vessel were not considered 
in the decision. The Attorney General did not want this 
principle to become a precedent, and he appealed the case 
to the Supreme Court, The highest court reversed the deci­
sion on the basis that the blockade was "practically effective" 
in the circumstances. The court said in effect that the 
blockade had not been effective against a military fleet, 
but that it was sufficient to prohibit entrance of unarmed 
commercial vessels. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the 
position of the lower court that the vessel be restored to 
the owner on the basis that "intent to enter" on the part 
of the Olinde Rodrigues had not been proven. Because of the 
"suspicious circumstances" connected with the steamer's near­
ness to San Juan, the court decided that all expenses and 
losses resulting from the capture should be paid by the
56
French owner,Fr e n c h m e n  were unhappy with American action 
in the matter, Cambon believed that the United States 
should pay an indemnity of $10,000 to the owner because 
his daughter had become sick in Charlestown,The French 
historian Le Fur accused the American Government of "obsti- 
nancy in an affair where all the presumptions were in favor 
of the seized vessel,"3^ Probably Hanotaux had reference to 
the incident when he later wrote i *'I saw the hour when, 
because of a matter without importance, we were almost 
pushed to a rupture* this was one of the worst moments of 
my ministerial career,"35
A third French mail steamer, the Manoubia, was cap­
tured eight miles north of Puerto Rico on July 25* The ship 
had orders to go to Sagua la Grande, a small Cuban port 
which was not within the area of the American blockade. On 
route the Ifanoubia was stopped and searched by an American 
man of war. The American commander did not possess a good
32James B, Scott (ed.). Prize Cases Decided in the 
United States Supreme Court, 1789-1910, Vol, III, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1923)» pp. 1863-1884, John B, Moore, 
"Maritime Law in the War with Spain," Political Science 
Quarterly, XV, (September, 1900), p, 420.
33cambon to Day, May 25, I898, Notes, Vol. 42.
3^ouis Le Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-ftmericaine 
de 1898 envisagée au point de vue du droit international 
public. (Paris*A. Pedone, IÔ9 9), p. 200. This anti-Ameri- 
can work is based on French and Spanish sources. For the 
other point of view see Benton, Law, p, 20?,
35Gabriel Hanotaux, la France vivante* en Amérique 
du nord, Paris * Librairie Hachette et cie, 1913)* p. 146.
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knowledge of the geography of the blockade, and finding 
that the steamer's destination was Cuba, he took it as a 
prize of war to Charlestown harbor. The Manoubia was not 
forced to appear before a prize court, but it was made to 
remain in quarantine for a period of six days. The basis 
for this action is not clear. Ambassador Cambon vigorously 
protested the matter to the Department of State, He wrote* 
"My government is beginning to be justly uneasy of American 
policy in regard to the unreasonable measures of severity 
such as those to which the Olinde Rodrigues and the Manoubia
have been subjected,"36
It was no secret that French industries supplied a 
large percentage of the Spanish war armaments. The American 
and French governments disagreed concerning the duty of the 
neutral government in controlling the sale of such goods to 
a belligerent. The most dramatic of the differences was the 
case of the Carlos V , a Spanish man-of-war which was fur­
nished gun-mounts by a Havre firm. The mounts were designed 
especially for the Carlos V while the vessel was in the port 
of Havre, and they were sold to Spain after the ship had 
left France, The United States protested that the action 
was practically the same as arming the vessel in a French 
port, Hanotaux responded that "the state of neutrality does 
not make it necessary to interfere with the commerce of its
36cambon to Day, August 2, I898, Notes, Vol, 41.
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citizens who remain entirely free to carry on, at their own 
risks and perils, all commercial operations." In a long 
memorandum he cited the precedent of British tradition as 
well as the statements of Thomas Jefferson.37 The Depart­
ment of State argued that there was a basic difference in 
ordinary contraband and articles of war measured for a 
specific man-of-war in a French harbor.3® Hanotaux conceded 
this theoretical distinction, but he argued that in practice 
it was impossible for the Foreign Office to know if arms 
were being sent to a particular man-of-war or to the Spanish 
navy in general. He therefore refused to take any respon­
sibility in the matter.39 The United States continued to
protest the French policy, and the two sides never reached
an agreement on this subject, which was made academic in 
nature by the American military success.
A few French companies hoped to sell ships to Spain
through the use of a third party. In May the American Con­
sulate at Bordeaux obtained information that the transatlan­
tic steamer, the Chateau lafitte, had been sold to Spain in 
this way. General Porter protested the matter to Hanotaux
3?Hanotaux to Porter, April 26, I898, Despatches,
Vol. 115.
38porter to Hanotaux, April 28, I898, Ibid.
39porter to Day, April 28, I898, Ibid.. no. 228.
^Oporter to Day, May 7, I8 98, Despatches, Vol. II6 , 
no. 242. Day to Porter, May 29, I898, Instructions, Vol. 24, 
pp. 33-4.
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and asked that the steamer should not be allowed to leave 
the Bordeaux Port before there could be an investigation.
Not long after this Hanotaux reported that his investigations
A
revealed that the Chateau lafitte had not been sold and was 
not for s a l e , I t  is not clear if this was a result of 
governmental pressure or if the Bordeaux consulate was 
badly informed, Hanotaux requested information on the 
policy of the Federal Government in such matters. Secretary 
Day replied that "the Department is inclined to treat each 
case upon its special circumstances rather than to attempt 
to anticipate the cases that may arise," As was customary 
in international law the United States did not hold the 
French Government responsible for the sale of contraband 
"in the ordinary course of commerce," But the sale of ships 
or arms were not to be included in this category, for the 
sale of these goods were interpreted as the same as "the 
setting on foot of an hostile expedition,"^3 Later that 
summer the Department of State learned that in Le Havre a 
ship was being built to be given to the Spanish navy. Funds 
were donated by the Association of Spanish Patriots of 
Argentina, Day sent Porter the instructions: "You are to
^^Porter to Hanotaux, May 10, I898, Despatches, Vol, 
1 16, Porter to Moore, May 11, I8 9 8, Ibid,
^2porter to Day, May 21, I8 9 8, Ibid,, no, 25 6,
^3Day to Porter, June 21, I8 9 8, Instructions, Vol,
24, pp, 49-5 0,
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keep in communication with our Consul at Le Havre, and to 
see that the ship does not pass into the hands of the 
Spanish Government during the continuation of the state 
of war."^^ But the co-operation of the Quai d*Orsay was 
not necessary in this instance. The ship was not finished 
in time to help Spain.
During the course of the war a number of Frenchmen 
accumulated financial grievances against the United States. 
The French citizen's only means of obtaining redress was 
through the American courts, and in most instances these 
legal suits were not successful. Several landowners in 
the West Indies suffered property damage caused by American 
military campaigns. Much of this damage resulted from 
"unauthorized action of individual soldiers acting, not 
in the performance of orders, but in violation of the 
military code," and the Federal Government assumed no respon­
sibility in this c a t e g o r y . Undersea telegraph cables 
belonging to the Compagnie Française des Cables Télégraph­
iques were destroyed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila.
The House committee on war claims recommended that $77,712 
be paid to the French company, and both the President and 
Secretary of State recommended that Congress pass the
^^ *Day to Porter, July 19, 1898, Ibid.. p. 72. Day 
to Porter, August 30, I898, Ibid., p. Ô5 .
Bacon to Jusserand, October 4, I9 0 7, FR, I9 0 7» pp. 
396-7 . Jusserand to Root, August 4, I9 0 6, Notes, Vol. 4o.
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appropriation. The House was slow in the matter and the 
French Government expressed considerable i r r i t a t i o n , I t  
was not until late in I903 that the appropriation was 
finally passed,
French public opinion, as expressed in newspapers 
and magazines, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Spanish 
position during the war. The historian Louis M, Sears was 
the first to seriously study this topic, and he reported 
that "a search in the library of Congress on material bearing 
on the subject reveals not a single utterance by any French­
man which could be viewed as genuinely friendly to the 
United States,"^? One American journalist, returning from 
Europe in the summer of I8 9 8, wrote that to cross the English 
channel from England into France "was almost like going from 
one's own into the enemy's country," In France he found 
"bitter hostility" to the American position, but in England 
"everybody, classes and masses, rich and poor, are with the 
A m e r i c a n s , H o r a c e  Porter on a number of occasions talked 
to Foreign Minister Hanotaux of the implications of this
iié
Jusserand to Hay, February 19, 1903, March 12, I9 0 3, 
March 12, I9 0 3, Ibid., Vol, 44, Memorandum of the French 
Embassy, July 20, I9 0 3, Ibid, Benton, Law, p. 211,
Louis M, Sears, "French Opinion of the Spanish-Amer­
ican War," Hispanic American Historical Review, VII (Feb,, 
1927), p. 2 5, Although some material was overlooked, this 
remains the best study of the subject. Because of the broader 
character of this chapter, I have not quoted as extensively 
as does Sears in his article.
48New York Times, July 1, I898,
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state of things. Always Hanotaux claimed that anti-American­
ism was a minority position which did "not represent the 
government nor the mass of the people," and he said that 
his government was "anxious to change the tone of what would 
seem to be the public sentiment.
French journalists were often intemperate in their 
denunciations of the United States. A popular political 
cartoon in France pictured the American Republic as a wolf 
and Spain as a defenseless lamb; a caption asked, "Will the 
might make right again?"50 paul Fauchille, an authority on 
international law, claimed that the United States had begun 
"a war of pure ambition." "Today it is Cuba that they claim," 
he warned, "Tomorrow it will be the rest of the Antilles, and 
then everything else of the continent that they do not 
possess."51 Most French journalists were content to criticize 
American policy, and very few went so far as to suggest that 
France should give military support to Spain. There were 
some writers who expressed understanding, if not approval, 
for the American position. Charles Benoist wrote L*Espagne. 
Cuba et les Etats-Unis while the war was still in progress.
^^Porter to Day, May 24, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116,
5®From La Silhouette, quoted in the Review of Reviews. 
July, 1898.
51pauchille was the editor of Revue générale de droit 
international privé, quoted in Maurice de Beaumarchais, La 
doctrine de Monroe: l'évolution de la politique des Etats-
Unis au XIX^ siècle, (Paris; Maison L. Larose et Foreel, 
1898), p. 166.
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and while clearly a supporter of Spain, he recognized that 
the United States had special interests in Cuba as a result 
of geographical propinquity.52 a writer for the Militaire 
also recognized the validity of the principle of le droit de 
voisinage. The writer noted that most Frenchmen considered 
Spain to be "a victim of aggression," but he believed that 
the history of the United States indicated that the nation 
did not wish to begin a program of colonial imperialism,53 
In the French press one conwtant theme was the possi­
bility of an Anglo-American alliance as a result of the 
war. The Fashoda crisis naturally intensified this fear. 
Francois Charmes in an editorial in the Revue des Deux Mondes 
wrote; "The first success of the United States, or the 
Anglo-Saxon race, against Spain, or the Latin race, have 
produced an unhealthful intoxication in the British imagina­
tion, and Mr, Chamberlain entertains this sentiment more 
each day."5^ The anti-Semitic paper, the Libre Parole, 
stated that the Spanish-American war demonstrated that "the 
very basis of the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant mind was extreme 
hatred for the Latin race and Catholicism."55 The moderate
52charles Benoist, L*Espagne. Cuba, et les Etats-Unis. 
(Paris; Perrin et Cie, 1696), p. 123.
53«La guerre actuelle," Militeire. May 4, I898, clip­
ping from the Hay scrapbook, book 45*
5^rançois Charmes, "Chronique de la quinzaine," Revue 
des Deux Mondes. CXLVII, (June 1, I898), p. 7I8.
55Libre Parole. April 22, I898.
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republican newspaper, le Journal des débats, was concerned 
about the possibility of a co-operation between England and 
America in the Par East.^^ This newspaper believed that 
rumors of a real Anglo-American alliance was nothing but 
speculation, but it feared that England's pro-American policy 
could not help but produce closer relations between the two 
countries,57
The Royalist press interpreted the war as a conflict 
between Republicanism and Monarchy in general, and it was 
therefore especially bitter in denouncing the American posi­
tion, The Figaro, the most respectable of the Royalist 
papers, charged that the United States was "urging a war 
against a weak nation for territorial aggrandizement under 
the pretense of humanitarian p r i n c i p l e s , "58 Consistently 
the Figaro reported that an American victory would be con­
trary to French colonial interests, for American expansionism 
would next be a threat to French colonies. One editorial 
warned : "The interests of Spain are not alone at stake. On
the other side of the Atlantic a great power has arisen , , , 
she has the gold and the men. She has the fleet and the 
army • , , , There is a new peril: The American p e r i l , " 5 9
5^Journal des Debats, July 8, 1898, July 24, I898, 
57ibid,, August 1 5, I8 9 8, November 14, I897, 
58Quoted in the New York Times, July 1, I898, p, 9 , 
59The Figaro, August 5, I898,
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Likewise the Soleil declared* "It is to the interests of 
Europe to uphold the rights of Spain, The question of Cuba 
involves not only the influence of Spain, but the influence 
of Europe in the Antilles and in all of A m e r i c a , gut the 
Figaro did not want the war to harm the American tourist 
business in Prance, It made a point to emphasize* "Americans 
may continue to visit Paris with perfect freedom; they will 
find that they are not in the slightest degree personally 
unpopular here."&l
The Socialist press in France favored the cause of the 
Cuban revolutionaries, but it could find little good to say 
about either Spain or the United States,^2 Before the war 
George Clemenceau advised Spain that it was in her interests 
to leave Cuba "instead of persevering in this insane struggle," 
He argued that "Spain will certainly fight heroically, but 
it requires only a glance at the resources of the two countries 
to understand that she will be fatally d e f e a t e d , T h e  
editor of La Revue socialiste, Paul Louis, interpreted the 
policies of Spain as "retrograd obstinance" and a continuation 
of the ideas of Philip II, Early in the struggle he believed 
that the United States would "contribute toward emancipating
^®the Soleil, August 14, I898,
^Iquoted in the Nation, May 17, 1899, Vol, 66, p, 375. 
^^London Times, April 25, I898.
^^Depeche (of Toulouse), September 28, I897,
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a people justly seeking independence,”^^ After it was clear 
that America would annex some territory Louis became more 
critical of the American cause. He applied a Marxist inter­
pretation to the appearance of American imperialism. The 
United States had gone to war to find needed markets which 
were created by the capitalistic system, Louis believed 
that this need would continue, and therefore he warned:
"Who knows at what side the cabinet at Washington will direct 
its blows, what power it will attack, or what new territory 
it will attempt to seize,
One of the most interesting accounts of the war appeared 
in a series in La revue de Paris written by a mysterious 
Lieutenant X. This eye-witness observer left Saigon for 
Bfenila on May 1 on board a French vessel which had orders to 
observe and report the course of the fighting. Lieutenant 
X was extremely anti-American, He believed that the United 
States was hypocritical in claiming to go to war for the 
benefit of Cuba, On May 1, he predicted that America would 
annex the Philippines, If the Americans just wanted to liber­
ate the Cubans, he asked, why were they attacking the Philip­
pines?^^ Especially he feared that the United States and
^^aul Louis, "A propos de la guerre Hispano-Américaine," 
La Revue Socialiste, May, I8 9 8, quoted in Sears, "opinion,"
p. 2 9.
^^Louis, "La situation internationale," Ibid,. Vol, 
XXVIII, Quoted in Ibid,, p, 43.
^^Lieutenant X, "La guerre aux Philippines," La Revue 
de Paris, IV, (August 1, I8 98), p, 521,
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England were seeking co-operation in the Far East, and he 
wrote that eventually these two nations would divide the 
entire world between themselves.^7 While observing the 
Manila conflict he wrote the following words* "We are all 
convinced that the duty of Europe is to intervene; and we 
are all persuaded that Europe will not do so. Of what are 
diplomats made? They have no sense of action. To the Mon­
roe doctrine we should respond with a European doctrine,
A number of ladies aid societies, religious groups 
and young peoples associations made donations to and expressed 
support for the Spanish cause. In April there was a large 
Paris rally of various French teenager associations which 
was called in order to find ways to help Spain, The organ­
izations which were represented included the General Asso­
ciation of Students, the Colonial Union, the Catholic Circle 
of Students and the Young Royalists. The enthusiastic assem­
bly formed a special committee which had "the function of 
organizing collections and circulating propaganda in behalf 
of Spain."^9 Likewise the Chambers of Commerce of several 
towns began collections to aid Spain."7® The Cadets in the 
French Academy for the Marine Infantry passed a resolution
^^Ibid.. August 15, 1898, pp. 882-3. 
^®Ibid., August 1, 1898, p. 5 1 5.
^^Le Temps, April 29» 1898. 
fOlbid.. April 25, 1898.
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favoring Spain, and they sent it to Madrid. General Porter 
protested the action, for the cadets were considered as in 
the government service. Minister Hanotaux saw that those 
responsible for the resolution were "properly reprimanded." 
Porter reported to Washington that the incident had been 
"worthy of some attention" even if it "was not much more 
than a boyish prank."71
During the war there were a few expressions of French 
sympathy for the United States. The Havre branch of the 
Association of French Women held a ball in which they col­
lected $134 .47 to be given to American wounded soldiers. The 
President of the association spoke of "the bonds of friend­
ship which have so long united France with A m e r i c a . " 7 2  The 
French Society of the Red Cross, in contrast to several 
societies in South America, was impartial from the beginning 
of the conflict. The French society collected subscriptions 
for the wounded of both sides, and in July it donated twenty- 
five thousand francs to the American Red Cross "to be used 
for the relief of the suffering caused by w a r . "73 in the 
Paris Fourth of July banquet there were many Frenchmen and 
French officials present. The main speaker was the French
71porter to Day, June 7, I898, Despatches, Vol, 116, 
no. 2 6 7.
72porter to Day, October 29, I898, Ibid.. no. 349* 
73iDioore to Porter, July 11, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24,
PP , 67-8. Le Fur, Etude. pp. 175-6.
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Minister of Commerce, M. Maruejouis, who declared in his 
speech: "Let me affirm to your compatriots that not a day,
not an hour, not a minute has the harmony which reigns among 
us ever even run the risk of being broken#7^ In the Bastile 
day celebration in New York the French Consul-General deliv­
ered a speech, and he strongly denied that the war had 
caused any tensions between the two countries. Such reports, 
he explained, "have emanated from utterly irresponsible per­
sons who desire to create a sensation." Prance has "always 
extended a hospitable welcome to visitors from the United 
States...and shall continue to do so."75
Ambassador Gambon, like almost all Frenchmen, was 
clearly sympathetic to the Spanish position in the struggle. 
While always careful in his public statements to conceal all 
traces of anti-Americanism, in his reports to the Quai d'Orsay 
he complained that "imperialism has become the credo of the 
Republican Party.7^ Especially he was critical of Senator 
Lodge and those who wanted America to become a colonial power. 
As for McKinley, Gambon wrote: "He has become quite another
man since the declaration of war. A worthy man but weak, now 
that war has been declared, he believes it to be just and
7^porter to Day, July 5» 1898, Despatches, Vol. Il6, 
no. 289. report contains newspaper clippings.
f^New York Times. July 15, 1898, p. ?.
7^Gambon to Hanotaux, June 24, I898, DDF, Vol. XIV, 
no. 241, pp. 356-8.
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carries on with all his heart to satisfy his conscience,?? 
Gambon praised Bryan and Cleveland for their position of 
anti-imperialism, but he had little confidence that they 
would succeed, 78 In spite of this Gambon hoped that the war 
would not be too harmful to Franco-American relations. He 
was upset by the fact that three-hundred women in Washington 
had signed a petition to stop buying perfumes and other 
luxury items from France, He constantly worried that the 
American press "presents us as violently hostile to the 
United States," and for this reason he suggested to the 
Foreign Office that there should be more efforts to control 
the "violent outbursts in the French press,"79 But to the 
American Department of State Gambon always denied that the 
press in France was anti-American, On one occasion he wrote 
to Secretary Day* "We protest against the insinuations in 
the American press, for we do everything in our power to 
please the American Government,"80
General Porter likewise attempted to use his influence 
to smooth over hard feelings between Paris and Washington,
7 7  \'Quoted in Genevieve Tabouis, The Life of Jules Gambon,
translated by C.F, Atkinson, (London* Jonathan Cape, 1938)»
p, 9 8, Generally this is not a very helpful work,
78cambon to Hanotaux, June 24, I898, DDF, Vol, XIV^, 
no, 241, p, 358,
f^Gambon to Hanotaux, May 6, I8 98, Ibid,, no, 179,
pp. 262-3.
GOcambon to Day, May 16, I898, Notes, Vol, 41,
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He assured his government that the amount of anti-American 
sentiment in Prance was exaggerated and that it mostly came 
from the extreme right. "The anti-Repuhlican press in 
France," he wrote, "criticizes its Republic nearly as much 
as it criticizes this Republic, and for some weeks it was 
annoying, but the Government behaved well throughout," Like 
Gambon he argued that "many papers have been with us heartily 
from the start, but their articles are never heard from at 
h o m e . " 8 1  Early in the war Porter suggested that the American 
Embassy should employ a skillful French journalist to present 
the American side of the war in the French newspapers. "If 
you approve of this," he wrote, "and will place four or five 
thousand dollars at the disposal of the Embassy I will see 
that so much as may be necessary shall be used very cautiously 
and economically."82 Shortly thereafter Secretary Day sent 
him $2 ,5 0 0 which was to be spent "to improve the friendly 
feeling in the press."83 Porter only spent $500 of the sum 
for propaganda, for American military success made such efforts
largely unnecessary.84
It was the American victories that more than anything
81porter to Hanna, August 2, I898, Porter papers,
box 3.
®^Porter to Day, May 24, I898, Despatches, Vol. II6 .
83oay to Porter, June 10, I898, Instructions, no. 2 3 7.
G4porter to Hay, December 19» I89 8, Despatches, Vol. 
1 1 6, no. 381.
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else improved the position of the United States in the French 
press, for as Ernest May writes, "the fact of power was hard 
to deny,"®5 After the victory at Manila Bay General Porter 
reportedI "After the totally unexpected result, to people 
in Europe, at Manila, the general opinion began to change 
very perceptibly. Another victory will speak more eloquently 
than any newspaper articles."®^ Later he wrotes "The result 
is everywhere felt by us abroad, as hats are raised consider­
ably higher to Americans and the power of our country and 
the great qualities of our people have been impressed upon 
other nations as never before,"8? The French press in the 
summer of I898 indicates that Porter's analysis was correct. 
After the first two months of the war, when there was no 
doubt as to the outcome, one finds fewer and fewer outbursts 
against the United States, The conservative Royalist news­
papers ceased to speak in behalf of Spain, The moderate 
Republican press began to advise Spain to face unpleasant 
realities and to sue for peace. Le Temps, for example, 
wrote that "peace must be made, and the longer it is deferred 
the more cruel will be the sacrifices which will be required,"®®
G^Ernest May, Democracy, p, 239*
®^Porter to Day, May 24, I898, Despatches, Vol, II6,
Day to Porter, June I6 , I898, Instructions, Vol, 24, pp, 46-7,
®7porter to Hay, September 6, I8 9 8, quoted in Meade, 
Soldier, p, 220,
®®Le Temps, June 11, I898, Also see Journal des Debats. 
July 8, 1098, July 24, I8 9 8, July 31. 1898,
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Francois Charmes in the Revue des Deux Mondes wrote that 
Spain had lost enough blood to maintain her honor and that 
to continue the war would serve no useful p u r p o s e , ^9
The Nobel prize winning novelist, Anatole Prance, in 
his L*anneau d*améthyste, written in 1899, includes an inter­
esting salon scene in which the subject of conversation is 
the Spanish-American war. In the scene everyone was entirely 
anti-American and pro-Spanish, One man asked a French gen­
eral if he thought that the "bandit Americans" might win.
The general answered that it would be very unlikely because 
of the superior experience of the Spanish navy. Hearing this 
a woman exclaimed* "Quel bonheurI Nos amis les Espagnols 
seront victorieux. Vive le roiI" Another man remarked that 
"the military success of our neighbors will be received with 
favor in France," A few hours later the general received a 
telegram which stated that Dewey had been completely victor­
ious in Manila Bay, The people in the salon were shocked at 
the news, and the majority believed that it was false American 
propaganda,90
®9prancois Charmes, "Chronique de la guinaaine," Revue 
des Deux Mondes, Vol, CXLVIII, July 15, 1898, pp, 495-^
Ibid,, August 1, 1898, p, 734, The Outlook late in May 
wrote that French newspapers were "changing their tone,"
LIX, (May 28, I898), p, 203.
9®Anatole France, L*anneau d*améthyste, (Paris* 
Calmann-Levy, n,d,), pp, 141-6, It should be noted that 
this is a work of satire directed against political and 
religious conservatism in Europe, It is obvious that Anatole 
France is antagonistic to Royalist Spain,
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French prestige in the United States did temporarily 
suffer as a result of the pro-Spanish sentiment in Prance, 
but it would be false to say that the reaction created any 
general hostility towards Prance.9^ Albert Shaw in the 
American Monthly Review of Reviews wrote that "we have no 
cause for serious complaint." Early in the conflict the 
French "were humbugged by their mercenary newspapers," but 
they were "rapidly seeing their mistake."92 The Outlook 
expressed the hope that "sooner or later the keen intell­
igence which is sometimes obscured but never wholly destroyed 
in Prance must discern the facts in the Cuban situation."93 
The Philadelphia Ledger regretted the expression of unfriend­
liness in Prance, but stated that despite this Americans 
continued to have "the warmest and most cordial feelings for 
Prance." This sympathy had been strengthened "by her adop­
tion in 1871 of a Republican form of government so much like 
our own."94 it should be observed that during the war one 
does not find a great deal written about Prance in American 
newspapers.
Anti-imperialists in America were especially tolerant
91white, Opinion, p. 224.
^^American Monthly Review of Reviews. XVII, (July 21, 
1898), pp. 426-7 .
93ihe Outlook. May 28, I898.
^^Philadelphia ledger, April 28, I898, quoted in White, 
Opinion, pp. 224-5. .
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of French opposition to the American position in the war.
The Nation reported that French opposition was to be expected 
for three reasons. First, there were financial ties between 
France and Spain. Secondly, "they are of the same religion—  
and religion still counts with the bulk of Frenchmen— and 
rely on the same saints in time of difficulty and danger." 
Finally, both nations "attach great importance to manners, 
and the American indifference to manners has always enraged 
them both to equal degrees. This war has, unhappily, brought 
out this trait in our character with unusual prominence.
There was probably never a war with so little attention to 
forms and proceeded by so much billingsgate,"95 on another 
occasion The Nation declaredi "From what we can learn, the 
general public has never shared in the newspaper feelings, 
or assumed feelings against America. French shopkeepers and 
artists remain as willing to see the color of American gold 
as ever, and say so."9^
The greatest hostility to France naturally came from 
the proponents of the "large policy" of colonial empire, 
Theodore Roosevelt, just after the war, wrote to a British 
friend congratulating him on the success of England during 
the Fashoda crisis, Roosevelt wrote : "I think that France
was right not to fight you for you would have done her up
95The Nation. LXVI (April 28, I898), p. 315. 
9*Ibid.. May 19, I898, p. 375.
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to an absolute certainty; and I personally think the task 
would have been an easy one. The day of the Latin races is 
over." He complimented England's attitude during the Spanish- 
American war, and he expressed the conviction that "it saved 
us from a chance of very serious foreign complications." As 
a result "the English-speaking peoples are now closer toge­
ther than for a century and a quarter." Roosevelt concluded 
that the two countries should maintain this unity for "their 
interests are really fundamentally the same, and they are 
more closely akin, not merely in blood, but in feeling and 
principle, than either is akin to any other."97 British- 
American unity in the year 1898, of course, implied that the 
relations between Prance and the United States would not be 
very friendly.
After the first month of fighting the situation of 
Spain was hopeless. In this situation the French Government 
decided to make timid and unofficial peace overtures to the 
two belligerents. The first indication of French initiatives 
was a speech by President Felix Faure at St. Etienne on June 
1, In this speech the President of the Republic departed 
from his custom of remaining silent on foreign affairs. With­
out being specific he declared: "We are resolved to care­
fully observe a strict neutrality, but we cannot help from 
hoping that circumstances will give the neutral states an
9?Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, November 25» I8 98, 
Morison, II, no. I09I, p. 8 90,
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opportunity to demonstrate their good will by working with 
both parties for the recovery of p e a c e , "98
The early peace initiatives were largely the work of 
Foreign Minister H a n o t a u x , 99 a few days after President 
Faure*s speech Hanotaux spoke to General Porter of his 
desire for peace. He said that the French Government was 
anxious that French creditors might lose as little as 
possible, Hanotaux expressed his conviction that Spain 
would "fight to the bitter end" unless she could be given 
reasonable terms for a settlement. If the United States 
would outline a moderate plan, Prance would use her influence 
to try to get Spain to accept it, Hanotaux suggested that 
the Spanish Government could probably be convinced to accept 
a settlement which included three principles: first a general
election in Cuba to decide the island’s fate; second, an 
American guarantee that Cuba would pay its debt to Spain; 
and third, the United States would agree to renounce all 
claims to the Philippines, Porter responded that he doubted 
that the last two proposals would be acceptable to Washington, 
but he agreed to forward the suggested plan to the Department 
of State, In his report Porter suggested that Hanotaux 
would be "the person whom Spain would trust rather than any
98porter to Day, June 3, I898, Despatches, Vol, II6 ,
99one biographer falsely attributes Delcasse with 
beginning the iniative toward a peace settlement, Alberic 
Neton, Delcasse, (Paris: Avenue Hoche, 1952), p. 11,
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other statesman in Europe to bring about negotiations for 
peace,” He therefore wrote that French good offices might 
be useful "to sugar-coat the pill which Spain would be 
obliged to swallow,"^®® Secretary of State Day instructed 
Porter to do or say nothing that might give the appearance 
that the United States was anxious for negotiations, but 
he also instructed the American Ambassador to avoid "repel­
ling the friendly overtures of Mr, Hanotaux,
The French Government hoped to encourage a peace 
settlement before the Spanish fleet in the West Indies was 
completely d e s t r o y e d , 102 Ambassador Gambon shared this view, 
and he encouraged Hanotaux to intervene more energetically,
He wrote that if Spain waited any longer to make peace she 
would be "completely at the mercy of the United States,"103 
On June 12 Hanotaux informed General Porter that he would 
have the French Ambassador in Madrid use his influence to 
encourage a spirit of compromise. This would be done "unoffi* 
cially and in a friendly manner," Hanotaux further stated 
that he was convinced that Spain was "ready for making peace
lOOporter to Day, June ?, I898, Despatches, Vol, II6,
lOlDay to Porter, July 6 , I898, Instructions, Vol» 24, 
pp. 63-4,
lOZporter to Day, June 1 0, I898, Despatches, Vol, II6 , 
no, 27 2,
103jules Gambon to Delcasse, July 8, I898, DDF, Vol, 
Xivl, no, 242, pp, 272-3,
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now, while she may still save s o m e t h i n g . "1^4 next day
he told Porter that Leon Y Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador 
in Paris, had full power for negotiating a declaration of 
peace, and that he wanted to meet with Porter as soon as 
p o s s i b l e , 105 But Secretary of State Day instructed Porter 
that “under no circumstances" was he "to admit European 
interference in any form." He could receive and transmit 
Castillo's proposals, but he could not open formal negotia­
tions. In addition Day cautioned; "Conversation in a quar­
ter as to possible contingencies and terms of peace should 
be avoided because any utterances by you may be misunder­
stood.
Hanotaux's peace overtures failed because in June 
neither Spain nor the United States was willing to make 
the concessions which would have been necessary for a settle­
ment. When Delcasse took charge of the Quai d'Orsay, he 
discontinued the efforts to get Porter and Castillo together. 
The new Foreign Minister told Porter that he "felt sure that 
any movement by a neutral power to interfere in any way in 
the matter would be misinterpreted and would produce only 
bad results," Delcasse did add that if he were asked by the
^^^Porter to Day, June I 3, I 898, Despatches, Vol. I I 6,
lO^porter to Day, June I 3, I 898, June 1 8 ,  June 2 1 ,  
Ibid.. no. 279.
lOÔDay to Porter, June 1 8 ,  I 898, Instructions, Vol.
2 4 ,  p .  5 5 .
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two governments to act as an intermediary "in his private 
and unofficial capacity," he would then be "most happy to 
put himself at their disposal and do his best to serve 
them."107 The United States never took advantage of this 
offer. Castillo did make a few more efforts to meet with 
Porter, but the latter declined the overtures for he feared 
that a meeting "might have involved only unprofitable dis- 
c u s s i o n , " 1 0 8  Members of the French foreign service did 
make a few unofficial gestures to encourage peace. The 
influential French Ambassador in Denmark, Jean Jules Jusser- 
and, expressed the fact that France desired peace to Henry 
White, the first secretary of the American Embassy at London. 
White responded that peace "could be on easy terms for Spain 
if she would sue for it." Jusserand assured him that France 
was entirely neutral and that "the reported alliance between 
France, Spain and Japan was all bosh."109
After the failure of Castillo's peace overtures in 
Paris the Spanish Government decided to sue for peace directly
107porter to Day, July 21, I898, Despatches, Vol. II6 , 
no. 302 «
lOBporter to Day, July 21, I898, Ibid.. no number.
In December Porter wrote 1 "Please do not publish any of the 
despatches concerning the Spanish Ambassador's unofficial 
overtures to me with regard to opening negotiations for the 
peace through this embassy." Porter to Hay, December 9, I898, 
Ibid.
l^^Memorandum of White, quoted in Alan Nevins, Henry 
White: Thirty Years in American Diplomacy. (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1930)» PP* 137-8. Conversation also in Jean Jules 
Jusserand, What Me Befellg The Reminiscences of J. J. Jusse­
rand, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933), PP» 166-7.
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in Washington. The Spanish Minister of State, the Duke 
d*Almodovar del Rio, on July 22 wrote a letter to President 
McKinley asking "upon what basis might be established a 
political status in Cuba and might be terminated a strife 
which might continue without s e a s o n , A m b a s s a d o r  Gambon 
was requested to present the peace message to the President. 
When Gambon, on June 26, delivered the note, McKinley asked 
him for his opinions and observations. In response Gambon 
said only that he hoped that the United States would be 
"humane, Christian and generous." The President, according 
to Gambon, seemed very happy to receive the Spanish appeal. 
Meanwhile in Paris General Porter told Hanotaux optimisti­
cally i "I am persuaded that now things will move fast."^^3 
Three days later both the United States and Spain sub­
mitted a list of conditions which they considered necessary 
before there could be an armistice. The two governments 
agreed that Spain would give up control of Cuba and that 
there would be a reasonable indemnity. On the issue of the 
ownership of the territorities, however, they were not in 
accord. Spain absolutely refused to give up her sovereignty
H^Duc d'Almodoval del Rio to McKinley, July 22, I898, 
PR, 1998, pp. 1819-20; DDF, Vol. XIV, pp. 400-2; Notes, Vol, 
41.
^Delcasse to Gambon, July 19» I8 9 8, DDF, Vol. XIV, 
no. 2 6 0, pp. 392-3 .
112(3ambon to Delcasse, July 27, I89 8, Ibid.. no, 266, 
pp. 402-3.
ll^Ibid., note 1, p. 403.
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over any colony other than Cuba, The United States demanded 
ownership of Porto Rico, the other Spanish islands in the 
West Indies, plus one island of the Landrones. Also the 
American Government required that the future "disposition" 
of the Philippines should be left open and decided later at 
the peace c o n f e r e n c e . There was clearly an impasse. 
Meanwhile fighting continued, and it would require two more 
weeks of diplomatic haggling before an armistice could be 
agreed upon.
Officially Ambassador Gambon was nothing but an inter­
mediary delivering the Spanish terms to the American President, 
He did, however, argue strongly in behalf of the position 
of Spain, He maintained that the cession of Cuba was "suf­
ficient as an indemnity" and that no further territorial 
cession would be required. President McKinley replied that 
additional Spanish concessions would be necessary in order 
to satisfy the American public. In one particular McKinley 
was persuaded by Cambori to make a change in the wording of 
the American position. In the first American draft it was 
stated that a special commission would establish the "pos­
session" of the Philippines, Cambon suggested that the word 
"disposition" would be more acceptable to the Spanish Govern­
ment and would not prejudice future negotiations. This 
suggestion was followed, McKinley told Cambon that he was
ll^d*Almodovar to Delcasse, July 19, 1898, DDF, Vol. 
Xivl, no. 267, pp. 404-6,
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personally sorry that Spain had not given in earlier so as 
to make it possible to offer less stringent terms. In his 
report of this meeting Cambon telegraphed DelcassI» "I 
regret that I have not been able to obtain greater conces­
sions; I fear that henceforth the position of the White House
will be unmoveable."115
Early in August the Spanish Minister of State asked 
Cambon for his opinion of the political situation in Wash­
ington. Cambon responded that he was convinced that McKinley 
was inflexible on the issues of Porto Rico and the Philippines. 
Cambon advisedi "And since your Excellency gives me the 
honor of asking my personal opinion, I can only answer that 
it is my conviction that any hesitation on the part of Spain 
will aggravate the situation and make American demands more 
rigorous."116 Cambon*s analysis of the situation turned out 
to be correct, and the interests of Spain would have been 
served if his advice had been requested earlier.
After receiving Cambon*s viewpoint the Spanish Govern­
ment agreed to all of the American conditions with the excep­
tion of the immediate evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico.
ll^Cambon to Delcasse, July 29, I896, Ibid.. no. 268,
pp. 406-1 3.
^^^Cambon to the Minister of State in Madrid (through 
Delcasse), August 4, 1898, Ibid., no. 2 7 6, p. 427* Cambon 
wrote to Delcasse that earlier he could have asked for less 
severe terms, but because of the suffering of American troops 
from Yellow Fever it was "too late." The refusal of Madrid 
to come to terms would provoke an "explosion of furor."
Cambon to Delcasse, August 6, I8 98, Ibid.. no. 280, pp. 232-3.
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The Spanish constitution made it necessary for the Cortes 
to concur in such a move, and it would therefore take time.^l? 
Delivering this message on August 10, Cambon found that 
McKinley and Day were disappointed with the news. The 
President said that he had expected "categorical acceptance" 
and could not agree to a delay resulting from reasons of 
Spain's internal politics. Cambon asked what Spain should 
be advised to do. McKinley suggested that Spain could agree 
to the formation of a special commission for negotiating the 
Spanish withdrawal of Porto Rico and Cuba, and secondly,
Spain could authorize Cambon to sign a protocol for the 
meeting of pleniopotentiaries to meet in Paris to negotiate 
a peace t r e a t y . C a m b o n  reported the details of the inter­
view to Madrid, and on August 12 he received authorization 
to sign an armistice and the preliminary p r o t o c o l . Later 
that same day the French Ambassador and the American Secretary 
of State met to sign the a r r a n g e m e n t s . T h i s  ended the 
bulk of the French diplomatic effort in behalf of Spain.
The diplomacy of Cambon was skillful and effective.
The basic factor in facilitating an armistice was the complete
llfduc d*Almodovar to Day (through Delcasse), August 
7, 1898, Ibid.. no. 289, pp. 436-9.
^^®Cambon to the Duke of Almodovar (through Delcasse), 
August 10, 1898, Ibid.. no. 284, pp. 444-5. Also see Tabouis, 
Cambon, p. 104.
H^Cambon to Day, August 12, FR, I898, pp. 825-6.
120Text in Ibid.. pp. 828-30.
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hopelessness of the Spanish cause, but it seems that Cambon 
did make a contribution, however small, to the fact that the 
armistice was signed as quickly as it was* After the sign­
ing of the protocol. Secretary Day wrote Cambon that he had 
"been instrumental in contributing to this auspicious result," 
Day wrote that he recognized that France had been close to 
Spain because of "propinquity and intimate association," 
but he added that the United States was entirely satisfied 
with Prance's diplomatic position during the war.^^^ Shortly 
after the armistice the Spanish Government suggested that 
Spanish Consul of Canada be sent to Washington to take charge 
of the Spanish Embassy,12% The Department of State decided 
that because a state of war continued to exist it was better 
that Spanish-American relations "continue to be conducted 
through the very acceptable channel through which they have 
heretofore been made since the beginning of the w a r , " ^ 2 3  
Later the Spanish Government suggested sending an "unofficial 
representative" to Washington, and the department responded 
that the earlier reply "answered by anticipation the present
121oay to Cambon, August 15, I898, PR, I898, pp, 827- 
8, On Cambon’s roll in the negotiations see George Bonnet, 
Miracle de la Prance, 1870-1919, (Paris* Payard, I9 6 5), 
p. 9 6,
^22oambon to Day, August 17, I898, PR, I898, p, 802, 
123jfl;oore to Cambon, August I9 , Ibid,, p, 803,
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c o m m u n i c a t i o n . This seemed to indicate that the Depart­
ment of State was satisfied with Gambon's diplomacy.
The French Government was happy with the choice of 
Paris for the negotiations. General Porter had earlier 
suggested Paris would be an ideal site because the French 
"take a pride in the fact that the city has been the place 
where so many important conferences have been held,"125 He 
believed that another advantage was the fact that "Paris is 
the city in closest communication socially and financially 
with M a d r i d . "126 At first McKinley and Day had preferred 
Washington as a location for peace talks. Ambassador Cambon 
argued that it would facilitate the negotiations if the lo­
cation were in a neutral country such as France. The Spanish 
Government strongly agreed with this point of view, and on 
August 1 Secretary Day agreed to Paris as a site.127 This 
decision was received with a great deal of favor in France, 
and General Porter was of the opinion that it did much to
12^ay to Cambon, August 24, I8 9 6, Ibid., pp. 806-7»
But in October the French Embassy made an appeal in behalf 
of Spanish colonies, and the United States refused to discuss 
the matter with the reason that there were negotiations in 
Paris. Hay to Thiebaut, October 29, I898, Ibid., p. 817.
125porter to Day, June 21, I8 9 8, Despatches, Vol. II6 , 
no. 2 7 9.
126porter to Day, July 13, I8 9 8, Ibid.
127cambon to Delcasse, August 1, I8 9 8, DDF, Vol. Xivl, 
no. 2 7 3» pp. 420-1.
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improve Franco-American r e l a t i o n s . S e v e r a l  Englishmen, 
on the other hand, feared that the choice of Paris would 
give France even greater influence on Spanish foreign poli­
cy, ^ 29
The proximity of the Philippines to French Indo-China 
made the French Government unhappy about the prospects of 
the Philippines becoming an American possession. General 
Porter reported that French officials worried that the 
American ownership of the islands would "further complicate 
the Eastern Question," He received unofficial information 
that the French Government would prefer to see the United 
States take possession of Cuba and let Spain retain the 
P h i l i p p i n e s , ^30 The French Government did not try to influ­
ence the Paris negotiations in the matter, for they realized 
that such action had no chance of success. In Washington 
Cambon and other French representatives did support the 
Spanish argument that the United States did not have the 
right to maintain political control over Manila before the 
final treaty terms were decided. The United States did not 
agree, and the French Government dropped the matter,^31
IZ^Meade, Soldier, p, 129,
Henry Wolff to Salisbury, August 14, I898, BD, 
Vol. II, pp. 254-5 ,
130porter to Day, June 10, I8 98, Despatches, Vol, II6 , 
no. 2 7 2.
13lEmbassy of France to the Department of State, Sep­
tember 11, 1898, FR, 1898, pp, 813-4, The Department of 
State to the French Embassy, September I6 , I898, Ibid,, pp, 
814-5. Thiebaut to Hay, October 4, I898, Ibid,, pp, 815-7 , 
Hay to Thiebaut, October 29, I898, Ibid,, p. 8I7 ,
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The French Government recognized that the alternative to 
American ownership of the islands was most likely ownership 
by Germany or England, For this reason the French Govern­
ment believed that it could live with the terms of the Treaty 
of Paris,
Following the war the French press was very critical 
of American annexation of the Philippine Islands, The war 
against Aguinaldo and the Philippine insurrectionists was 
taken as proof of America's hypocrisy in earlier criticizing 
Spanish colonialism. Le Temps wrotei "What a scandal!
They went to war under the pretext of liberating the Philip­
pines and of giving an oppressed people the right to govern 
themselves. They have ended by a conquest of force and 
the imposing of an unwanted r e g i m e , "^^2 ^ later editorial
noted that McKinley did not have the authority of Congress 
for the military operations in the Philippines, and the 
article concluded that "this is the President's war made 
with the money and the soldiers of the United States,"^33 
In regard to the war in the Philippines the unknown lieu­
tenant X wrote I "The Americans massacre the natives in the 
name of the dollar as the Spanish did in the name of the 
Saints, The liberty of the Philippines has survived exactly
4
132]je Temps, January 11, 1898, 
133ibid,, August 5, 1905,
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the amount of time which it was necessary for the Americans 
to substitute their tyranny for that of Spain.
In the few years following the Treaty of Paris there 
appeared a whole stream of French books on the new role of 
the United States as a major world power, and with few excep­
tions they were critical of the American Republic, In the 
first scholarly study of the diplomacy of the Spanish-Amer­
ican war Louis Le Pur emphasized that the United States had 
become a colonial power "in one blow" and "at the expense 
of Spain." He wrote that the Republic had "broken with the 
Monroe Doctrine and decided to play her part in the concert 
of the great powers." Le Pur feared that in the internation­
al situation this could create "new germs of discord and 
hate."^35 The diplomatic historian Achille Viallate observed 
that the war "was a definite mark of the passage of the United 
States from the rank of a purely American power to the rank 
of a world power," He wrotei "Because of their great number, 
their riches, their force of expansion, their fighting spirit, 
their national pride, the United States trouble the world and 
make us wonder if there will be the Americanization of the 
w o r l d . "^38 Hector Petin believed that the United States had
^3^Lieutenant X, "Guerre," La Revue de Paris. Vol. VI 
(November 15, 1899), pp. 393-4.
^35Le Fur, Etude. pp. 310-2, 314.
 ^ 138Achille Viallate, Essais d'histoire diplomatique 
américaine. (Paris 1 E. Guilmoto, 1905), p. I05.
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seized the Philippines "without any regard for international 
law" and "without concern for the people of the Philippines." 
He feared that the annexation of the Philippines and the 
Hawaiian islands indicated that the United States was ex­
tending the Monroe Doctrine to the entire Pacific.^37 
Maurice de Beaumarchais repeated this theme, and he believed 
that the Spanish nation had "manifested a moderation and a 
dignity that made a singular contrast with the violent and 
outrageous American actions."^38
The well-known historian Henry Hauser was shocked 
at the "hypocrisy" of America's claiming to go to war to 
liberate Cuba and then using the war to become a colonial 
empire. He declared: "When they take a colony, it is with
a brutality and a contempt for forms which surpass the most 
shamless European aggressions. An explosion, which was 
probably accidental, of one of their ships was sufficient 
reason for them to expunge Spain from the new world." He 
was disappointed that the United States had ceased to become 
a "pacifistic democracy," and he was convinced that "the 
most surprising event in the last years of the nineteenth 
century is the entry of the United States into the politics
^3?Hector Petin. Les Etats-Unis et la Doctrine de 
Monroe, (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, I9 0 0), pp. 418, 423, ^35-6.
138,Maurice de Beaumarchais, La doctrine de Monroe : 
l'évolution de la politique des Etats-Unis au xix^ siècle. 
(Paris: Ancienne Maison L. Larose et Porcel, IÔ9Ô), p. 18?.
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of world imperialism."^39 Prantz Despagnet, another serious 
historian, regretted that France had not been able to achieve 
"more just terms" for Spain, Nevertheless he had no doubts 
of the fact that Prance had "fulfilled to the utmost her 
pacifying role in helping terminate a war, which, if con­
tinued, would have menaced Europe by resulting in an even 
greater increase of American c o n q u e s t s , "1^0 economist, 
Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, wrote that America was determined to 
dominate the Pacific, He believed that this would require 
strong coaling stations in the Philippines and a canal through 
Central America,1^1
French diplomatic leaders were unhappy with the out­
come of the war. Ambassador Cambon feared that the new 
American predominance in South America was a major economic 
threat to French interests. In the same context he complained: 
"From a moral point of view, our intellectual influence and 
French culture in the American hemisphere are being bruskly 
eliminated by the United S t a t e s , "1^2 But French officials
^^^Henry Hauser, L*impérialisme américain, (Paris: 
Pages libres, 1905)# pp. 67, 86.
 ^ l^Oprantz Despagnet, La diplomatie de la troisième 
republique et le droit des gens, (Paris: Librairie de la
société de recueil sirez, 190^), pp, 795-6,
^^^Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les Etats-Unis: Puissance
Coloniale," Revue des Deux Mondes. VII (January 1, 1902),
pp. 110-2,
l^^cambon to Delcasse, May 29, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI^, 
no. 159, p. 252,
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also breathed a sigh of relief when peace was restored.
Before the Chamber of Deputies Delcasse declared: "Policy,
race, commercial relations, mutual esteem and friendship, 
a thousand diverse and powerful reasons made us wish that 
this war which we viewed with regret, would come to an end."^^3 
Hanotaux later admitted that "the proximity of France to 
Spain created a feeling of friendship and good will toward 
the neighboring kingdom,” He claimed that "there was no­
thing underneath, in the policy of France toward the United 
States; or rather, if there was anything underneath it was 
all sympathy and cordiality." Hanotaux concluded that for 
Franco-American relations the war was "a critical period, 
which was more important and more dangerous than one can 
imagine so long afterwards.
If France's diplomacy is to be seen in perspective 
it is necessary to compare it to that of Germany and England. 
France was not guilty of Germany's tactlessness which left 
a heritage of bitterness and suspicion in German-American 
relations, France committed no indiscretion to be compared 
to Vice Admiral von Diederichs' exploits at Manila or the
1^3Journal officiel de la république Française. Chambre, 
I (January 23, 1899, p. 146. *’
l^^Gabriel Hanotaux, "Le General Porter et l'affaire 
de Cuba," Letter of July 27, 1927, in Meade, Soldier, pp. 
201-3.
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German attempts to gain territory as a result of the war. 
Great Britain, on the other hand, pursued a policy that made 
for better American relations. The colonial secretary,
Joseph Chamberlain, and other British statesmen encouraged 
the United States to annex the Philippines, and the British 
press was favorable to the American side in the conflict. 
Although historians disagree concerning the influence of the 
war on Anglo-American relations, it is clear that there was 
a new closeness between the new countries after 1898.^^^
For Prance, the Spanish-American war did not have any extreme 
results in her American relations, and this is one reason 
that historians have not paid much attention to France's role 
during the conflict.
In summary, during the Spanish-American war there were 
difficulties in Franco-American relations, but these diffi­
culties were never really serious. One standard historical
^^^Langer, Imperialism, p. 5 1 9. Andrew Dickson White, 
Autobiography. (New York: Century, I9 0 5). Vol. II, pp. I70-I.
Two important articles emphasize that Germany did not want 
to anger the United States. Thomas Bailey, "Dewey and the 
Germans at Manila Bay," American Historical Review, VL (Octo­
ber, 1939), pp. 59-82. Lester Shippee, "Germany and the 
Spanish-American War," American Historical Review, XXX
(July, 1925), pp. 754-7 .
^46see Gelber, Friendship, pp. 30-2; Campbell, Under­
standing, pp. 44-55; Alfred Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy 
of the United States, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.,
19 3 8), pp. 30-1. Robert Neale minimized the effects of the 
war on the relations between the governments of Britain and 
the United States, and supports the thesis that the British 
press was more pro-American than was the British Government. 
Neale, Expansion, pp. 205» 213.
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work on the subject of the American conquest of the Philip­
pines concludes that France was "bound by tradition and 
financial interests" to Spain, but that despite this "she 
was friendly to the United States."1^7 This is perhaps an 
overstatement, but it is generally correct. The war did not 
leave any legacy of hard feelings, and the restoration of 
peace presented the opportunity for a new Franco-American 
rapprochement. The extent to which this opportunity was 
realized in the subsequent few years is the subject matter 
for the following chapters of this study.
l^?livezey and Grunder, Philippines, p. 15.
CHAPTER IV 
THE MOVEKiENT TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT
With the ending of the Spanish-American War there 
was an immediate improvement in relations between the United 
States and France, and this improvement continued almost 
unbroken until the first World War. Largely this was an 
accident of historical circumstances which resulted in a 
general harmony of interests. But in addition to this, there 
were efforts made by many groups and many individuals which 
were consciously directed toward this goal. For example, 
the two French Foreign Ministers, Gabriel Hanotaux and 
Théophile Delcasse, both realized the importance of the 
potential diplomatic support which might be obtained from 
the American Republic, and this consideration was an impor­
tant aspect of the foreign policy of both men. In the 
preceding chapter it was seen that Hanotaux was anxious 
that the French Government remain neutral during the war, 
and after leaving the Quai d*Orsay, he continued to try to 
improve Franco-American relations, Delcasse was no less 
anxious to continue this diplomatic effort. His best 
biographier has demonstrated that Delcasse "saw in the ever
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growing United States a useful addition to his system of 
ententes, and systematically set about wooing the new power, 
During the first decade of the twentieth century Amer­
ican foreign policy was largely dominated by one man—  
Theodore Roosevelt, For this reason, in the study of Franco- 
American relations, it is of primary importance to consider 
Roosevelt's conception of France, Before becoming President 
he generally expressed a general disdain for French culture. 
As a student at Harvard he wrote that his most difficult 
study was "that villainous F r e n c h . I n  several letters he 
wrote that the French were not progressive or capable of 
self-government, and for this reason he was convinced that 
"the day of the Latin races is almost over,"^ Roosevelt 
was at one time concerned that the French Canadians were 
"swarming into New England with ominous rapidity,"^ One of 
his major criticisms of Jefferson was that as President
Iporter, Delcasse. pp, 1^4, 325» ^Porter adds that 
"after the 'happy mediation' of Delcasse which put an end 
to the Spanish-American War he was able to render Franco- 
American relations still more close and still more confi­
dent," p. 154, Probably Porter exaggerates the role of 
Delcasse in the improvement of relations,
^Garleton Putnam, Theodore Roosevelt1 The Formative 
Years, 1855-1886, (New York; Charles Schreibner's Sons,
1958), p, l4o,
^Roosevelt to Bryce, November 25, I8 9 8, Morison, 
Roosevelt, II, p, 889, Roosevelt to Sternburg, October 11, 
1901, Morison, Roosevelt, III, p, I7 3,
^Roosevelt to Francis Parkman, Ifey 22, I898, Morison, 
Roosevelt, I, pp, 282-3,
97
"Jefferson put the interests of France above the interests 
and honor of America,"5 In I898 Roosevelt wrote that France 
had been unfriendly toward the United States for more than 
a century, and he hoped that the American Government would 
not "submit" to French efforts to increase her colonial 
empire in South America.& At the time of the Boxer Rebel­
lion Roosevelt felt it easy to believe reports that the 
French soldiers had been "inefficient as well as inconceivably 
and wantonly cruel towards the C h i n e s e ,
After becoming President, Roosevelt became much more 
favorable toward France, At the time of his European trip of 
1910 he wrote of his admiration for French rulers 1
It shows my own complacent Anglo-Saxon ignorance 
that I had hitherto rather looked down upon 
French public men, and have thought of them as 
people of marked levity. When I met them, I 
found that they had just as solid characters 
as English and American public men.*
While President, Roosevelt did not denounce French culture
in his letters as he had earlier, and indeed, at times he
^Roosevelt to Francis Moore, February 9, I898, Ibid,,
pp, 771-2 ,
^Roosevelt to Francis Moore, February 5, I898, Ibid.,
pp. 768-9 .
7Roosevelt to Sternburg, March 8, I90I, Morison, 
Roosevelt, III, pp, 5-6, Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 19, 
1 9 0 0, Morison, Roosevelt, II, p, 1428, Roosevelt to Gerald 
Kitson, May 4, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt, III, p, 70,
^Roosevelt to George Jevelyan, October 1, 1911, Mori­
son, Roosevelt, VII, p, 380,
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appeared to be somewhat pro-French.^ It should be pointed 
out that the letters of Roosevelt do not often reflect 
systematic conceptions about the nations of the world. 
Roosevelt wrote what was on his mind at the time, and he 
adapted his letter to the person to whom he was writing.
Yet there is a noticable change in the general description 
of France that appears in Roosevelt's correspondence. This 
improvement resulted from a number of considerations. 
Primarily, it was because Roosevelt became convinced that 
the interests of France and the United States were compli­
mentary to each other. The increasing competition with 
Germany, Russia, and then Japan caused him to desire the 
diplomatic support of France. Also there is reason to 
believe that Roosevelt was influenced by two skillful French 
Ambassadors, Jules Gambon and Jean-Jules Jusserand. Roose­
velt was a man who was influenced by personal relationships, 
and both men tried to use this to the advantage of France.
Jules Gambon was the French Ambassador for the first 
year and a half of Roosevelt's administration, and during 
this time Roosevelt and Gambon became very close friends. 
Always, Gambon expressed a profound admiration for the 
American President in his diplomatic reports, correspondence 
not intended for publicity. In one despatch he described
^Roosevelt to Delcasse, October 18, 1904, Morison, 
Roosevelt, V, p. 365. Roosevelt to Carnegie, August 6, I9 0 6, 
Ibid., pT 345. Jusserand to Delcasse, October 18, 1904,
DDF, Vol. v2, no. 380, p. 475. Jusserand, Befell, pp. 275-6.
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Roosevelt as "skillful in flattering opinion, simple, unsel­
fish" and "anything but a vulgar personage," Yet Gambon 
also wrote that Roosevelt was an imperialist who "loves war, 
and thinks it necessary to humanity and to the greatness of 
the United States." It is significant that Gambon, who was 
suspicious of American ambitions, did not think that Roose­
velt as President would be a real danger to French inter­
ests,^® Roosevelt and Gambon had a number of lengthy conver­
sations, In 1902 Gambon was once pleased to report that 
Roosevelt had expressed his conviction that it was in the 
American interests to work for closer co-operation with 
France, Gambon was equally pleased that Roosevelt indicated 
fears of Germany's intentions,^
Any study of Franco-American relations early in the 
twentieth century would have to take into account the in­
fluence of Jean-Jules Jusserand,who was Ambassador in Wash­
ington from 1902 to 1925*^2 Jusserand, was chosen to go to 
the United States following a successful career in Denmark,
l®Tabouis, Gambon, pp, IO7-8 ,
l^Gambcn to Delcasse^, January 15# 1902, DDF, Vol. 11^, 
no, 3 2, p# 33»
In 1936 a memorial stone of Jusserand was placed at 
Rock Creek Park, At the dedication Franklin D, Roosevelt 
declared: "We know his splendid career as the representative
of our Sister Republic, the deep friendship between himself 
and Theodore Roosevelt, his wide knowledge and understanding 
of the American people," William Paris et al,, Jean-Jules 
Jusserand: Ambassador of the French Republic to the United
States of America, 1902-1925# (New York: Jusserand Memorial
Committee, 1937)» pp. 19-20.
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and he was especially prepared to go to an English speaking 
country because of his knowledge of English history and 
literature. His works English Wayfaring Life in the Middle 
Ages (1899) and Shakespeare in France (I898) were recognized 
as major historical contributions. Roosevelt, who was an 
omnivorous reader, was delighted that Jusserand was to take 
charge of the French Embassy. Before their first meeting, 
Roosevelt is reported to have said: "I have bought the
works of the French Ambassador, and I am ready to pass an 
examination on them."^3 After the formal diplomatic intro­
duction, the two men spoke of literature and politics. 
Roosevelt compared English medieval life with observations 
in Colorado, and Jusserand was impressed with the President's 
knowledge as well as his ability to speak F r e n c h . T h e
following day Roosevelt wrote to his son: "He is a nice
little man, very dark and dapper, and is really a fine 
scholar. Having the diplomats presented to me is an awful
bore as a rule. But this was a different matter; I kept
him talking for an hour."^^
Shortly after the formal presentation, Roosevelt 
invited Jusserand to join him in a walk in Rock Creek Park.
In his memoirs Jusserand described this experience: "a run:
13Jusserand, Befell, p. 221. 
l^ibid.. pp. 220-1.
l^Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, February 8, 1902, 
Morison, Roosevelt. Ill, p. 422.
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no stopping, no breathing time, no slacking of speed, but a 
continuous race, careless of mud, thornes, and the rest."^^ 
Following the walk the two men went swimming in the nude in 
the Potomac River, In the water Roosevelt remarked to 
Jusserand that he had forgotten to remove his gloves, and 
the French Ambassador replied, "We might meet ladies,"1? 
Jusserand's athletic ability impressed Roosevelt and contri­
buted toward the development of an intimate friendship 
between the two men. One British Ambassador, disliked by 
Roosevelt, had made a bad impression on the American Presi­
dent when he had failed to keep up with Roosevelt's pace,18 
Jusserand believed that his athletic ability was important 
in his personal relations with Roosevelt, In his presiden­
tial address to the American Historical Association in 1922 
Jusserand referred to his "boyhood days" of "swimming rivers 
and climbing rocks," and he declared that this early exper­
ience was "of service years later, when as Ambassador in 
far-off America, in order to keep company with the chief of 
state. President Roosevelt,"19 Very often Roosevelt played
1^Jusserand, Befell, pp, 330-2.
l^Ibid,. pp, 333-6, Roosevelt, Autobiography, p, 52, 
Also see* Nicholas Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt* The Man 
As I Knew Him. (New York* Dodd, Mead, and Co., I9 6 9), p, 40,
l®Sir Percy Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand % A Biography. 
(London* Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1926), p, 275*
19Jean-Jules Jusserand, "The School for Ambassadors," 
American Historical Review. XXVII (April, 1922), p, 436,
102
tennis and went horseback riding with Jusserand, to the 
extent that the French Ambassador was sometimes considered 
as a member of Roosevelt's tennis court cabinet.20
Jusserand was sent to Washington to work in behalf 
of French interests, and he always believed that the major 
way to fulfill this task was to help give Roosevelt a better 
impression of France and French culture. In a lengthy 
despatch of 1904 Jusserand reported to Delcasse that the 
American President had a bad impression of the French char­
acter because he had read only the "skeptical, irrespectful, 
decadent and quarrelsome side" of French literature, and he 
boasted that he was taking advantage of his opportunities to 
educate the President, Jusserand wrote that at a dinner 
Roosevelt praised the brave Germanic warriors of the 
Nibelungenlied. Jusserand declared that courage was not 
only present in German medieval literature, but that it was 
just as prevalent in the Chanson de Roland. Roosevelt had 
never read the epic poem and he asked the Ambassador if he 
had a copy of the work. Jusserand was naturally happy to 
rush the work to Roosevelt, and the President was immediately 
impressed with the romantic atmosphere of chivalry which was 
so in keeping with his values,Jusserand wrote in What Me
^^Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, February 2, 1908, 
Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. VI, p. 922.
21Jusserand to Delcasse, March 9» 1904, DDF, Vol. IV^, 
no. 340, pp. 446-7,
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Befell that after this event the Chanson de Roland "enjoyed
more popularity in Washington Society than it ever did 
before, or ever has since,"2% it is interesting that when 
Roosevelt delivered his presidential address to the American 
Historical Association he made reference to the famous poem.23 
Jusserand was a very perceptive writer, and some of 
the best descriptions of Theodore Roosevelt are to be found 
in his diplomatic reports to the Quai d'Orsay. Jusserand, 
like Gambon, admired the ability and intelligence of Roose­
velt. He accepted without question Roosevelt's account of 
how he had threatened the German Emperor during the Vene-
pit
zuelan crisis of 1902. In a 1905 conversation, Roosevelt 
told JusserandI "When I think of the future, I can foresee 
the possibility of war with Germany, England, Russia, and 
Japan, but I cannot anticipate one with France." Roosevelt 
is reported to have further stated* "What I love about 
France, is that with all her literature and her fine arts, 
when it is necessary to fight, she is always ready."25 it 
is impossible to measure the extent to which Roosevelt's 
thinking was influenced by Jusserand, but it can be stated
Jusserand, Befell, p. 254.
23Theodore Roosevelt, "History as Literature," Amer­
ican Historical Review. XVIII (April, 1913), p. 4?4.
2^jusserand, Befell, pp. 237-8.
Jusserand to Delcasse, January 25, 1905, DDF, Vol. 
VI, no. 49, pp. 63-4.
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that the influence was real. Secretary of State Root, an­
other of Jusserand's personal friends, later wrote in regard 
to the French Ambassador: "No finer statesmanship, no more
judicious diplomacy, no wiser sympathy has ever taken part 
in the great affairs of the world.
When considering the role of the diplomats on Franco- 
American relations, there should be some mention of those 
in charge of the American Embassy at Paris, The American 
Ambassadors of the period, Horace Porter, Robert McCormick 
and Henry White, were capable and conscientious,^7 Even 
more important for the orderly functioning of the Embassy 
was the work of Henry Vignaud, the first secretary at the 
Embassy for more than thirty years, Vignaud was born in 
New Orleans in the French quarter, and at a young age he was 
editor of La Renaissance Louisianaise, a literary review.
At the outbreak of the Civil War he joined the Confederate 
Army and became a Captain» When New Orleans was captured 
he fled to Paris, France, where he worked as a journalist 
in the effort to enlist European aid for the Southern cause. 
After the war Vignaud quickly returned his allegiance to the 
Federal Government, and he represented the United States at
^^Paris, Jusserand, p, 29.
7^(jhe only work on the subject is Heckles Wilson, 
America's Ambassadors to France, 1777-1927. (New York: 
Frederick A, Stokes, 192Ô,) This is a poor work of little 
research or analysis, Roosevelt praised Porter in his 
letter to Uferia Storer, October 4, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt. 
Vol. Ill, p, 159.
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the settlement of the Alabama claims. In 188? he was 
appointed secretary of the Paris Embassy. Ambassadors 
Porter and McCormick both indicated that they relied very 
heavily on the efforts of the first secretary,vignaud 
wrote many long perceptive dispatches to Washington, and on 
several occasions he served as charge d'affaires. He was 
respected in Paris, and he had valuable contacts in the 
French Government, In I905 he served as the Umpire of the 
arbitration of the French claims against Haiti,^9 in addi­
tion to his diplomatic career, Vignaud was an important 
historian who wrote several scholarly books on Columbus 
and Amerigo Vespucci,3®
The personal relationships of the diplomats did have 
some influence on Franco-American diplomatic relations, but 
of much greater significance was the nature of the European 
power struggle and the position of the United States in 
respect to that struggle. It has been often emphasized that 
during the period of this study a central theme of American
PfiMcCormick to Root, December 15, I9 0 6, Despatches,
Vol. 125, Meade and Pearson, Soldier, pp. 191-2,
29waldo leland, "Henry Vignaud," Dictionary of American 
Biography edited by Dumas Malone, (New York: Charles
Schribner's Sons, 1936), Vol. X, pp, 268-9 ,
^^Histoire critique de la grande entreprise de 
Christophe Colomb, 2 vols, (Paris: H, Welter, I9II),
Vignaud argued in this work that Columbus was not searching 
for the Orient but that he hoped to discover a new continent. 
The thesis has been rejected by Samuel Eliot Morison and 
most scholars of today.
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foreign policy was the development of a closer co-operation 
with Great Britain. Secretary Hay in 1899 wrote that "the 
one indispensible feature of our foreign policy should be 
a friendly understanding with E n g l a n d , A t  the time that 
Hay wrote these words there was the possibility of a French 
intervention into the Boer War, and the year before there had 
almost been a Franco-British war as a result of the Fashoda 
crisis.32 Years later Foreign Minister Hanotaux wrote that 
the tensions between France and Britain had created diffi­
culties between France and the United States. Hanotaux 
indicated that this situation had been of great concern to 
him in the late 1890*8,33 It was always understood at the 
Quai d'Orsay that there could not be a public alliance 
between the English speaking countries, but some officials 
did worry about the possibility of a possible secret entente.
The unexpected Entente Cordiale which was signed by 
Paul Gambon and Lord Lansdowne on April 8, 1904, created a 
diplomatic revolution which was to have a major influence on 
the entire international situation of the early twentieth 
century.3^ The formation of the entente naturally improved
3ÏHay to Henry White, September 24, I8 9 8, Thayer, Hay. 
Vol. II, p. 221.
32Langer, Expansion, pp. 670-2. Dennis, Adventures. 
p. 440.
33Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivante: en ^érique
du Nord, (Paris» Librairie Hachette et oie, I9 1 3), p. 49,
3^or the agreement see DDF, Vol. IV^, no. 389, pp.
533-43.
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the relations between France and the United States, Shortly 
after it was made public, there was a poll taken by the 
Literary Digest revealing that the majority of American press 
editors looked upon the agreement with favor,35 in a private 
letter Secretary Root informed Henry White that the Department 
of State would attempt to encourage the continuation of the 
entente because "it is useful to us as well as a g r e e a b l e ,"36 
At about this same time Roosevelt wrote the English King 
that there was a "constantly growing friendship and under­
standing between the English-speaking peoples," and he con­
cluded that American interests were "identical" with those 
of Great Britain,37 A conviction of oneness in American 
and British interests implied that there would be no basic 
contradiction between the interests of the United States and 
France,
It is also obvious that America's position in regard 
to Germany had a direct bearing on her French relations. It 
can generally be said that American-German relations gradually 
worsened after the Samoan controversy of 1885 until the out­
break of the first World War, and the American press reflected
^^Literarv Digest, XXVIII (April l6 , 1904), p, 634,
3&Root to White, November 28, 1905, quoted in Nevins, 
White, pp, 267-8 ,
Roosevelt to Edward VII, March 9, I9 0 5, quoted in 
Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, (London* Macmillan & Co,, 1925), 
Vol. II, P, 432; Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. IV, p. 1135*
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this t r e n d . J o h n  Hay was probably the most anti-German 
of the American public leaders, and the German foreign 
office was unhappy in I898 when Hay was appointed Secretary 
of State.39 The German Ambassador, Speck von Sternburg, was 
a very capable diplomat, and he was an important figure who 
worked hard in the effort to improve German-American rela­
tions. Sternburg and Roosevelt were good friends before the 
latter became President, and Roosevelt had the American 
Ambassador in Berlin use his influence to have Sternburg 
sent to W a s h i n g t o n . W h e n  Sternburg was appointed Ambassa­
dor in 1903 Roosevelt assured Jusserand that the new German 
Ambassador would have no influence on American foreign policy, 
Jusserand, however, was concerned that Sternburg would be 
able to use his special friendship with the President to the 
detriment of French i n t e r e s t s . T h e  following year Jusse­
rand complainedI "All the means and special aptitudes that 
have ever been used by Ambassadors are being tried by Stern­
burg.
3®Clara Eve Schieber, The Transformation of American 
Sentiment toward Germany, 1870-191%. (New York* The Corn- 
hill Publishing co., 1923). PP. 6 3, 15I, 198-203.
39oennett, Hay, pp. 385-6 .
^^Roosevelt to White, December 17» 1901, Morison, 
Roosevelt. Vol. Ill, p. 208.
Margerie to Delcasse, January 18, I9 0 3, DDF, Vol. 
IIl2, no. 33» p. 43; January 12, I9 0 3, no. 20, pp. 25-6.
42Jusserand to Delcasse, March 9» 1904, Ibid.. IV%, 
no. 340, pp. 444-5.
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Roosevelt's views of Germany and the German Kaiser, 
like his views on most subjects, were in a constant state 
of transition, and these views generally reflected his imme­
diate reaction to events. German policy during the Spanish- 
American war angered Roosevelt, but the very next year he 
wrote that the Kaiser was "far and away the greatest crowned 
head of the present d a y , "^3 in I900 Roosevelt wrote of his 
"very strong hope that Germany, England and the United States 
will more and more be able to act t o g e t h e r . W i l l i a m  II 
admired the militarism of Roosevelt, and the Kaiser often 
said, "That's my m a n  ."^ 5^ in 1904, when the Venezuelan crisis 
was fresh on his memory, Roosevelt declared: "The only man
I understand and who understands me is the Kaiser. "^6 At 
this same time Ambassador Jusserand became very upset when 
he heard Roosevelt praise the courage and initiative of the 
German Kaiser.^? Bulow was optimistic about Roosevelt's 
attitude to the extent that he suggested to the Emperor that 
there should be the effort for a defensive alliance between
^^Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 27, 1899, Morison, 
Roosevelt. Vol. II, pp. 1097-8.
^Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 19, 1900, Ibid.. 
p. 1428.
^^Bernhard von Bulow, Mémoires du Chancelier de Bulow. 
(Paris: Librairie Pion, 1930), Vol. I, p. 474.
^^Sternburg to BÛlow, September 27, 1904, GP, Vol. XIX^, 
no. 6266, p. 5^2 .
Jusserand to Delcasse, March 9, 1904, DDF, Vol. IV%, 
no, 340, p. 446.
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the United States and Germany.^® This optimism, however, 
disappeared at the time of the Moroccan crisis, and by I906 
it was clear that the thrust of American power was on the 
side of the Entente Cordiale,
The policies of France and the United States were 
generally complimentary in the two Hague Conferences. Both 
governments gave lip service to the two ideals of arms 
limitations and arbitration, but neither government was an 
enthusiastic supporter for an ambitious program. At the 
first Hague Conference of 1899 France sent as delegates Leon 
Bourgeois and Baron d'Estournelies de Constant, both of whom 
were well known leaders of the peace movement. The United 
States sent Andrew Dickson White, who shared their views, 
and Captain Alfred Mahan, the most outspoken militarist in 
the United States. The most important contribution of the 
conference was the creation of the Arbitration Tribunal.
This project was largely due to the work of White and Bour­
geois. The American delegation almost refused to sign the 
arbitration convention at the last moment because of Mahan’s 
belief that it did not recognize American isolation from 
European conflict. The Americans finally signed with a 
qualifying statement that America had no obligation to 
"intrude, mingle or entangle" herself in European politics.
^®Bulow to William II, December 24, 1904, GP, XIX^, 
no. 6274, pp. 547-9 .
49Andrew Dickson White, Autobiography. (New York: 
Century, 1905)» pp. 338-41.
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When Roosevelt became President he at first had little faith 
in the tribunal's future, but it is interesting that in 1902 
Baron d*Estournelies helped to convince him to place an 
insignificant Mexican quarrel over Church property at the 
arbitration Tribunal for a d e c i s i o n . T h i s  early settle­
ment helped to establish the Hague Tribunal as a permanent 
instrument of international relations.
As Roosevelt assumed the position of power he became 
more a supporter of the peace movement. By I906 he was 
supporting the calling of a second Hague Conference, although 
at the time he wrote his son that the American Navy was "an 
infinitely more potent factor for peace than all the peace 
societies."51 Roosevelt was worried about the military 
expansion of Germany, and he wrote in a letter that Germany 
"despised the Hague Conference and the whole Hague idea."5% 
Before the second conference met he expressed his conviction 
that "we can work hand in hand with France and England," and 
he always emphasized his conviction that these three nations 
of "free peoples" could not "disarm and leave the various
5®Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs. (Boston: Houghton
Miffin, 1913). Vol. II, pp. 390-1.
5lRoosevelt to Eliot Roosevelt, September 22, I9 0 6, 
Morison, Roosevelt. Vol. V, p. 421.
52Roosevelt to Straus, February 2?, 1906, Ibid.. Vol. 
V, p. 168.
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military despotisms and military barbarisms armed, **53 At 
the second Hague Conference the question of a limitation 
of armaments was never even mentioned, and Prance was one 
of the nation’s primarily responsible for keeping the ques­
tion off of the agenda, 54 Before the conference, however, 
the French Government took the position that if the United 
States would support a positive program of arms limitations, 
the French delegate would not be instructed to oppose the 
American plan,55 To France’s pleasure Roosevelt did not 
choose to support such a plan, but rather he placed his 
support in behalf of improving the machinery of the Arbitra­
tion Tribunal,5^ The French Government did not fear that 
this program would be contrary to French interests.
If Roosevelt was not utopian in his hopes for the 
peace movement, he did support the formation of arbitration 
treaties between the United States and friendly nations. 
Following the Franco-British arbitration treaty of 1903
^^Roosevelt to Henry White, August 14, I9 0 6, Morison 
Roosevelt, Vol. V, p, 359» Roosevelt to Andrew Carnegie, 
August 6, 1 9 0 6, Ibid,. p. 346,
5^Beale, Roosevelt, pp, 295» 300,
55paul Gambon to Pichon, January I9 , I9 0 7, DDF, Vol. 
X^, no, 395» PP# 624-5, Pichon to Jusserand, January 14, 
1907» Ibid,. no, 3 9 2, pp, 619-2 0 ,
Root to Choate and Porter, May 3I» 1905» James 
Scott, ed,, Instructions of the American Delegates to the 
Hague Peace Conferences and their Official Reports, (New 
YorkI Oxford University Press, I9I6 ), pp, 79-60, Meade 
and Pearson, Soldier, pp, 311-32,
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Baron d*Estournelies and the peace spokesmen of both the 
United States and Prance advocated that their two governments 
should follow the precedent of the treaty of I90 3. Early 
in 1904 Hay and Jusserand had a long conversation about the 
possibility of arranging a similar arbitration treaty.
Foreign Minister Delcasse outlined a provisional treaty which 
would provide for arbitration at the Hague Court all questions 
of legal differences or interpretations of treaties with the 
exception of matters of "the vital interests, the indepen­
dence or the honor of the contracting parties." Delcasse 
further proposed that before a question would be submitted 
to the court the two nations would sign a "special agreement" 
defining the objects and the limits of the settlement.57 A 
Franco-American treaty, almost identical to Delcasse's 
suggested one, was signed between Secretary Hay and Jusserand 
on November 1, 1904. At the time when the treaty was made 
public General Porter told reporters that Franco-American 
relations were so close that the treaty would probably have 
little effect except that it gave "definite treaty form to 
the long existing friendship of the two governments and 
peoples."5®
The Franco-American treaty of 1904 was only one of 
a series of almost identical arbitration treaties negotiated
Jusserand to Hay, February 26, 1904, Notes. Vol. 45.
5^New York Observer. November 3» 1904, clipping in 
the Porter papers. Box V.
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by Roosevelt and Hay in November and December of that year.
The Senate was unhappy with the treaties primarily because 
of its fear that the President was trying to usurp the legis­
lative prerogatives. In February, 1905» the Senate voted to 
amend the agreements so as to make it necessary for the Senate 
to concur before any matter preceding its submission to the 
Hague Tribunal, Roosevelt was hopeful that he might make a 
compromise with the Senate, He told Jusserand* "The Senate 
will not give me all I want, but I shall snatch some part of 
it,"59 Roosevelt wrote one Senator that the amendment "con­
verts the whole business into sham."^® Roosevelt failed in 
his efforts at a compromise. He and Secretary Hay decided 
to drop the treaties entirely rather than accept the amend­
ment which they believed made them valueless. Secretary Hay 
said of the matter* "A treaty entering the Senate is like a 
bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when 
the final blow will fall, but one thing is certain, it will 
never leave the arena alive,
Three years later Secretary of State Root persuaded 
Roosevelt that weak arbitration treaties were better than
59conversation of February 19» 1905» Jusserand, Befell.
p, 261,
üORoosevelt to John Spooner, January 6, 1905» Morison, 
Roosevelt, Vol. IV, no, 3420, p, 1092,
5lwilliam Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Letters of John 
Hay, (Boston and New York* Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915), II, 
p, 263,
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none at all, and Root negotiated new treaties that incor­
porated the Senate amendment# The first of the new series 
of treaties was made with Prance, signed between Root and 
Jusserand on February 10, 1908.62 v/ith the French treaty as 
a pattern the Roosevelt Administration successfully concluded 
twenty-five such agreements with all the major powers of the 
world except Germany.^3 Later in 1911 President Taft nego­
tiated arbitration treaties with Great Britain and France 
which went farther than the Roosevelt treaties in that they 
included all justiciable matters even national interests were 
involved. Roosevelt bitterly attacked the proposed treaties. 
He argued that such an arrangement was possible with England 
but that it was "academic" because of the "impossibility" of 
serious disagreement between the two English speaking coun­
tries,^^ Such a treaty with any other country was "not merely 
foolish but wicked."65 Roosevelt encouraged the Senate to 
amend the treaties so as to exclude matters of national
^^Copy in FR, 1908, pp. 331-3.
63por a discussion of the treaties see William S. Holt, 
Treaties Defeated by the Senate, (Baltimore* The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1933). pp. 204-12. Philip Jessup, Elihu Root. 
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938), pp. 79-81,
6^Theodore Roosevelt, "The Arbitration Treaty with 
Great Britain," The Outlook, Vol. XGVIII (May 20, I9II), 
p. 97-8. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, August 22, 1911» Morison, 
no. 5508.
^^Roosevelt, "Arbitration* Pretence and Reality,"
The Outlook, XCIX (November 4, I9II), p. 5 8 6. "The Peace 
of Righteousness," September 11, 1911» Ibid., pp. 66-7 0,
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interest, and this became the fate of Taft's ambitious 
treaties.66 The implication of Roosevelt's position was 
that he feared a possible conflict of interest between 
Prance and the United States, but probably he did not ser­
iously entertain such fears. Taft was convinced that Roose­
velt was motivated primarily by his ambitions for the election 
of 19 1 2, and in hindsight this seems to have been the sit­
uations 6?
The improvement of the European news coverage in the 
United States seems to have had an influence in American- 
French relations. Until 1902 the Associated Press had only 
one foreign agency which was in London, and this implied 
that the news was from a British perspective. In that year 
Ambassador Jules Gambon complained to the director of the 
Associated Press, Melville Stone, that all news relating to 
France had a British nuance. Stone replied that the tele­
graph service in France was generally inefficient and that 
it was faster to operate through London. He did agree to
go to Paris to see about the possibilities of establishing
/
a french office, and Gambon wired Delcasse that the matter 
should be treated with some urgency. In Paris Stone and
t
Delcasse discussed the matter, and the latter agreed to
^^See George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and 
the Birth of Modern ^erica, 1900-191^ (New York: Harper
& Row, 1958), pp. 278-9.
67Sullivan, Times, Vol. V, p. 461.
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co-operate with the Associated Press in providing a rapid 
telegraph service on government lines. After the change 
went into effect Stone noted in his memoirs: "We established
an adequate bureau in Paris, and employed a large number of 
subordinate correspondents throughout the country, sometimes 
Frenchmen and sometimes Americans, and our service has proved 
highly satisfactory."^® After this change in the Associated 
Press there were fewer complaints by Frenchmen that the 
United States did not have the French version of newspaper 
items.
Educators in the United States have always had a cer­
tain amount of influence on public opinion. In the latter 
part of the nineteenth century Germany was considered to be 
a type of intellectual Mecca, and many Americans went to 
Germany to do graduate work. France did not have the prestige 
in the American academic world. Some interested Frenchmen,
hoping to change the situation, in 1874 organized the 
/ / /
Société Américaine de France, The Franco-American Committee 
was organized in I895 with the single purpose of providing 
opportunities for American students in France, and in I909  
the committee was reorganized on a larger scale under the
®®Melville E, Stone, "M.E.S."--His Book: A Tribute
and a Souvenir of the Twenty-Five Years. 1893-1918. of the 
Service of Melville E. Stone as General Manager of the 
Associated Press, (New York and London: Harper & Brothers 
Pub,, I9IÈ), pp. 125-9 .
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leadership of Gabriel H a n o t a u x , Harvard University took 
the leadership in improving relations between the academic 
works of Prance and the United S t a t e s , T h e  Harvard his­
torian, Charles H, Haskins, in 1897 declared that opportun­
ities for American students of history were very good in 
Prance,71 In I898 James H, Hyde provided a large fund which 
was to be used to bring prominent Prench professors to give 
conferences at Harvard, In 1904 Hyde financed a chair at 
the Sorbonne for a visiting professor of Harvard each year, 
Por the first three years the chair was filled by Barrett 
Wendell, George Santayana and Archibald C, Coolidge,?^
This experience resulted in Wendell's popular La Prance 
d'aujourd'hui and an unpublished manuscript by Coolidge, 
"Prance as a World P o w e r , "73 py the beginning of World 
War I the bias among American college and university pro­
fessors was almost five to four against Germany,7^
^Sigmund Skard, American Studies in Europe i Their 
History and Present Organization, (Philadelphia! University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 195&),Vol, II, pp, 144-5,
7®Bernard Pay et al,. Harvard and Prance, (Paris 1 
Revue d'histoire moderne, I936),
71"0pportunities for American Students of History at 
Paris", American Historical Review, Vol, III, (April, I898), 
pp, 418-30,
72pay, Harvard, pp, 215, 23I,
73Barrett Wendell, la Prance d'aujourd'hui, (Paris 1 
Nelson, 1909), Coolidge's manuscript is in the Coolidge col­
lection at Harvard University Library,
74schieber, Opinion, p, 284,
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In France one is astonished by the material published 
about the United States during the general period of this 
study, and this indicates that Frenchmen had a great deal 
of interest about the American Republic, After 1880 the 
study of American history and geography became popular in 
France, and many students studied in American universities.
In 1898 Andre Siegfried, who was to write much on the United 
States, visited the country for the first time,?^ The 
popular novelist, Paul Auguste Adam, visited the United 
States in 1904, and the following year he wrote Vues d*Amér­
ique. ou la nouvelle .jouvence, which was pro-American and 
widely read in F r a n c e . 77 The economist, Pierre Leroy- 
Beaulieu, presented a very attractive picture of the American 
economy in his Les Etats-Unis au XX^ siècle.7Q The famous 
pacifist, Paul d'Estournelles de Constant, was a great 
admirer of the United States as is seen in his America and 
Her P r o b l e m s . 79 Gabriel Hanotaux was especially interested
^^Skard, Studies, pp. 146-7.
7^Andre Siegfried, Les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. (Paris* 
Librairie Armand, 1929).
77Paul Auguste Marie Adam, Vues d'Amerique, ou la 
nouvelle .jouvence, (Paris* Ollendorff, 1905).
78pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Etats-Unis au XX® siecle. 
(Paris* A Colin, 1909).
79paul H. B, d'Estournelles de Constant, America and 
Her Problems. (New York» The Macmillan Co., 1915). The 
work was later translated into French.
120
in French relations with the United States, In 1913 Hanotaux 
wrote La France vivante en Amérique du Nord which begani 
“This volume is a book of action. Its object is concrete 
and precise* to develop the relations between France and 
America,“80
One important writer to popularize a good image of 
the United States in France was Andre Tardieu, Tardieu 
delivered the Hyde lectures at Harvard in I9O8 , These lec­
tures were published the next year in France and the Alli­
ances,^^ After delivering the Harvard lectures Tardieu 
visited the United States for a month, and during this time 
he met many important political leaders including Lodge, 
Roosevelt and Root, These experiences were the basis for one 
of the most interesting of travel accounts of AmericaI Notes 
sur les Etats-Unis, Tardieu’s descriptive account was almost 
entirely pro-American, He reported that "Americans love 
France,” “The United States," he wrote, “are a nation of 
tradition, and the American tradition has, at its roots, a 
French tradition,“82 Tardieu reported that the majority of 
American leaders, including Roosevelt, were admirers of France
8®Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivante en Amérique du 
Nord. (Paris* Librairie Hachette, 1913)» P» 1»
Q t /
André Tardieu, France and the Alliances. (Paris*
F, Alcan, 1910).
ftp  ^ / /
André Tardieu, Notes sur les Etats-Unis* la societe--
la politique— la diplomatie, (Paris* Calmann-Levy, I9O8 ),
pp, 67-Ô,
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and the French c u l t u r e , H e  emphasized the great power of 
the United States and the benefit that this power could be
to Prance,84
Pierre de Coubertin was an important figure who was 
busy trying to further the Franco-American friendship. In 
1893 he studied in the United States, and he was shocked to 
find that interest in French thought, literature and culture 
had declined. In order to improve the situation he began 
in 1900 a yearbook, La Chronique de France, The preface to 
the first edition frankly states that the purpose of the work 
would be to "conquer sympathies for France," and for this 
reason free copies were to be sent to the university libraries 
of Europe, America and A s i a , 85 By 1902 Coubertin believed 
that there had been an improvement to the extent that he 
wrote an article entitled "La conquête des Etats-Unis," In 
the article he summarized the relations between the two 
countries, and he concluded that a rapprochement had been 
achieved to the extent that the two nations had a type of 
unsigned alliance. In bringing this change he noted a num­
ber of factors: the Hyde conferences at Harvard, improved
trade relations, harmonious interests and a wise foreign
83lbid,, pp, 123, 1 3 1, 103, 135.
84ibid,, 367-8 , 373-4,
®^"Avant-propos," La Chronique de France, Vol, I, 
1900, pp, VI-X,
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policy on the part of Prance.86 in I903 Coubertin established 
foundations for the study of French literature at Princeton, 
Tulane, Stanford and the University of California,^7
In an account of Franco-American cultural relations 
it is impossible to overlook Henry Adams, The ideas of Adams 
were profoundly influenced by French scientists and philoso­
phers, and Adams was well acquainted with French literature 
from the Chanson de Roland through the nineteenth century,88 
During his lifetime he made some twenty-five trips to France, 
and in the last fifteen years before his death he had the 
practice of spending seven months of each year in Paris,
It is no wonder that the prose in his letters and in his 
books was saturated with French words and expressions. The 
monumental History of the United States during the Adminis­
trations of Jefferson and Madison was dependent on a thorough 
use of French original s o u r c e s , I n  I905 he published the 
famous Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres, an interpretative 
work on France during the middle ages, Adams was not always
G^Ibid,. "la conquête des Etats-Unis," 1902, pp, 107-
13.
^7White, Opinion, p, 2 3 8,
®®This has been handled in detail in Max Baym, The 
French Education of Henry Adams. (New York* Columbia 
University Press, 1931), pp. 22?-231,
G^Ernest Samuels, Henry Adams* The Major Phase. 
(Cambridge* The Belknap Press, 1964), pp. 587-595,
^^Baym, Adams. p, 230,
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uncritical of France, and he once wrote his friend, John Hay, 
that France was in a state of "moral c o l l a p s e , "91 But it 
is clear that Adams was a great admirer of the French cultural 
tradition, and it is probable that many readers in the early 
twentieth century gained a mystical attachment to that tra­
dition from Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres.
Around the turn of the century there were a number of 
ceremonial occasions and dedications which were significant 
for what they reflected about Franco-American relations. In 
1900 France erected a statue of the Marquis de Lafayette in 
Paris, and in order to recognize the occasion the American 
Government minted fifty thousand special Lafayette d o l l a r s , 92 
Two years later the French Government presented the United 
States with a statue of the Comte de Rochambeau. This 
statue was placed in Lafayette Square across from the White 
House. At the dedication ceremony Jules Gambon declared 
that France and the United States "blend in one common chord 
their national hymns and in celebrating their common glory 
they give the world an example of fidelity in f r i e n d s h i p . "93
9^Adams to John Hay, August 20, I899» in Worthington 
Ford, (ed.) Letters of Henry Adams, 1892-1918, (Boston and 
New York I Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 235.
92porter to Hay, March 10, I9 0 0, Despatches, Vol. 118, 
no. 6 3 8.
93oe B. Randolph Keim. Rochambeaui A Commemoration 
of the Congress of the United Stetes of America of the Services 
of the French Auxiliary Forces in the War of Independence. 
(WashingtonI Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 92.
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Henry Cabot Lodge also delivered an address on Rochambeau*s 
importance during the Revolutionary War.9^ It is interesting 
to note that Gambon early suggested that the gift of a 
statue would be a wise gesture on the part of the French 
Government, and Gambon believed that he had been largely 
responsible for the statue of Rochambeau.9^ In I903 France 
presented the United States with bronze casting of the bust 
of George Washington designed by David d*Angers. An earlier 
copy of the same work had been destroyed during the War of 
1812 .96 In 1904 Secretary of State Hay was offered the award 
of the Grand Gross of the National Order of the Legion of 
Honor. In I905 the Commissioner of Art of France offered 
Auguste Rodin's "le Penseur" to the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York.9?
The anniversary of the bi-centenary of the birth of 
Benjamin Franklin attracted a great deal of attention in 
both France and the United States, and the event was natur­
ally the time for the diplomats to speak of Franklin's work 
as a diplomatic representative in France, The American
^Speech is in Henry Cabot Lodge, A Fighting Frigate 
and Other Essays and Addresses. (New York: Charles Schrib-
ner's Sons, 1902), pp. 291-304,
9^Cambon to Delcassé, B^8ay 21, 1902, DDF, Vol. 11%, 
no, 2 5 9# PP* 316-8, Genevieve Tabouis, The Life of Jules 
Gambon. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), p. 113*
9oporter to Hay, October 27, I9 0 3, Despatches, Vol,
123, no, 1254,
9?New York Times, June 15, 1905* p, 4,
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Congress voted to give the French Republic a gold medallion 
to commemorate the occasion. At a Philadelphia ceremony 
Secretary Root spoke of the traditional "American sentiment 
for Prance,"9® In the celebration at Paris there were 4,000 
people assembled in the Palace of the Trocadero, Albert 
Henry Smith, an editor of a collection of Franklin's writ­
ings, delivered the main address. Emile Loubet, Emile Bour­
geois, Aristide Briand and other public leaders took the 
time to be present. The most notable event of the Paris 
celebration was the unveiling of a statue of Franklin made 
by John J. B o y l e . 99
France was not the only nation to try to court the 
American Republic through gifts and ceremonial dedications. 
The German Emperor was also active in similar efforts. In 
1902 William II tried to gain Roosevelt’s sympathy by having 
Alice Roosevelt christen a large yacht and by sending his 
brother, Prince Henry, to visit the United States. The 
Kaiser was very hopeful that the visit of his brother would 
cause an enthusiastic reception, but except for the German 
community, it was not a success.^9® Ambassador Gambon
9®jusserand, Befell, p. 328. Jusserand to Root, May 
20, 1906, Notes. Vol. 46.
99ie Temps, April 28, I9 0 6,
^99schieber, Sentiment, p. 24?.^ Bulow believed that 
the voyage of Henry was a success. Bulow to Henry, January 
3 0, 1902, GP, XVII, no. 5 1 0 6, p. 2 43. Bulow, Memoirs, p. 662.
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anxiously watched the American attitudes to the Prince's 
voyage, Gambon was pleased to note that the anti-German 
John Hay believed that the voyage was "nothing but noise 
without significance." Gambon was less pleased with Roose­
velt's friendly attitude toward Henry, "That can not be 
translated into tangible accomplishments," reported Gambon 
to Paris, "but given the very personal character of the 
President, it is possible that the Prince has not completely 
wasted his time,"101 Roosevelt did write in a letter that 
the Prince was "a thoroughly good fellow," but during the 
Venezuelan crisis later that year it became clear that the 
trip had made no mark on American foreign p o l i c y , 102 Three 
years later Jusserand noted that the voyage was still remem­
bered by Roosevelt, but that this was of no permanent bene­
fit to Germany,103
The International Exposition of 1900 occupied 277 
acres in the heart of Paris and attracted fifty million 
visitors from April to November, Naturally the event received 
much interest in the United States, The American Congress
lOlcambon to Delcasse, February 26, 1902, DDF, Vol,
11%, no, 104, pp, 123-5; May 21, 1902, Ibid,. no, 259» pp. 
316-18,
lO^Roosevelt to Choate, March 3, 1902, quoted in 
Nelson Blake, "Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt", 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLII (September, 1955)» 
p. 1Ô5,
Jusserand to Delcasse, March 6, 1905» DDF, Vol,
Vl2, no, 192, pp, 172-3.
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in 1897 was one of the last of the governments to accept the 
invitation to participate in the exposition. In his annual 
message of that year President McKinley reported "an almost 
unprecedented interest in the proposed exposition," and he 
expressed his hope that the United States "would make a 
worthy exhibit of American genius and skill and their unri­
valed achievement in every branch of i n d u s t r y . D e s p i t e  
the late date for the American decision to participate, she 
was given as large an area for expositions as was any other 
nation. In I898, during the Spanish-American War, M. Marue- 
jouls, the Minister of the Interior, declared in a speech 
that American participation in the event was "the guarantee 
of her perfect accord with P r a n c e . "105 At the same time 
the Congress passed an appropriation of $650,000 to be spent 
at Paris, In his second annual message McKinley declared 
that this was insufficient, and he asked that the amount 
be increased to one million dollars so that the United States 
"might not rest content with any secondary place."1®^ The 
President attempted to use the influence of his office to 
encourage greater American participation, for he believed
lO^The first annual message of December 6 , 1897, in 
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 
(New YorkI Bureau of National Literature, 1911), Vol.' XIV,
pp. 6267-8 ,
lO^porter to Day, July 5, I8 9 8, Despatches, Vol. II6 , 
no. 2 8 9, dispatche contains a newspaper clipping.
lO^Second message of December 5, 1898, in Compilation. 
Vol. XIV, p. 6330.
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that the occassion would have a positive effect on American 
trade as well as Franco-American relations. Later the 
President reported that he had "visited and importuned" 
manufacturers to send exhibits and that in his appeals he 
had made "appeals to patriotism."10?
Several thousand Americans visited the Paris Exposi­
tion. Albert Shaw in a long article encouraged more to 
attend, and he maintained that "the present exposition, as 
a popular university, surpasses anything the world has ever 
seen before."^®® At Paris it appeared that the French had 
forgotten about the surge of anti-Americanism during the 
war two years earlier, Henry Steed, a British journalist, 
complained in his memoirs that the French at the exposition 
neglected England and Germany in the effort to draw nearer 
to her "Sister R e p u b l i c . on the fourth of July the 
American flag was displayed on the Eiffel Tower, carried 
by most of the boats on the Seine, and was displayed from 
many windows. In reference to this day Ambassador Porter
107lbid., p. 6427. Porter also urged that the expo­
sition would help improve relations with France and encourage 
American commerce. Porter to Day, May 24, I898, Despatches, 
Vol. 116.
^®®Albert Shaw, "Paris and the Exposition of I9OO," 
American Monthly Review of Reviews, June, I9 0 0, Vol. XXII, 
pp. 678-9. B.D. Woodward, "The Exposition of I9 0 0," North 
American Review, March, 1900, Vol. GIXX, pp. 472-9,
^^%enry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892- 
192 2, (Garden CityI Doubleday, Page and Co., 1924), Vol. I,
pp. 190-1 .
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observed that "all Paris seemed to display the feeling of 
good will toward the United States which has been steadily 
growing for at least two years."1^0 The United States 
had over seven thousand displays at the exposition— more 
than any other country except for Prance, Americans won 
over two thousand prizes, which was a good showing even if 
it was less than the number won by Prance, England, Germany, 
and Japan.
In 1903 the Exposition honoring the centenary of the 
Louisiana Purchase was naturally well publicized in Prance,
In 1901 Delcasse told General Porter that Prance would accept 
an invitation for participation at the Exposition, but the 
Poreign Minister wanted assurances that there would be 
measures which would prevent a fire such as had occurred at 
the Chicago World’s Pair.^ü The following year Prance for­
mally accepted the invitation to participate.112 Prenchmen 
did not travel as widely as Americans at the turn of the 
century, and for that reason there were few French visitors 
at the Louisiana Exposition, French dignitaries, however, 
had a conspicuous role in the various ceremonial occassions
ll^Quoted in Meade and Pearson, Porter, p. 237.
lllporter to Hay, December 3 0» 1901, Despatches, Vol. 
CXX, no. 943.
112porter to Hay, February 7, 1902, Ibid.. no. 96I.
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of the e v e n t , A m b a s s a d o r  Jusserand believed that the 
Exposition was important to the extent that he includes sev­
eral pages about the matter in his memoirs. He indicated 
that he was impressed by the friendliness that was manifested 
toward F r a n c e , A t  the time of the Exhibition, New Orleans, 
the most French city in the United States, held a large fete 
to Commemorate the Louisiana Centenary, At this occasion 
Jusserand delivered a speech in French to a large crowd, and 
the speech was received with a great deal of enthusiasm,
In 1904 General Porter was able to find the body of 
John Paul Jones after a search of six years and a cost of 
over $35,000, When Porter arrived in France in 1897 he 
"felt a deep sense of humiliation" at the thought that the 
father of the American Navy "had for more than a century 
been lying in a distant foreign land, in a neglected and 
forgotten grave and that no serious attempt had ever been 
made to find his body,"^^^ After two years Porter was able 
to find a copy of Jones' burial certificate which placed 
the burial spot in a deserted grave yard in North East Paris, 
It was already known that the body had been placed in a lead
H^Robert A, Reid, The Greatest of Exhibitions Com­
pletely Illustrated. (St, Louis: Louisiana Purchase Expo-
sition Co., 1904), pp, 6 5, 143, 145,
T14
Jusserand, Befell, pp, 230-5*
ll^Ibid,, pp, 258-9.
ll^Porter to Hay, April 29, 1903, Porter Papers, box
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coffin. Porter's search was kept secret because of the 
tendency in France to regard digging in cemeteries as 
sacrilegious.117 When the coffin was finally discovered 
the body was identified beyond a reasonable doubt because 
it was well preserved and resembled the sculpture of Jean- 
Antoine Houdon. It should be noted that Porter's long search 
for the remains of the American hero took up the greater part 
of his time while he was Ambassador at Paris.H®
Porter's efforts to locate the body of John Paul Jones 
were primarily motivated by patriotic sentiment, but Porter 
was also convinced that the discovery would encourage good 
feelings between France and the United States. After the 
discovery the French Government quickly agreed to allow the 
body to be reburied at the Annapolis Naval Academy. The 
French Government tried to exploit the occasion for a diplo­
matic advantage. At the transfer of the body there was a 
large, impressive ceremony which was jointly financed by 
the French Government and the American E m b a s s y . S e n a t o r  
Lodge was in Paris at the time and he wrote of the events
llfporter to Hay, October 20, I9 0 3, Ibid., box 3.
ll®For a long discussion of the search and many photo­
graphs see Porter to Hay, May I9 , I9 0 5, Despatches, Vol.
124, Porter wrote of the matter in ’’The Recovery of the 
Body of John Paul Jones," Century Magazine. October, I9 0 7.
li9ucCormick to Root, October 3» 1905» Despatches,
Vol. 125, no, 5 1.
132
The ceremony was really splendid and imposing—  
performed with all the excellence and good taste 
of which the French are capable. They left 
nothing undone. The feeling shown to the United 
States from the Ministers to the vast crowds 
which lined the route was very striking. They 
feel that we have stood their friend in the 
Morocco business and the feeling is universal,
"La conduite des Etats-Unis était epatante" is 
what you hear again and again. Their gratitude 
to you and their confidence in you are equally 
marked and I received expressions of it from 
every one. The Prime Minister and all the Cabi­
net following the coffin of Jones on foot— a great
compliment,IZO
The body was taken to the United States by a squadron of 
American battleships, and the French Government provided a 
detachment of cruisers to accompany the American squadron,
At Annapolis on March 23, 1906 there was a long memorial 
ceremony at which time there were speeches delivered by 
Jusserand, Roosevelt and Porter, This was one of those 
times in which it seemed natural to have many words about 
the closeness of France and the United States as well as 
about France's role in the American Revolution,^22
The famous Dreyfus Affair created much attention 
throughout the world, and the United States was no exception, 
Elizabeth White, in her interesting study of American opin­
ion towards France, concluded that the American press was
^20Lodge to Roosevelt, July 8, 1905, Lodge, Letters, 
Vol, II, p, 164, New York Herald (European Edition), July 7, 
1905, clipping in Despatches, Vol, 124,
^21jusserand to Root, April 1, I9 0 6, Notes, Vol, 46,
^22Jusserand, Befell, pp, 285-7• John Paul Jones 
Commemoration at Annapolis, April 24, 1906, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, I9 0 7), pp. 49-79.
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"practically unanimous" in supporting the cause of D r e y f u s . ^23 
A typical article in the Political Science Quarterly of I898 
condemned the system of the "secret trial" in France, and 
the author concluded that Dreyfus* condemnation had "no 
spark of fraternal sympathy in the heart of any genuine Amer­
i c a n , "124 well-known humorist Finley Peter Dunne had
his character "Mr. Dooley" exclaim in his Irish accent:
"The Frrinch are a tumulche people . . . not steady ayether 
in their politics or their morals . . .  it ain't been cap. 
Dhryfuss that's been on thrile, but the honor of the nation 
and honor of the a r r m y , " 1 2 5  Robert Ogden wrote in The Nation 
that France stood "disgraced before the world by this terrible 
denial of j u s t i c e . "126 john T. Moore, Jr. believed that 
Americans should not be too self-righteous in the matter, 
for he believed that Americans should be thankful that they 
possessed the common law and did not have the pressure 
created by aggressive n e i g h b o r s . 127 in a speech at Walton,
New York, in 1899 Theodore Roosevelt declared:
123white, Opinion, p. 252.
l^^Frederick W, Whitredge, "Zola, Dreyfus, and the 
Republic," Political Science Quarterly. Vol. XIII (June,
1898), p. 2 7 2.
125Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley in Peace and in War. 
(Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 189&), pp. 234-8.
12^The Nation. Vol. IXIX, p. 200.
127iiThe Dreyfus and Zola Trials," Atlantic, Vol. IXXI,
p. 5 8 5.
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It was less Dreyfus on trial than those who tried 
him. We should draw lessons from the trial. It 
was due in part to the bitter religious prejudices 
of the French people. Those who have ever wavered 
from the doctrine of the separation of Church and 
State should ponder upon what has h a p p e n e d , 128
In 1906, after a bitter controversy of twelve years, 
Alfred Dreyfus was finally declared innocent by the Court of 
Cassation, the highest court of France, General Porter, who 
had always refused to discuss the matter publically, breathed 
a sigh of relief, for he had feared that there had been the 
possibility that the affair might have done real damage to 
Franco-American relations,129 American public opinion was 
generally very happy with the outcome, Albert Shaw, for 
example, wrote that "it is not Dreyfus alone who has been 
vindicated before the eyes of mankind--it is France herself," 
He concluded that the acquital demonstrated that "the French 
mind recognizes justice in the ideal and in the abstract, 
and however far short in practice French institutions have 
come from meeting the ideals, there is always the effort to 
bring life into harmony with truth and justice,"13^ it is 
difficult to evaluate whether the Dreyfus Affair had any
128Albert Bushnell Hart, ed,, Theodore Roosevelt 
Cyclopedia, (New York; Roosevelt Memorial Association, 1941), 
p. 1^5.
129jieade and Pearson, Porter, pp. 225. 230,
^30American Monthly Review of Reviews. XXXIV (August, 
1906), p, 147.
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real effect on relations between the United States and 
Prance, Probably Elizabeth White was correct when she 
wrote that it did not lead to "any active ill-will against 
France," but that "it made a very bad impression and led 
to a good deal of patronizing disparagement,"131
At the turn of the century the Religious question was 
a burning issue in French public life, and the subject was 
a consideration which can not be overlooked in the study 
of Franco-American diplomatic relations. At the time con­
servative Catholics of France and of all Europe disliked the 
United States because of her separation of religious and 
public institutions and because the leading liberal voices 
of Catholicism were to be found in that country. In I899 
Leo XIII addressed the letter Testem Benevolentiae against 
liberal ideas which were "called by some Americanism,
The French clergyman, Abbe Charles Maignen, associated 
Americanism with heresy, and he strongly denounced both in 
his Etudes sur 1*Américanisme.133 There were a few liberal
131white, Opinion, p, 256,
132j;(iward Hales, The Catholic Church in the Modern 
World. (Garden CityI Hanover House, 1956), p. 170, P, L, 
Pechenard "The End of 'Americanism* in France", North 
American Review, Vol, CLXX (March, 1900), pp, 420-432,
 ^ ^^^Charles BÈiignen, Etude sur 1*Américanismei 
le Pere Hecker, est-il un saint? (Paris 1 V, Retaux, I899). 
The Catholic paper la Verite on Jfey 2, I897 asked the ques­
tion if the United States was a Christian nation. For 
several examples of Clerical opinion see May, Power, p, 184,
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French Catholics who were more favorable toward the American
/ / / 
experience, Abbe Felix Klein in L*Amérique de demain argued
that the American separation of Church and State allowed for 
greater s p i r i t u a l i t y , I t  should be emphasized that the 
government of the Third Republic was made up almost entirely 
of the anti-clerical party, and conservative Catholics in 
France generally denounced the French Government as vehemently 
as they did the American Government, Rome officially opposed 
the Third Republic until the ralliement of Leo XIII in 1892, 
and even after that date many French Catholics still did not 
accept the Republic, The fact that both the governments of 
France and the United States were denounced in conservative 
Catholic circles probably had little influence on the diplo­
matic relations between the two nations, but if there was 
any influence it was in the direction of more favorable 
relations.
The French Government in I90I took away most of the 
power of the religious orders in the public schools, and 
four years later the Napoleonic Concordat was finally nulli­
fied— an action which meant the formal separation of Church
l^^Felix Klein, L'Amérique de demain. (Paris 1 Plon- 
Nourrit et cie, 1910), ,Also see Viscount de Meaux, L*Eglise 
Catholique et la liberté aux Etats-Unis. (Paris 1 Pion, 
1893), 2 vols.
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and S t a t e . 135 Many American Catholics charged that the 
French Government was following a policy of religious per­
secution, but the mainstream of American opinion took the 
side of the government and looked upon the action as analo­
gous to the American tradition of separation in Church and 
State. 136 Albert Shaw was of the conviction that the separ­
ation would make Prance a stronger nation as it would tend 
to help eliminate bigotry and intolerance.^37 Prank Vander- 
lip wrote that anti-Clericalism was justified in France 
because "the traditional attitude of the church and the 
clerical party has been reactionary and generally unfriendly 
to the R e p u b l i c «"^38 The Outlook argued that "any movement 
which will take the church out of political life, and con­
serve all its energies for its works, will bring untold 
blessings to it and to the w o r l d . "^39 The New York Times.
^^^Pius X condemned the action in the Encyclical of 
February 11, I9 0 6. Frank M. Anderson, ed.. The Constitutions 
and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of 
France. 17^9-1907% (New York: Russell & Russell, I9O8 ),
pp. 670-6. It should be noted that this was a restatement 
of the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX in 1864.
136white, Opinion, p. 257• White has many examples 
of clerical opinion in the United States. This gives a false 
impression for in I905 the United States was predominately 
Protestant.
^37American Monthly Review of Reviews. XXXIV (August, 
1906), pp. 134-6. December. 1906, Ibid.."p. 664.
138wpoiitical Problems of Europe as they Interest 
Americans," Scribner's Magazine, XXXVII (January, 1905), pp. 
1—1 8.
The Outlook. LXXXV (January 12, I9 0 7), p. 57.
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while clearly on the side of the government, maintained a 
policy of neutrality in the matter, and the paper was content 
to express the hope that both sides would work for a compro­
mise.^^® Barrett Wendell was of the opinion that there were 
extremists on both sides, and he wrote that until tolerance 
was learned "the question of religion in France must remain 
one of action and r e a c t i o n . A n d r e w  Carnegie wrote that 
the religious policy of the French Government would be a 
factor in the future in drawing that government and the 
American Government closer t o g e t h e r . I t  is not clear if 
Carnegie was correct, but there is no doubt but that the 
majority of literate Americans smiled with favor when they 
read that clerical influence was being minimized in the 
Republic of France.
Diplomatic relations inherently are associated with 
cultural factors, ceremonial occasions and public opinion. 
Often, it is true, such considerations do not indicate much 
substance when it comes to the formation of foreign policy, 
and it would be a mistake to exaggerate their significance.
l^^New York Times, June 27, 1905» p. 8.
^^^Wendell, France, p. 6?.
l^^Andrew Carnegie, "An Anglo-French-American Under­
standing," North American Review, VolL. CIXXXI, (September, 
1905). p. 513.
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Still, it is obvious that they are a small part of the entire 
story, and they must not be overlooked if there is to be a 
balanced perspective of Franco-American relations.
CHAPTER V 
COLONIAL AND COMMERCIAL COMPETITION
Around the turn of the century there was a general 
improvement in the diplomatic relations between Prance and 
the United States. This is not to say there were no areas 
of conflict between the two powers. Even among national 
states with very friendly relations there are usually dis­
agreements and conflicts of interests. In this state of 
Franco-American relations the main sources of friction were 
economic policies and imperial ambitions. Such was to be 
expected from two industrial and colonial nations. But it 
is important to notice that the conflict which developed was 
of a limited nature, especially when compared to the many 
diplomatic crises of the era before World War I.
The question of the tariff was a constant cause of 
irritation between American and French diplomats throughout 
the nineteenth century.^ Conflict over the tariff question 
was intensified during the two decades before the first World
See Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franc o-American 
Relations, I830-I87I, (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1959)» P» 88.
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War.^ The historian Sidney Pay has pointed out that commer­
cial controversies are seldom, if ever, the cause for war.^ 
This is probably true, but the diplomatic correspondence used 
for this study reveals that the tariff was a source of major 
concern in Franco-American diplomacy. In fact, at least one 
third of the correspondence was directly or indirectly re­
lated to the subject of the tariff. This was a matter which 
generated much heated rhetoric. Even the most skilled and 
polite of diplomats— such as John Hay and Jules Jusserand—  
often lost their tempers and used rough language when dis­
cussing the matter.
For the sake of perspective, it should be emphasized 
that the United States had tariff controversies with other 
European nations, and especially with Germany.^ It should 
also be noted that America's trade with France was consider­
ably less than her trade with either Germany or England.
The major explanation for this development was the relative 
slowness of France's industrial development. France, then 
and now, based her economy primarily on agriculture and light 
industry. There was very little mass production such as was
2See Louis Sears, "John Sherman," The American Secretar­
ies of State and Their Diplomacy. (New York; Pageant Book 
Companies, 1958)» P» 17*
^Sidney Fay, The Origins of the World War. (New York; 
MacMillan Co., 1928), Vol. I, p. 4é.
^Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten 
in der Weltpolitik. (New York; Macmillan Co., 1935)» Vol. II,
pp. 1274-1635.
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to be found in Germany and England,^ A recent economic 
historian has written that "at the beginning of the twen­
tieth century not only was France no longer the wealthiest 
nation in Europe ; among Western nations it was among the 
least progressive e c o n o m i c a l l y . An older economist argued 
that since the middle of the nineteenth century the French 
economy had been in a state of "economic stagnation," and 
he believed that the reason was that the French "are essen­
tially not a business people."?
In January, 1893, the French Parliament passed a tariff 
law which established the principle of the maximum and min­
imum rates. This tariff law remained in effect until 1910. 
With this system, goods were classified into 121 categories, 
and the French Poreign Minister had the power to make reci­
procal agreements with other countries. The difference 
between the maximum and the minimum rates was between twenty 
and fifty per cent.® By 1900 the Foreign Minister had made 
reciprocal arrangements with all of the European nations
^Herbert Peis, Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914:
An Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection 
of World Finance with Diplomacy Before the War. ^New Haven: 
Yale University Press), p. 34.
^Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Development of 
Europe. 1800-1914. (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 
1916), p. 502. The same point is made in J. H. Chapham, The 
Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914, (Cam- 
bridge, England* The University Press, 193^), p. 25Ô.
?Percy Ashley, Modern Tariff History* Germany. United 
States, France. (New York* E. P. Dutton and Company, 1920), 
pp. 357-8.
Gjbid.. pp. 344-7.
1^ 3
except Portugal, and the United States was the only large 
commercial country which was required to pay the maximum 
tariff on almost all items.? In this situation it was 
impossible for American products to compete in many areas 
of the French market. The fact that a single tariff system 
was applied throughout the entire French empire meant that 
the market was large and attractive, American exports to 
France had not dramatically declined since the tariff of 
1893# but they had not increased to the extent of British 
and German exports. Whether true or not, many American 
businessmen were convinced that they would be able to signi­
ficantly increase their exports to France if they could 
obtain the same tariff rates as their competitors. Largely 
for this reason the Republican platform of I 896 favored a 
tariff law which would allow for reciprocal tariff agree­
ments ,
The high American tariff was the major reason that 
France required maximum rates on most American products. In 
1897 the Congress of the United States passed the Dingley 
tariff, which had the highest rates until that time. The 
average dutiable rate was 5i^ or an increase of lOfS over the
?Ibid,, pp, 333-6 ,
1?U,S,, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Documents 
Relating to Reciprocity Convention with France. December 6 , 
1902, Sen doc, 225# 56th cong,, 1st sess,, serial no, 3858, 
p, 64,
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Wilson t a r i f f , A s  had been advocated in the Republican 
platform of I896, the Dingley tariff incorporated the prin­
ciple of reciprocity.12 This provision was especially aimed 
at France, with the hope that it could be used as a bargain­
ing measure to obtain better terms on the French market,13 
It must be understood that the Dingley tariff allowed for 
two different kinds of reciprocal agreements. First, the 
President was given the power to make executive agreements 
which would lower the tariff on certain enumerated goods in 
return for similar treatment for American exports. In such 
an executive agreement, it was of course not necessary for 
the Senate to give its approval. The enumerated articles 
included brandies, champagne, wines, art works, stationary, 
and other common exports from Francej it is obvious that the 
list was selected with France in mind. Secondly, the Presi­
dent was authorized to negotiate formal reciprocal treaties 
with any country. In a treaty the American tariff could be 
lowered as much as 2095, and it was to remain in effect for a
llcharles Olcott, William McKinley, (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin Co,, I9I6 ), Vol. II, p, 367.
12The idea of reciprocity treaties was encouraged by 
the French tariff of 1892, but the idea had often been advo­
cated in the United States after the Civil War, Secretaries 
of State Blaine and Frelinghuysen had both negotiated such 
treaties, but they had failed ratification in the Senate,
The McKinley tariff of I890 provided for reciprocal treaties,
l^Frank Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 
(New York: 0, P, Putman’s Sons, 1923), pp, 313-5,
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period of five years. The difficulty was that— as in the 
case of any treaty--it was necessary to have the Senate's 
ratification before the reciprocal treaty would go into 
effect,
In France the Dingley tariff caused dissatisfaction 
among manufacturers, and there was considerable pressure on 
the Government to enact reprisals against American goods. 
Francois Charmes in the Revue des Deux Mondes expressed a 
common sentiment when he wrote that "our tariff rates have 
the height of a simple parapet in comparison to the immense 
wall which the Americans have constructed with their energetic 
and rude h a n d s . O n  March 22, I898, the French Chamber of 
Deputies increased the rates on a number of key American 
products. Secretary of State Day wrote Ambassador Porter 
that the increases were "plainly unequal and unjust," and 
that there should be efforts to try to convince Foreign 
Minister Hanotaux to take "immediate action." Day expressed 
the belief that the French action was an indication "of an 
unfriendly disposition on the part of the French Government 
toward the commercial interests of the United States.
14Edward Younger, John A. Kassoni Politics and Diplo­
macy From Lincoln to McKinley. (Iowa City: State Historical
Society of Iowa, 1955)# p. 3o8,
^^François Charmes, "Chronique de la quinzaine," Revue 
des Deux Mondes, CL (November 15» I898), pp. 700-I.
^%illiam Day to Porter, May 1 6, I898, Instructions, 
Vol. 24, pp. 15-1 7.
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President McKinley hoped to improve Franco-American 
commercial relations by negotiating both a reciprocal execu­
tive agreement and a reciprocal treaty. To conduct the nego­
tiations he chose John Kasson, a Republican leader of Iowa 
who was known as an expert on the subject of the tariff. In 
general Kasson had been a supporter of the protective tariff, 
but he believed that the principle of reciprocity was compli­
mentary to a policy of protection. He immediately began 
negotiations with Ambassador Gambon, It was not too diffi­
cult to agree on terms for an executive agreement, and such 
an arrangement was concluded on May 28, I898, By the agree­
ment the United States was granted the French minimum tariff 
on several items, and France was allowed a lower tariff rate 
on most of the enumerated articles of the Dingley tariff.
The arrangement seemed to be satisfactory to both sides, and 
it was repeated with modifications in 1902 and 1908.^®
More significant for American trade was the possibility 
for formal reciprocal treaties, and the policy of the McKinley 
Administration was to negotiate treaties with as many nations 
as possible. France was chosen as the country with which to 
make the first treaty. Primarily this was because of the 
French system of the dual tariff which made a treaty with
^^Proclamation of May 3 0, I898, Messages. Vol. XIV, 
pp. 6480-1; FR, I898, pp. 292-4.
18In the summer there was a lively debate concerning 
the application of the agreement to French brandies. See 
FR, 1898, pp. 304-6.
14?
France more clearly in the American interest than one with 
most other nations. Kasson believed that the French treaty 
would be a kind of "trial balloon" for the Senate ; if the 
Senate failed to give its approval, there would then be 
little attempt for another attempt.^9 In June Secretary Day 
instructed General Porter to speak to the French Foreign 
Minister about the possibility of negotiating a treaty.20 
Delcasse was quick to assure Porter that France would be 
willing to give most-favored-nation treatment to American 
exports in return for similar concessions.Kasson and 
Gambon were already trying to come to some kind of terms.
In contrast to the earlier agreement, the conclusion of a 
treaty was slow, and the relations between the two men often 
became strained. Kasson wanted the two countries to give 
similar reductions in their respective rates. Gambon re­
fused with the argument that the American rates were almost 
twice as large as the French rates. The American position 
was that France exported more industrialized goods into the 
United States than vice versa, and that French rates were no 
higher than the rates for any other country. Kasson
53-4.
^^Younger, Kasson. p. 374. Tarbell, Tariff, p. 255» 
20oay to Porter, June 22, 1898, Instructions, 24, pp.
^^Delcasse to Porter, July 22, 1898, Despatches, Vol.
116.
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complained that France wanted "a total sacrifice by the 
United States" rather than a treaty based on true recipro­
city.^2
Finally on July 24, I8 9 8, Gambon and Kasson agreed on 
a reciprocal convention. Kasson later declared in a speech 
that "the negotiations were long, both sides were persistent 
and sometimes obstinate, but finally conciliation prevailed 
and the treaty was signed."23 By the arrangement, the French 
minimum rates were to be granted to nineteen American pro­
ducts, of which the most important were canned meats, fruits, 
lumber, paving blocks, staves, hops and lard. The United 
States in return was to grant reductions of between five and 
twenty percent on some thirty items from France. Although 
France received concessions on all items authorized by the 
Dingley tariff except for champagnes and sparkling wines, 
the maximum reduction of twenty percent was used in only 
eight cases, and most of the reductions were less than ten 
percent. Even after the discount, French goods were to be 
charged by rates which were as high as those of the McKinley
tariff.24
2?Memorandums of two conversations between Gambon and 
Kasson, May 17, I898, Instructions, 24, pp. 22-7; May I9 , 
1898, Ibid.. pp. 27-31.
23john Kasson, Reciprocity; The Benefits that will 
Accure to this Gountry by the Gonfirmation of the Treaties 
now pending in the UMted States Senate, (Washington; Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1901), p. 3 1.
24a  copy of the treaty is in U.S. Senate, Reciprocity.
pp. 2-7 .
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The French Government was pleased with the provisions 
of the reciprocity treaty. In the attempt to encourage the 
American Congress to ratify the treaty, the French Government 
in the summer of I898 issued a decree which placed pork and 
lard products on the minimum list. Secretary Hanotaux told 
Porter that this was a "guesture" to demonstrate the French 
attitude toward the importance of trade with the United 
States. 25 The French Minister of Commerce, M. Maruejouis, 
declared in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies that the 
Kasson treaty would "advance the cause of universal commerce 
and civilization."26 French industrialists who exported 
goods to America quickly came to the support of the arrange­
ment. The Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce, representing the 
wine makers of the area, urged the Chamber of Deputies that 
ratification would be a boon to the wine industry.27 The 
American treaty was ratified by the French Parliament in 
July of I899 without a great deal of opposition.28
President McKinley hoped for ratification. He sent 
the treaty— along with six others— to the Senate "with a
^^Porter to Day, July 10, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 273.
28porter to Day, Ibid., no. 287. This despatch includes 
a newspaper clipping.
^^Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce to the French Minister 
of Commerce, January 4, 1899, in Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 
148-51.
^Gporter to Hay, April 3, I9 0 0, Despatches, Vol. 118, 
nos. 6 0 1, 602.
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view to receiving the advise and consent of the Senate to 
its ratification."The New York Times urged that the 
treaty was in the American interest, and maintained that 
most of the opposition resulted from "the greed and stupid­
ity of the antidiluvian protectionists."30 Before being 
reported to the Senate, the proposed bill was considered by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The chairman of the 
Committee, Cushman Davis, supported the treaty, as did most 
of the other members. The first job of the Committee was to 
try to determine the viewpoint of American business leaders. 
Several hundred special interest groups throughout the country 
wrote letters and sent witnesses to argue for and against the 
proposal. The support and the opposition seemed to about 
even. But there were powerful industries that believed the 
treaty to be against their interests. These included the 
manufacturers of cotton knit goods, paper, electric fixtures, 
tiles, brushes and optical instruments.31 The opposition 
was better organized and more active than the groups who 
supported the Kasson treaty.
In January, 1900, Kasson appeared before the Foreign 
Relations Committee to argue in behalf of ratification. In 
his opening statement Kasson declared that the Dingley tariff
29u.S. Senate, Reciprocity, p. 1,
3QRew York Times, January 8 , 1900, April 1, I900,
3 % . S. Senate, Reciprocity, letters for on pp. 110-321 
those against on pp. 145-62.
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had produced an effect of "exasperation throughout the 
commercial world and the governments as well."32 This had 
resulted in an European movement to increase the tariff rates 
on American products. Kasson stated that the situation was 
worse in France than anywhere else, for the maximum tariff 
made it impossible for America to successfully compete for 
that nations* market of forty million people. He further 
maintained that the proposed treaty would greatly improve 
the situation. The rates on American exports to France would 
be an average of thirty percent less, and this was twice as 
much as the American reduction by the agreement. After 
Kasson’s speech there was a discussion. Senator Lodge men­
tioned that shoe manufacturers in Massachusetts were opposed 
to the treaty. Kasson responded that it was inevitable that 
some interest groups would not find the agreement to be in 
their advantage, but he argued that industrial leaders should 
consider the interests of America’s economy as a whole. The 
treaty with France was reciprocal, and thus it was based on 
the principle of "to give and to take."33 "We are to get 
into their market," concluded Kasson, "with all but the 
excepted articles at the lowest rate granted to any nation, 
and this is all the American producers ask for. The conces­
sion by the United States is limited to particular articles."3^
32ihid., p. 66. 
33lbid.. p. 80. 
34ibid.. p. 80.
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The French treaty was reported favorably to the Senate 
by the Foreign Relations Committee in February, I900, Imme­
diately there was a concerted effort against ratification 
led by George Perkins of California and Nelson Aldrich of 
Rhode Island,35 There developed such strong opposition that 
the consideration of the Kasson treaty was never placed on 
the Senate calendar, but it was referred back to committee 
for amending. There it was pigeonholed, never again to be 
considered by the Senate body, Robert Porter of the New York 
Times took a Senate poll which indicated that the treaty 
would probably have been approved if it had ever been voted 
on, but this was never known for certain,3^ The Republican 
platform of I900 again supported a policy of tariff recipro­
city, but it was recommended that tariff rates should be 
lowered only on goods "we do not ourselves produce,"37 jn 
his last speech at Buffalo, President McKinley spoke in favor 
of reciprocity as "the natural ourgrowth of our wonderful 
industrial development,"3^ Theodore Roosevelt stated in 
his inaugural addresss "I ask the attention of the Senate
35cong:ressional Record. March 2, I9 0 0, Vol. 33, part 3, 
5 6th cong,, 1st sess,, p, 2459,
3^New York Times. February 27, I9OO, The Porter poll 
indicated that fifty Senators favored ratification, eleven 
opposed, and twenty-eight were uncommitted. Fifty-five posi­
tive votes were required for ratification,
37younger, Kasson, p, 376,
30£)ennett, Hay, p, 417,
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to the reciprocity treaties laid before it by my predeces­
sor. "39 He, however, did not fight for ratification, and this 
was of disappointment to Hay and Jusserand, both of whom had 
a greater desire for Franco-American reciprocity than did 
the President.^0 Even if Roosevelt had taken a more active 
interest in the matter, it is doubtful that the tariff could 
have passed the Senate. In 1904 John Osborne wrote that the 
reciprocity treaties had expired and were "of little interest 
to anyone but an historian."^!
John Kasson was upset that his treaty had failed to 
pass the Senate, and he resigned in Lfâ.rch, 1901. He gave 
as a reason that the impossibility of Senate action made his 
salary a waste of government m o n e y . ^2 The fact that he was 
eighty years of age certainly had an influence on his decision. 
Many historians have pointed out that the failure at ratifi­
cation resulted in a higher tariff for American exports to 
F r a n c e . ^3 The effect was felt even several years later. In
39pR, 1901, pp. XXII-XXIII. Before the speech Roosevelt 
asked Lodge’s advise, and Lodge wrote him: "The more I think
of it the better I like the paragraphs on reciprocity."
October 17, I90I, Letters. Vol. I, p. 50?.
^0Jusserand to Rouvier, June 28, I9 0 5, DDF, XVI, p. ISO. 
Dennett, Hay, p. 4l8.
^Ijohn Osborne, "Reciprocity and the American Tariff 
System," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science. XXIII (January. 1904Ï. no. 55-84.
^^Younger, Kasson. p. 377#
^3ibid.. p. 3 6 8. Taussig, Tariff, pp. 327-31# James 
Laughlin and Parker Willis, Reciprocity, (New York: The Baker
and Taylor Co., I9 0 3), p. 7 0.
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1905 the French Government took away many of the rights of 
American companies in France, and the Embassy in Paris re­
ported that support for the bill had been a result of the 
Senate's failure to ratify the Kasson t a r i f f . I n  190?
Root complained to Jusserand that the French discrimination 
against American goods was unfair.^5 Ambassador Jusserand 
responded that "France never practiced discrimination of any 
kind against the United States." "It is certainly through 
no fault of France," he argued, "that the ratification of 
the treaty thus concluded was put off from year to year and 
finally given up, whereby the very situation with which the 
Federal Government finds fault was c r e a t e d . N e a r  this 
time Secretary Root wrote an article advocating that the 
United States should follow France's example of the minimum 
and maximum tariff rates. He maintained that this policy 
would "enable us to protect ourselves against those who use 
us badly."^7
44porter to Hay, December 14, 1904, Despatches, Vol. 124. 
McCormick to Root, September 21, 1905» Ibid.. Vol. 125» no.
46.
^^Root to Jusserand, December 28, 190?, Department of 
State, France, (numerical file), Vol. 478. This volume is 
entirely concerned with economic matters.
Jusserand to Root, November 12, 190?, Ibid. Also 
see S.H.F. "Acute Tariff Difficulties with France," American 
Economist. XLIV (July 16, 1909)» pp. 25» 36-7.
^^Elihu Root, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
XXIX (April, 1907), pp. 446-70.
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The French Government was not entirely anti-American 
in its tariff policy. In 1902 there was an attempt to form 
a European coalition against American trade. The action had 
no chance of success without the co-operation of France and 
Russia. Delcasse was happy to tell General Porter that 
Germany had made such a proposal. Delcasse claimed that the 
French Government had given "a prompt and emphatic refusal." 
He further told the American Ambassador that "the relations 
between his country and the United States were of the most 
friendly character, that the trade between them was increas­
ing, and that there was every desire on the part of France 
to continue her harmonious intercourse with the American
Republic."^8
Despite its overwhelming bulk, the greater part of the 
diplomatic correspondence dealing with the tariff was of a 
technical nature and was concerned with very minor questions. 
For example, there were hundreds of letters written on such 
questions as the type of oil used in preserving French sar­
dines, the kinds of American nursery plants infected by San 
Jose Scale, the effectiveness of the measures taken to pro­
tect American cattle from Texas fever, whether labels on 
French products should be required to be printed in English, 
and the early enforcement of the Pure Food and Drug Act on
LQ
Porter to Hay, February 6, 1902, Despatches, Vol. 
120, no. 9 6 0. To what extent this report was true is diffi­
cult to determine, but certainly Delcasse was not morally 
opposed to exaggeration in diplomatic rhetoric.
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French products.^^ Despite the reams of material on such 
matters in the department of state Archives, it does not 
seem either sufficiently interesting or worthwhile to justify 
their consideration in any detail. There are, however, two 
points that might be emphasised in this connection. First, 
for the sake of perspective it should be understood that the 
diplomats spent a great deal of their time in dealing with 
trivia and routine. Secondly, although minor economic ques­
tions often caused irritation, they were not the source of 
real crises, and they did not seem to have a great deal of 
influence on the formation of basic foreign policy,
America's trade with Prance was an extremely small part 
of her foreign trade. In I898 American exports totaled 
$1 ,231,0 0 0,000, Exports to the United Kingdom were 
$541,000,000; to Germany they were $156,000,000; and to 
France they were only $95*000,000, That same year total 
imports to the United States were $616,000,000, Imports from 
the United Kingdom were $109,000,000; from Germany they were 
$70,000,000; and imports from France were $53*000,000, In 
1907 American exports abroad had increased to $1,881,000,000,
^^see especially Hay to Porter, March 26, 1902, Instruc­
tions, Vol, 24, Adee to Porter, November I6 , 1904, Ibid,,
Vol, 2 5* p. 3 7. Root to White, White Papers, box 18, Memo­
randum of the French Embassy, December 20, I9 0 7* France, Vol, 
4 78, Hay to Porter, March 26, I9 0 2, Instructions, Vol, 24, 
pp. 468-9, Francis Loomis to Porter, August 11, I9 0 3, Ibid,, 
p. 603, Jusserand to Root, April 11, 1904, April 21, 1904,
Notes, Vol, 4 5, Root to Jusserand, April 22, Ibid, The
Foreign Relations volumes devote many pages to such matters, 
but the Documents diplomatiques français do not.
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To the United Kingdom the value was $608,000,000; the value 
to Germany was $257*000,000; and the value of exports to 
France was $114,000,000. Imports to the United States in 
1907 were worth $1,434,000,000. Of this amount British 
imports totaled $246,000,000; the total of German imports 
was $1 62,0 0 0,0 0 0; and French imports to the United States 
reached the total value of $128,000,000. For the years 
between I898 and I907 the total French exports to the 
United States were $843,000,000, and during the same period 
the American exports to France were $820,000,000.^® The 
favorable balance of trade for France is more significant 
when it is remembered that since 1894 the United States has 
always had a favorable balance of merchandise trade.51
An interesting interpretative question is the extent 
to which there is a connection between foreign trade and the 
formation of foreign policy. It would certainly be a mistake 
to induce a broad theory of foreign relations from the study 
of Franco-American diplomatic relations for only a few years, 
but it is interesting that the commerce between the two 
countries from I898 to I907 seems to have had little influence 
on the basic policy orientation of either government. There
^®U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of 
the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, (Washington;
Government Printing Office, i960), pp. 5 5 0, 552.
5^See Gilbert Fite and Jim Reese, An Economic History 
of the United States, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1965), pp, 463-6.
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is no evidence that the Spanish-American War caused any 
serious damage to Franco-American trade, even during the 
year of I898, More significant than this, for the ten years 
after the war America's trade with Germany was much greater 
than her trade with France, Yet during these years the 
direction of American power was increasingly used to support 
France at the expense of Germany,
At the turn of the century foreign investments were an 
established part of the economy of France, It is estimated 
that between one-half and one-third Of the entire French 
capital savings was invested outside the country, Herbert 
Feis, in the best study of this subject, has emphasized that 
the investments were ’’guided and often controlled by the 
government" with political as well as economic goals in m i n d , 32 
It was in large part a result of the dual alliance that one- 
fourth of the French investment was in Russian securities.
The economic advisers of the Quai d'Orsay did not believe 
that there was a large diplomatic advantage to be gained 
from investments in the United States, Still these invest­
ments totaled two million francs in I9 0 0, and they had grown 
to six million francs by 1914,^3 At the beginning of the 
century the United States was moving in the direction of large
^ Feis, Banker, pp, 49-50, Harry D, White, The French 
International Accounts. 1880-1913, (Cambridge 1 Harvard 
University Press, 1933)t P* 2 6 7,
33peis, Banker, pp, 51-2, 57-9.
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foreign investments, American insurance companies in Prance 
were becoming an important consideration,^^ It should be 
emphasized that American investments were small when com­
pared to those of France, and until the first World War the 
United States was classified as a debtor nation,55 in con­
trast to France, foreign policy did not have much influence 
in directing American investments. At least this was the 
case until the dollar diplomacy of the Taft Administration, 
Much has been written about the economic value and 
the economic motivation of European colonialism. This is 
a very complex subject, but it is certain that in the case 
of French colonialism a basic part of the policy was to 
stimulate the home industry. It is also certain that the 
French policy was contrary to the American economic inter­
ests, It is interesting to note that Jules Ferry, the foun­
der of the French Empire in the 1880*s, stressed the value 
of the colonies as a market for French products. The law of 
January 11, 1892, extended the French protective tariff 
throughout the colonies, and thus gave French industry the 
same relative advantage in the entire empire that it enjoyed 
in mainland France, Eugene Etienne, the Secretary of State
5^Charles Lowb, Legal Status of American Corporations 
in France, (Parisi the Lecram Press, 1921), pp, 39-40,
^5cieona Lewis, America's Stake in International In­
vestments, (New York: The Brookings Institution, 1938),
pp, 3, 96-7 . This is the most detailed work on the subject. 
Also see Charles Hobson, The Export of Capital, (London: 
Constable and Company, 1914), p, 1^4,
l6o
for the Colonies, explained "that since France must incur the 
obligations involved in a colonial domain, it is just and 
proper that this domain should be reserved as a market for 
French products,
Madagascar is one example of the influence of French 
imperialism on American trade. This African island, which 
is larger than France, was made a French protectorate in 
1895 and a French colony in 1896,^^ Before this development 
the majority of Madagascar's trade was with Britain and the 
United States, and both nations had treaties with Madagascar 
which granted most-favored-nation treatment. In I896 the 
French Foreign Minister, in a matter of fact way, notified 
the Department of State that the American treaty had become 
"inconsistent with the new order of things," He explained 
that the French policy was to maintain a single tariff system 
throughout the French empire, and thus French colonies were 
not allowed to have bilateral commercial agreements,This 
was obviously not good news to Secretary of State Richard 
Olney, but the United States was not prepared to challenge 
France's right to make colonies in Africa, Olney did refuse 
to recognize a change in Madagascar’s tariff until the French
5&Stephen Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 
1870-19 2 5, (London* P, S, King and Son, I929), p. 44,
5?See David Brogan, The Development of Modern France, 
1870-193 9, (New York* Harper Torchbooks, I966), pp, 243-6,
5^Bourgeois to Eusthis, April I6 , I896, FR, I896,
p. 123.
161
Government had gone through the normal legal channels to 
make it clear that the nation had become a "territory by 
conquest and absorption,"59 shortly thereafter the French 
Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution to this effect, and 
the United States then recognized French sovereignty over
Madagascar, 60
After Madagascar was made into a colony, French goods 
enjoyed a relative advantage over other foreign items in that 
market. In fact, by 190? more than ninety percent of the 
colony’s trade was with France and her empire.Certainly 
this was no major tragedy for the American economy, but there 
were special interests in the United States which were hurt 
as a result of the French colonial policy. In a report to 
the Department of State the Committee on American Interests 
in China concluded* "We certainly do not wish to have our 
experience of exclusion from Madagascar practiced in a 
greatly enlarged scale in the case of C h i n a , A s  far as 
possible the Department of State tried to give moderate 
support to American interests in Madagascar, but never did 
this ever take the form of direct opposition to France, In
59oiney to Eusthis, May 2, I8 96, Ibid,, p. 125,
^^Hanotaux to Eusthis, June 3, I89 6, Ibid,, pp. 130-2,
6l"BfeLdagascar," Encyclopaedia Britannica. 11th edition, 
Vol, 12, p. 275.
^^Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The New Empire : An Inter­
pretation of American Expansion, (Ithaca* Cornell University 
Press, 1966), p, 355,
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1897 France asked the holders of concessions and deeds in 
the colony to register the property with the French Provincial 
Resident or face forfeiture. Secretary of State Sherman 
notified France that the Department of State would encourage 
Americans to comply with the orders, but that the department 
would not consider non-compliance as sufficient reason for 
a confiscation of property,
There was a similar Franco-American conflict of inter­
ests in the colony of Tunisia. In Tunisia the United States 
had treaties of 1797 and 1824 giving her most-favored-nation 
status. In 1881 the French Government forced the North 
African country into a treaty which took away most of Tuni­
sia's sovereignty, but for several years there was no attempt 
to repudiate the special rights of American trade. Of course, 
American interests in the region were minor; trade between 
the United States and Tunisia amounted to only $31,000 in 
1896, In that year the French Government decided it was 
time to consolidate the empire under one colonial policy, and 
in accordance with this goal the French Ambassador notified 
the Department of State that the two American-Tunisian 
treaties would have to be abrogated,Secretary of State 
Olney objected with the argument that to place Tunisia under
^^Sherman to Vignaud, August 12, I8 9 7, Instructions, 
Vol. 33» no, 101,
^^^tenotre to Olney, September 16, I897, December
29, 1896, Notes, Vol, 41,
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the French tariff would give an advantage to Germany, England 
and other nations that had the minimum rates. He requested 
that the United States should continue to have the benefit 
of the most-favored-nation clause in relation to countries 
other than France, As in the case of Madagascar, he did not 
challenge the right of the French to have a colony in Tunisia, 
But the French Government was not willing to make any excep­
tions in its attempt to have a single tariff system through­
out the empire, The French Ambassador ignored the American 
argument that the change would be to the benefit of the 
European powers. He simply wrote that all other countries 
had agreed and that "the concurrence of the Federal Govern­
ment in the same principle would seem all the more easy, 
since American interests are of very small importance in the 
Regency,"^5
In October, 1897» the French Government unilaterally 
annulled the American-Tunisian treaties. The French Ambas­
sador tersely wrote to Secretary Sherman* "I therefore have 
the honor to inform you that the Government of the Republic, 
both in its own name and in the name of His Highness the 
Bey of Tunis, denounces the treaties concluded in 1797 and 
1824."^^ The American Government grudgingly accepted the
^^Patenotre to Olney, September 16, 1897» December 29» 
I8 9 6, Notes, Vol, 41,
^^Patenotre to Sherman, October 19» 1897, Notes, Vol,
41,
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d e v e l o p m e n t . in the negotiations for the commercial treaty, 
John Kasson tried to get special tariff rates for Tunisia, The 
Ambassador immediately rejected this suggestion as contrary 
to the French colonial p o l i c y , i n  the final draft Tunisia 
was as a part of the French empire, which at least was a 
clarification of American-Tunisian commerce,^9 With the 
defeat of the treaty in the Senate, the position of American 
rights in Tunisia was again in doubt. In addition to the 
tariff, there was also the question whether the United States 
would continue to have the right of extra-territoriality.
It was not until 1904 that the United States and France signed 
a treaty defining the legal relationship between the United 
States and the Bey of Tunisia, By the arrangement the French 
tariff was applied to Tunisia, and American citizens were 
guaranteed the same rights in the colony which they had in 
France,70
Elsewhere in the French empire there was little satis­
faction for American commercial ambitions. The large market 
of Indo-China was almost eliminated from American penetration, 
at a time when it was commonly believed that the Far East
7^}îay to Porter, January 5t 1898, Instructions, Vol, 24,
pp, 134-5 .
68proposed treaty drafted by Kasson, March 8, I898, Ibid,, 
pp, 134-5. Memorandum of Gambon, May 2, 1898, Ibid,, pp,
136-7.
^^Second draft of the treaty by Kasson, May 4, I8 98, 
Instructions, Vol. 24, pp, 138-9,
70por the treaty see FR, 1904, pp, 304-5,
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offered great commercial opportunity,^^ Certainly, American 
imperialism was equally detrimental to French trade. After 
1898 France found fewer markets in the Philippines, Cuba 
and Porto Rico, France did not challenge the right to main­
tain a relative advantage within declared colonies, but in 
the case of Cuba, Ambassador Cambon in I900 vigorously com­
plained that the tariff rates had been increased on French 
products, 72 Neither France nor the United States was liberal 
in regard to the tariff on imports from the other's colonies. 
In 1899 the United States refused to admit Algerian goods at 
the same rates as French products. The French Government 
maintained that Algeria was "an integral part" of France and 
not just a colony, Algeria was divided into departments like 
those of the mother country; she had representatives in the 
French Parliament; and she was united with the French cus­
toms, 73 In the commercial agreement of 1902 the United States 
gave special rates for Algerian imports in exchange for the 
minimum tariff on coffee from Porto Rico,7^ In 1907 France 
threatened to put Porto Rican coffee on the maximum list.
 ^In 1905 French exports into Indo-China were valued 
at 4 ,314 ,586 British pounds, and American exports were 
126 ,425 pounds, "Indo-China," Encyclopaedia Britinnaca,
11th edit,, Vol, XIII, Roberts, Colonial Policy, pp, 494-5,
72cambon to Hay, May 3I, I9 0 0, Notes, Vol, 4 3,
73
Cambon to Hay, December 27, I899, Notes, Vol, 42; 
May 10, 1900, Ibid,, Vol, 43.
7^Agreement in FR, 1902, pp, 418-9,
l66
Secretary Root responded that this would be "commercial war­
fare" and that "we shall not hesitate to use the weapons 
which are under our control in carrying out the warfare, 
much as we regret to do s o . "75 But in the commercial agree­
ment of 1908 the minimum tariff was continued on Porto Rican 
coffee in exchange for lower rates on French champagne and 
sparkling wines.
The policy of imperialism brought conflict in areas 
other than economic matters. Religious organizations in 
both Prance and the United States took advantage of colon­
ialism to try to further their missionary ambitions. The 
governments of both countries had the formal policy of non­
discrimination toward all religious groups, but in practice 
the French Government often became the supporter of Catholic 
rights and the United States of Protestant rights. In 1904 
Senator Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa complained that American 
Merman missionaries in the Society Islands had been hindered 
from their efforts by the French colonial administration.
He charged that this was "a religious persecution under 
official order and sanction." The Department of State did 
not care to take firm action in such a matter, but Hay did 
instruct General Porter to use American good offices to get
f^Root to White, June 27, 190?, Instructions, Vol. 478. 
f^Agreement in FR, 1908, pp. 329-30.
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"equal privileges of worship and assemblage with those 
accorded to other denominations in the Society Islands,
France had a long history of involvement in the Eastern 
Question. In contrast, the United States, except for a few 
religious schools, had almost no interests in the Near East, 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century several American 
Protestant schools suffered damages during local revolutions 
against the Ottoman Empire, The United States demanded that 
the schools be given a suitable indemnity, but the Turkish 
Government was slow to make a settlement. Secretary Hay 
discussed the question with Jules Cambon in I900, Hay asked 
if the European powers would oppose a forceful action by the 
United States, Cambon was evasive to Hay, but he advised 
Delcasse that France should encourage the Sultan to seek 
conciliation for "nothing would be so perilious for the 
future than to let the United States penetrate into the Medi­
terranean, "78 It appears that Delcasse shared Cambon*s 
anxiety, and he instructed the French Ambassadors throughout 
Europe to use their influence to encourage the Sultan to pay 
the indemnity, Delcasse indicated that he wanted to keep 
the United States out of the Eastern Question,79 The French
77nay to Porter, December 19, 1904, February 18, I9 0 5, 
Instructions, Vol, 25, pp, 45-6, and p, 59»
78Reference in DDF, Vol, XVI^, p, 200, note 1,
79Delcasse to Ambassadors in St, Petersburg, Constan­
tinople, and Berlin, April 22, I900, Ibid,. no, 122, p. I98,
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Ambassador in Constantinople did not see any reason to fear 
an American penetration into the area, and he believed that 
a show of force was the only way the United States could 
collect the indemnity.®® Twice President Roosevelt ordered 
the American fleet into Turkish waters in order to get Abdul 
Hamid to come to terms. Both movements were temporary with­
out any effort to establish a permanent power base, and it 
appears that they did not create any concern at the Quai 
d'Orsay.®!
In South America there was a greater potential for 
conflict between American and French goals. Americans re­
membered the attempt of Napoleon III to establish a sphere 
of influence in Mexico, and although France only had a few 
small colonies in that part of the world in I8 9 8, she con­
tinued to regard several of the weaker South American Repub­
lics as potential colonies. In France the Monroe Doctrine 
was unpopular, and it was generally looked upon as an excuse 
for American imperialism. At the time of the Spanish-American 
War Maurice de Beaumarchais wrote that it gave "North Americans 
the illusion that it was in the interests of all Americans, 
while most often it serves the special interests of the
®®Constans to Delcasse, April 23, 1900, Ibid.. no. 123.,
p. 199.
®!liewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back. (New Haven and 
London* Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 37-8. The French 
archives need to be checked to see the reaction at the Quai 
d'Orsay.
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United States.”®^ Bijr this time the meaning of the Monroe 
Doctrine had been greatly expanded since it had been declared 
seventy years earlier. In 1895 Secretary of State Richard 
Olney had been belligerent in warning Britain that the United 
States would protect Latin America from European intervention, 
Theodore Roosevelt was one leader who had applauded this 
broad and vigorous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine,
He wrote that "every true patriot, every man of statesmanlike 
habit, should look forward to the day when not a single 
European power will hold a foot of American soil,"84
In the late nineteenth century the United States did 
not have any major controversy with France because of the 
latter's policy in South America, but there were some areas 
of disagreement. One such area was Brazil, There was no 
clear settlement of the boundary line between Brazil and 
French Guiana, Gold was discovered in the disputed district 
in 1894, and the next year France sent troops into a part of 
the area. In London the influential Ambassador, Thomas
82 ^ Maurice de Beaumarchais, La doctrine de Monroei 
1*evolution de la politique des Etats-Unis au XIX^ sïeole. 
(paris : L* Larose et Forcel, 1Ô98), p, 229*
®^01ney to Bayard, July 20, 1895» FR, I895-I896, pp.
560-2 ,
Qh
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Monroe Doctrine," American 
Ideals, (New York* C,P, Putnam's Sons, 1897), p. 252, Roose­
velt wrote that the justification of the doctrine was "the 
needs of the nation and true interests of Western Civiliza­
tion" and that if it "did not already exist it would be 
necessary to create it," p, 246,
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Bayard, warned the French Ambassador that the United States 
had "serious interests in Latin America."^5 The French 
Government chose not to push the matter, and certainly the 
United States influenced that policy, France had a more 
significant controversy with Santo Domingo, In 1894 France 
sent a squadron into the Caribbean to force the Government 
of Santo Domingo into paying reparations to several French 
companies. The American Government was concerned enough to 
send one ship into the area with instructions to "watch 
carefully,"86 There was trouble again in 1899* In that 
year there were anti-French manifestations in Santo Domingo, 
and President Jimenez refused to pay the French debt. The 
French Government presented Jimenez with the ultimatum that 
force would be used unless there were an immediate payment 
accompanied with a public apology, Santo Domingo gave in 
to the demands. Shortly thereafter Delcasse wrotei "The 
incident is closed by the public apology of President Jimenez 
and by the payment of the indemnity which was due our nation. 
The delicate point of the affair was the United States,"8?
France was naturally interested in the construction of 
a canal across the isthmus of Central America, After the 
failure of the French venture under Ferdinand de Lessups, it
^^Quoted in LaFeber, Empire. p. 278,
88pR, 1895, I, pp. 397-8. LaFeber, Empire, pp. 247-8,
8?Delcasse to Barrère, Ambassador to Rome, January 17, 
1900, DDF, XVll, no, 50, p, 73*
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was generally recognized that only the United States would 
have the interests and the means to complete a canal. The 
French had special rights in both Panama and Nicaragua, but 
because the project would benefit her world trade, France
QO /
had no reason to oppose American efforts. Delcasse hoped 
that Philippe Bunau-Varilla would be successful in selling 
the Panamanian rights in the United States, but he was never 
involved in the matter.^9 When there was the possibility of 
a revolution in Panama, Delcasse made it clear that France 
would not intervene in the affair except to protect French 
interests. 90 French leaders were not unhappy with the out­
come of the revolution and the treaty between Hay and Bunau- 
Varilla, and France was the first nation to gi/e diplomatic 
recognition to the new Panamanian Government.^1 General 
Porter, in a despatch, noted that the majority of the French 
people were "much pleased with events."92 The Suez engineer, 
Gustave Sautereau, wrote a book which was very favorable
® Gambon to Delcasse, February 18, 1900% DDF, XVI^,  ^
p. 126. Frederick Murhard, Nouveau recueil general de traites. 
conventions et autres transactions remarquables. Continuation 
or the work of George von Martens, (Goettingue* Dieterick, 
I863), Vol. XVI, 2nd part, p. I8 3.
®^Delcasse to Gambon, February 3, I9 0 0, DDF, XVI^, no.
68, p. 104.
QO *
Delcasse to Gambon, April 28,. 1900, Ibid.. no. 129,
p. 207.
91porter to Hay, November I9 , I9 03, Despatches, Vol. I2 3. 
92
Porter to Hay, November 11, I903, Ibid.. p. 360.
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toward America's projected construction of a canal,93 The 
Quai d'Orsay had little sympathy for the fate of Columbia, 
and when that country was slow in paying for damages to 
foreign countries during the revolution, Delcasse suggested 
to the United States that they should take punitive action,9^ 
Secretary Root discouraged France from taking such action, 
but it was clear that Delcasse's suggestion was an indirect 
approval of the policy of the United States toward the Pana­
manian revolution,93
For more than thirty years one of the major diplomatic 
problems of the American hemisphere was Venezuela's inability 
and refusal to pay her foreign debt. On several occasions 
this question became a consideration in Franco-American diplo­
matic relations, France, more than any other European country, 
had special interests in the affairs of the Venezuelan Repub­
lic, Out of a population of two and one-half million, more 
than 2 ,5 0 0 of Venezuela's citizens were French speaking.
Even more important, two of the principle banks in the nation 
were entirely controlled by French capital, and a French com­
pany had a monopoly on the telegraph service in Venezuela,9&
Gustave Sauteruau, The Great Ocean Ways of the World: 
Suez, Nicarague, Panama. (Paris* Privately Published, 1905)»
p. 6.
gh
French Embassy to Root, September 1, 1905t Notes, Vol.
46,
^^Memorandum for Root, signed I,B,S,, March 14, I9 0 6,
Ibid,
96pierre de Coubertin, "La conquête des Etats-Unis," la 
Chronique de France, (Auxerre* A, Lanier, 1902), pp. 121, 126,
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The American Government was suspicious of possible French 
ambitions to expand her influence in the country. In 1881 
Venezuela refused to pay her debt to French creditors, and 
the French Government threatened to send in troops and occupy 
several customs houses until the debt had been collected.
The Department of State was concerned that this could lead 
to territorial aggrandizement, and Secretary James G, Blaine 
notified Prance that the United States would intervene if 
there were a threat to the Monroe Doctrine,97 Eventually 
the conflict was settled through compromise, and a Franco- 
Venezuelan treaty of 1885 guaranteed that France would respect 
Venezuela's territorial integrity and would not intervene 
until all other means had been exhausted,98
After the revolution of 1899 the Venezuelan Government 
was in the hands of Cipriano Castro, and this scoundrel 
repudiated the previous government's debt to France, Britain, 
Germany and Italy, Many Americans feared that the European 
powers might use this as an opportunity to gain a new foothold 
in South America, Roosevelt made reference to this fear in 
his annual message of 1901: "We do not guarantee any state
against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that 
punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of
97siaine to Noyes, July 23, 1881, FR, 1881, pp, 1216-8, 
98]yieniorandum of January 13, 1903, FR, 1903, p, 410,
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territory by any non-American power,"99 The French charge 
d'affaires in Washington reported to the Quai d'Orsay that he 
feared the message indicated that Roosevelt intended to begin 
a policy of direct intervention in South America,100 The 
next year the governments of Britain, Germany and Italy 
decided that patience would not work with Castro, and they 
joined in à concerted effort to force him to meet his inter­
national commitments. The three powers placed a blockade 
around Venezuela until February, 1903v when the two sides 
agreed to submit the conflict to the Hague Tribunal for 
arbitration. Thirteen years later Roosevelt wrote to his 
friend, William Thayer, that Germany had agreed to arbitrate 
the matter only after he had threatened the Kaiser with force. 
There is no evidence that 1die incident took place in exactly 
the way Roosevelt described it, and most historians believe 
it was one of his several romantic exaggerations,1^1
Prance had large claims against Venezuela in 1902, but
go
Annual Message of December 3, 1901, Ibid., 1901, pp, 
xxxvi-xxxvii,
^®9jy[argerie to Delcasse, December 29» 1901, DDF, I^, 
no, 575» pp. 680-1,
lOlgee Thayer, Hay, Vol, II, pp, 412-5, This story is 
accepted in James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt 
Administrations, 1897-1909» (New York* The Macmillan Go,, 
1922), p, 428, Beale, Roosevelt, pp, 395-413. The account 
is rejected in Howard Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean, 
(Chicago* The University of Chicago Press, 1927)» p, 136. 
John Bassett Moore, "John Hay," Political Science Quarterly, 
XXXII (1917), pp, 119-2 1, Herbert Bowen, "Roosevelt and 
Venequela," North American Review. CCX (September, 1919)» 
p. 4l6.
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she did not participate in the joint effort of that year 
despite the urging of England and Germany that she should 
do so. This policy was predicated on two considerations. 
First, in February of that year the French Government had 
negotiated an arbitration treaty with Venezuela by which 
the extent of the French debt was to be decided by an umpire 
selected by Roosevelt, The treaty further guaranteed that 
France would have primacy in any payments Venezuela would 
make to her foreign c r e d i t o r s . I n  the second place, France 
did not join the united demarche because of her concern for 
the policy of the United States. The French Embassy in 
Washington went out of its way to indicate that France's 
abstinence was a demonstration of the "friendly character" 
of her foreign policy.^^3 Ambassador Sternburg informed his 
government that he had learned from a "reliable source" 
that in the Venezuelan affair "France was marching hand in 
hand with Washington." He advised the Foreign Office to 
follow a course of moderation to avoid a "permanent coalition" 
of the two governments.10^ Roosevelt did indicate to the 
French charge d'affaires that after the arbitration it might
1 OP The terms are in Jackson H, Ralston and W. T. S. 
Doyle, Report of the French-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission 
Under the Protocol of 1902, (Washington* Government Printing 
Office, 1906).
Memorandum of January 13» 1903» FR, 1902, p. 410.
^^Mternburg to the Foreign Office, January 31» 1903»
GP, XVII, no. 51444, p. 285.
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be possible for either France or Mexico to take charge of 
Venezuela's customs until the foreign debt was paid,^®^
Two years after the incident Ambassador Jusserand was con­
vinced that the French policy had resulted in closer rela­
tions with the United S t a t e s , T w o  contemporary political 
writers, René Pinon and Pierre de Coubertin, shared Jusse­
rand' s viewpoint, 107
President Roosevelt chose Frank Plumley of Vermont as 
the umpire of the Franco-Venezuelan arbitration. The French 
Government initially claimed that the debt was over eight 
million dollars, but in the final settlement of I903 the 
amount was lowered to $668,000, If France was willing to 
compromise on the amount, she expected the recognition of 
her right to priority in the collection of the claims against 
Venezuela, During the united blockade France had reminded 
the powers of this provision of the Franco-Venezuelan treaty, 
and the powers had agreed to respect the t r e a t y , 108 The 
French charge in Washington had also talked to Herbert Bowen,
^^^Margerie to Delcasse, January 18, I9 0 3» DDF, III^, 
no, 3 0f P» 4 7,
108Jusserand to Delcasse, March 9» 1903» DDF, Ibid,, no. 
127» p. 161, Margerie to Delcasse, January 28, I9 0 3, Ibid., 
no. 46, pp. 62-3»
^^^Rene Pinon, "Le conflit franco-vénézuelien," Revue 
des Deux Mondes, XXXII (March 15, 1906), pp, 433-4. Coubertin, 
"Etats-Unis," pp, I30-I,
Mémorandum of December 18, 1902, Notes, Vol, 44, 
Memorandum of January 13» 1903» Ibid,
177
the American Minister in Venezuela, about the French claims. 
Bowen had assured him that the United States would remember 
and defend the principle of primacy for the French claims.
But at the Hague Tribunal later that year, the treaty between 
France and Venezuela was ignored. Priority of payment was 
granted to the three powers who had used force. French cre­
ditors, completely unrepresented at the Hague, believed that 
the decision was unfair. They were especially angry that the 
United States had failed to give diplomatic support to the 
power that had not participated in the blockade.110 In the 
event of further trouble with Venezuela, the French Government 
was not likely to discount the possible use of coercion.
Things had not improved in the Santo Domingo since 
the crisis between that unstable country and France by 1899* 
Santo Domingo had a debt of $32,000,000, of which the greater 
part was owed to European creditors. With a default on the 
obligation in 1904, France, Italy and Germany began to threat­
en the use of force. It was in this situation that Roosevelt 
pronounced his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In 
his state of the Union message he declared that the preserva­
tion of the doctrine might force the United States "in flagrant 
cases of such wrong doing or importance, to the exercise of
^^^Margerie to Delcasse, January 28, I9 0 3, DDF, III^, 
no. 46, pp. 61-2 .
llOpinon,,"conflit," p. 434. Jules Basdevant, "Le con­
flit franco-venezuelien." Revue Générale de Droit Internation­
al Public. XIII, 509 et seq.
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an international police p o w e r . I n  France the announce­
ment of the "Roosevelt corollary" created some concern.
Le Temps, which normally reflected the viewpoint of the 
Quai d'Orsay, indicated that the Monroe Doctrine had "assumed 
an offensive character." This newspaper feared that the
policy could lead to an alliance with E n g l a n d . O n e  author 
/ /
in the Revue Generale de Droit International Public denounced 
the principle of the message as a "hypocritical formula which 
will serve the exclusive and selfish interests of the United 
States."^^3 The historian Achille Viallate was less passion­
ate, and he was convinced that it was necessary for French­
men to accept the advent of American imperialism as a fact 
of the international situation.
Early in 1905 President Roosevelt negotiated a contro­
versial treaty with Santo Domingo which placed the customs 
of the country entirely under American control. The agree­
ment provided that 45 percent of the revenues would go to 
the Government of Santo Domingo and the remainder would be 
used to pay the foreign debt. With this arrangement there 
was not the slightest possibility that France or any other
ll^Message of December 6 , 1904, FR, 1904, p. Xli.
112Quoted in the Literary Digest, XXX (January 21, 1905)• 
p. 104.
^^3Julian La Ferriere, "L*impérialisme aux Etats-Unis 
et la doctrine de Monroe," Revue Générale de Droit Interna­
tional Public. XII, p. 2 6 3.
^^^Revue Politique et Litéraire, IV, pp, 393-98.
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power would intervene in Santo Domingo, If France was not 
prepared to oppose the application of the Roosevelt corollary, 
this did not mean that she was completely happy with the 
situation. When Roosevelt justified his policy in his annual 
message of 1905,^^^ an editorial in Le Temps declared: "We
are already well acquainted with the doctrine of the 'big 
stick.' This doctrine is now enlarged and exaggerated to 
extraordinary p r o p o r t i o n s , I t  is not entirely a coinci­
dence that in 1905 there appeared three French books on the 
subject of the Monroe Doctrine: Joseph Ribet's Des trans­
formations de la doctrine de Monroe, Daniel Antokoletz's 
La doctrine de Monroe et I'Amerique and Horace de Barrai 
Montferrat's De Monroe a Roosevelt. 1823-1905,^^? All three 
works assumed that American foreign policy in South America 
was a form of imperialism contrary to the interests of the 
South American Republics, Also the three works did not see 
any reason to suspect that Europe had ambitions for terri­
tory in that part of the world.
Meanwhile the conflict between France and Venezuela
^^%R, 1905f pp. xxxv-xxxvi,
^^^Quoted in Literary Digest, XXXI (December 5 0, I9 0 5), 
p. 995.
^^^Josept Ribet, Des transformations de la doctrine de 
Monroe, (Auxerre: Impr. A, Lanier, I9 0 5). Daniel Antokletz,
La doctrine de Monroe et I'Amerique. (Paris: E, Larose, 1905)
These two works were theses for the Sorbonne under Louis  ^
Renault, Horace Dominique de Barrai Monteferrât. De Monroe a 
Roosevelt. 1823-1905. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie,, I9 0 5),
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had become more critical. In September, I9 0 5, President 
Castro withdrew the permit of La compagnie française des 
cables télégraphiques, the company which had a monopoly in 
the Venezuelan interior. This was done with the excuse that 
the company had co-operated with the revolutionaries in the 
fiasco of 1903» but it was clear to most observers that this 
was an attempt to nationalize the telegraph s y s t e m . % n  
October the new Ambassador in Paris, Robert McCormick, noted 
that "the continued arbitrary action of President Castro has 
aroused considerable i r r i t a t i o n . T h e  Minister at Caracas, 
William Russell, reported later that month that five French 
warships were ready for action "in case of not arriving at 
a perfect understanding promptly."^^0 At the Quai d'Orsay 
it was well remembered that two years earlier Germany, Britain 
and Italy had achieved positive results only after they had 
used aggressive methods. It was also well remembered that 
during the blockade President Roosevelt had told M, Margerie, 
the French charge, that it was not the American policy to let 
the Venezuelan Government use the Monroe Doctrine to escape 
her financial obligations.121
XI8
See Venezuela, Proceso Franco-Venezolano. 1905-1906. 
(Caracas: Imprenta Nacional, 1907), p. xliv,
^^%cCormick to Root, October 5* 1905f Despatches, Vol.
1 2 5* no. 4 9.
1^ "^ Quoted in Jessup, Root, p. 495»
121]yiargerie to Delcasse, January 18, 1903, DDF, 111%, 
no. 331 pp. 44-5.
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President Roosevelt feared that France was ready to 
break diplomatic relations with Venezuela, At this point he 
was convinced that the crisis was the fault of the Venezuelan 
Government, In a letter to Hay he referred to President 
Castro as "an unspeakably villainous little monkey," "I 
should like to send an expedition against him," wrote Roose­
velt, "but this at present would be inadvisable in such a 
mundane world as ours, alike from the standpoint of internal 
and international politics, B y  the time that Elihu Root 
had been appointed Secretary of State, the crisis was worse.
In his message to congress in December, 1905t Roosevelt made 
it clear that the United states looked with disfavor upon 
even a temporary occupation of territory by a European power, 
but he repeated the promise that the Monroe Doctrine would 
never be "used by any nation of this continent as a shield 
to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against 
other nations,"123 A few days after the message Root wrote 
Minister Russell that "nothing but the efforts of this gov­
ernment have for a considerable time prevented the use of 
force by Prance," Root further stated that he was fearful
122Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905» Roosevelt Papers, 
series 4b ,
123pR, 1905, pp, xxxv-xxxvi.
182
that the United States would not be able to "maintain the 
peaceful status quo much longer."12^
On December 15 Roosevelt, Root and Jusserand met at 
the White House to discuss the crisis. The conversation 
was frank and candid, Jusserand made it clear that if the 
talks with Venezuela failed, the French Government would 
"have to employ more telling measures than the mere sending 
of naval vessels to Venezuelan waters," France would "pro­
bably be obliged to occupy temporarily one point or another, 
and seize perhaps some customs house; having recourse, in a 
word, to means which, while having chances of being felt, 
would avoid bloodshed," President Roosevelt responded that 
he understood "the necessities of such a situation," He 
assured Jusserand that the Monroe Doctrine "could certainly 
not be used by Southern Republics to shield them from the 
consequences of their own torts, and that France ought to 
feel no uneasiness in this particular case," Roosevelt 
explained that the United States would be satisfied so long 
as France would give assurances that she had no goals for a 
permanent occupation of territory and that the occupation of 
any customs house "would be of as limited duration as possible,"
1 T-hRoot to Russell, December 11, 1905, Quoted in Jessup, 
Root, p, 495* In his interpretation Jessup writes: "Without
doubt the fiery Theodore Roosevelt would have been quite 
ready to assume a more aggressive attitude toward the Latin 
American Republics if Root had not held the check rein," 
p, 497, Jessup does not have documentation to completely 
support this interpretation.
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Jusserand told Roosevelt that, while he did not define French
foreign policy, he did feel sure that these two conditions
would be entirely satisfactory to the Quai d*O r s a y ,^^5
/
Early in I906 the French charge d'affaires in Caracas 
went on board a French ship for several hours, and the 
Venezuelan Government refused him permission to re-enter the 
mainland, France severed her diplomatic relations with the 
Government of Castro, Ambassador Jusserand notified the 
Department of State of the situation, and he emphasized that 
the French Government had decided on this course only after 
it had "exhausted all other means," In addition, Jusserand 
requested that the American Minister in Caracas might be 
instructed to take charge of the French archives and French 
interests in Venezuela so long as the state of non-recognition 
might continue,126 Root agreed, and the same day he tele­
graphed Russell to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ^2? Like France, 
Venezuela was anxious to know about the viewpoint in
^This conversation is described in detail in two 
unsigned memorandums of December 15, 1905, Notes, Vol, 46, 
Philip Jessup writes that these memorandums were written by 
Root with the aid of Jusserand, but he does not give any 
basis for this explanation, Jessup, Root, pp, 495-6,
Jusserand to Root, January 9, 1906, Notes, Vol, 46, 
Rouvier did not ask the Venezuelan charge d'affaires to leave 
Paris until January 18, Rouvier then declared: "Dy its
prolongment and by progressively assuming a more aggressive 
character the attitude of the Government of President Castro 
has become incompatable with the maintainance of diplomatic 
relations between the two states," Venezuela, Proceso, p, 
Ixxvi,
^^^Root to Russell, January 9» 1906, PR, I906, p, 1432,
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Washington, and the Venezuelan Foreign Minister asked Russell 
to inform him "without delay" if the United States "in these 
circumstances will maintain and defend the Monroe D o c t r i n e , " 1 2 8  
About two weeks later Root simply answered that "the Govern­
ment of the United States is not aware that any circumstances 
exist which require action by the United States in order to 
maintain and defend the Monroe Doctrine."1^9 Le Temps did 
notice that Roosevelt sent the American cruiser, the US3 
Denver, in the proximity of the Venezuelan waters to observe 
the situation. 130
The French Government made a lot of threats, but it 
neither established a blockade or occupied any customs houses. 
Without recourse to the archives at the Quai d'Orsay the 
best source for insight into the policy of the French Govern­
ment is Le Temps. Several editorials in mid-January, probably 
written by André Tardieu, considered the various options which 
were open to France. It was impossible for the government 
to back down, explained the writer, for the entire trans- 
Atlantic cable system was at stake. The writer ruled out a 
military occupation, because he explained: "The delicate
point is that France does not want to anger the American
^^®Russell to Root, January 9, 1906, quoted in Jessup, 
Root, p. 496.
^^^Root to Russell, January 30, I90 6, Ibid.. p. 497. 
130i,g Temps, January 22, I906.
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public on the subject of the Monroe D o c t r i n e . B u t  Le 
Temps was persuaded that a blockade and a naval demonstration 
would not be considered unacceptable by the Roosevelt Admin­
istration.^^^ The newspaper noted that there had been no 
opposition to the French policy at Washington, but it also 
remarked that one would have "to conjecture to what point 
this attitude of approval would extend to the f u t u r e . "^33 
One editorial expressed the idea that no power would object 
to the use of coercion for each power would believe that it 
was in the common interest to teach Castro a l e s s o n . ^34
The analysis of American public opinion in Le Temps 
was probably correct, for during the controversy the Amer­
ican press was almost unanimous in taking a pro-French posi­
tion. The Outlook stated in an editorial that "Castro 
has ignored his duty in this respect, and has pushed the 
friendly feeling which France had for his country to their 
limit and beyond what patience and forbearance r e q u i r e . "136 
Albert Shaw, long a bitter critic of Castro, wrote in the
131Le Temps. January 22, I90 6, January 31, I906. 
^^^Ibid.. January 24, I9 0 6.
^^^Ibid., January 20, I9 0 6.
^^^Ibid., January 26, I9 0 6.
133white, Opinion, p. 21?.
^^^The Outlook. LXXXII (January 20, I9 0 6), p. 104; 
Ibid., (January 27# I9 0 6), p. 145.
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American Monthly Review of Reviews; “The eminently calm and 
fair attitude of the French Foreign Office has prevented 
any possible opposition to even the sternest of measures 
against President Castro."^37 Harper's Weekly the influ­
ential George Harvey expressed confidence that the French 
Government would not violate either the letter or the spirit 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Harvey noted that Castro's "temper 
ran away with him, and led him to commit an act which no 
self-respecting government like that of France could be 
expected to overlook."^38
The Venezuelan Government— weak, poor and without any 
hope of outside help— had no choice but to submit to the 
French demands. In February Castro agreed to pay the French 
claims, stop harassing the French cable company and recognize 
a French Minister in Caracas. Without these concessions, 
there is no doubt but that France would have used force.
Still it must be understood that the controversy occurred 
at the same time as the Moroccan crisis, and for this reason 
France was in a conciliatory mood. The Franco-Venezuelan 
controversy was so brief that it did not have a significant 
influence on relations between France and the United States. 
Most works on American diplomatic history have very little to 
say about the incident, if they mention it at all.^39
137American Monthly Review of Reviews. XXXIII (March,
1906), pp. 266-7 .
^38Harper's Weekly. L (February 10, I9 06), p. 182. 
^39a major exception is Jessup, Root, pp. 495-7.
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The following year at the Second Hague Conference the 
United States took the leadership in the adoption of a reso­
lution concerning the use of coercion to collect foreign 
debts. General Horace Porter introduced the resolution, 
which was a modification of a memorandum given the United 
States in 1902 by Mr, Luis M, Drago, the then Foreign Minis­
ter of the Argentine Republic, The final resolution which 
was adopted committed the powers "not to have recourse to 
armed force for the recovery of contract debts," but this 
principle was not to apply to cases where the debtor state 
refused arbitration or refused to abide by the award of the 
a r b i t r a t o r , T h e  French Government did not oppose the 
passage of the so-called Drago Doctrine at the Hague, but 
certainly it would have if there had not been provision for 
the use of force as a last resort. As the resolution was 
worded, there was never any concern that it was meant to 
refer to the recent actions of France, By the time of this 
Hague Conference the French Government had given up any hope 
of territorial aggrandizement in South America, France 
wanted to maintain her special interests in South America, 
but she had come to the conclusion that this could best be 
done by working with and not against the United States,
l^^For the resolution see Bemis, Diplomatic History, 
p. 525.
^^^This interpretation is emphasized in J, Fred Hippy, 
Latin America in World Politics, (James Sprunt Historical 
Studies, XIX, 192?), PP. 130-1,
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As France was continuing to build a large empire in 
Africa, the United States had almost no interests on the 
continent. With one exception Americans had no objection to 
French colonialism in this region of the world; the one 
exception was the Republic of Liberia, The modern nation of 
Liberia had its beginning in 1822 when the American Coloni­
zation Society sent a group of free Negroes to the area.
The Republic of Liberia was organized in 184?, based on the 
model of the American constitution, and the United States 
recognized the Republic in 1862, The Government in Monrovia- 
named after President Monroe—  made a courageous effort for 
economic progress and political stability, but it was over­
whelmed by many difficult problems. The major problem was 
that the local tribes for the most part did not feel any sense 
of loyalty toward the central government. By the end of the 
nineteenth century the Liberian Government had effective 
control only in the coast towns and in the settlements along 
the St, Paul and St, John Rivers, A related problem was that 
Liberia's colonial neighbors, France and Britain, used this 
instability as an excuse to expand the boundaries of their 
colonies at the expense of the defenseless Republic,
Beginning in the 1880's Britain and France began to 
eat away at the outer edges of Liberia, In 1883 the British 
authorities at the colony of Sierra Leone sent in troops to 
occupy portions of territory which had long been claimed 
by the Liberian Government, The following year the French
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Foreign Minister announced that the boundary lines between 
Liberia and Ivory Coast were uncertain, and he called for 
an investigation. The French survey claimed that France 
should have sovereignty over the area between the Cavally 
River and the San Pedro River, an area sixty miles wide and 
one hundred miles long. The French authorities made agree­
ments with the local tribes, and then they, following the 
British precedent, sent in occupation troops. In 1892 Secre­
tary of State James Blaine notified the French Government 
that the United States would strongly protest any action 
which forced Liberia to cede long claimed territory,1^2 
This seems to have little effect, for in December of that 
year Liberia had no choice but to sign a treaty which recog­
nized the French claims,^^3 The United States did not con­
sider any action against France, but the following year 
President Grover Cleveland said in his annual message that 
the United States felt "earnest concern lest territorial 
impairment in Liberia should take place without her uncon­
strained consent,
In 1897 the British Ambassador in Washington gave 
Secretary of State Richard Olney a memorandum which reported
T A?
Blaine to Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, June 4, 1892, 
FR, 1892, p, 167,
^^^Treaty in FR, 1893, PP. 297-8,
^^^Speech of December 4, 1893» in Ibid,, p, vii; 
Messages. Vol, XIII, p, 5870,
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that France was making plans for an encroachment of Liberian 
territory. Olney was interested and instructed the American 
Minister in Monrovia» "In the light of the enclosed memor­
andum, which you are to regard as wholly confidential, ascer­
tain and immediately report all that you can, showing the 
present view of the Liberian Government upon the matter,"1^5 
Just after the change in the executive branch of the American 
Government, the new Secretary of State, John Sherman, instructed 
General Porter to find out all that he could about the matter. 
John Hay in I898 again called Porter's attention to the 
charges of French aggression, "Our position in reference 
to the citizens of Liberia," he wrote, "is such that we 
could not be justified in regarding with indifference any 
attempt to oppress them or deprive them of their indepen­
dence." He suggested to Porter that he should tell Delcassa 
that the United States was concerned but that she would 
"take it for granted that their (British) apprehension are 
not well founded."1^7 After a conversation with Delcasse, 
Ambassador Porter reported that he had received an "assuring 
response," Hay was pleased, and he instructed the Paris
1 J[i O
Embassy to "continue to watch the matter with care." The
l^^oiney to William Heard, February 23» 1897, Instructions, 
Liberia, Vol. 2, no. 37,
l^^Sherman to Porter, May 20, 1897, quoted in Dennis, 
Adventures, p. 4 38.
l^?Hay to Porter, June 28, I898, Instructions, Vol. 24,
p. 199.
^^®Adee to Vignaud, August 23, 1898, Ibid., p. 218.
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next year Hay wrote Porter that he should again emphasize 
/
to Delcasse that the American people would be opposed to 
"any action by any European Government that might threaten 
the integrity or independence of L i b e r i a ,"1^9
The Liberian Government was so worried about French 
territorial ambitions in I900 that it expressed the desire 
for the United States Navy to construct a coaling station 
on the Liberian coast. At the request of McKinley, this 
possibility was investigated by the Navy Department, The 
Secretary of Navy concluded that the region was not practical 
for a coaling station, and that such a project would require 
an "expenditure of a sum of money so large that the Navy 
Department does not feel justified in bringing the matter to 
the attention of C o n g r e s s , After learning of this, the 
Liberian Minister in Washington suggested that the United 
States should at least assign a military attache at her 
Legation in Monrovia, Secretary Hay did not like the idea, 
for he believed that only a very strong military force would 
have any influence on the policies of the European powers.
He wrote to the American Minister in Monrovia: "It appears
inexpedient to detail an officer of the army for duty as 
military attache of the Legation,
l^^Hay to Porter, June 28, 1699» Instructions, Vol, 24, 
p, 640,
^5%ay to Ernest Lyon, November 3» 1903» Instructions, 
Liberia, Vol, 2, no, 12,
^^%ay to Lyon, November 13» 1903» Ibid,, no, 13.
192
In 1904 France formally charged that there was no 
effective police control in the northern part of Liberia 
next to French Guinea, The French Government obliged Liberia 
to agree to the appointment of a Franco-Liberian Commission 
to investigate the amount of political stability in that 
general area. Hoping for some outside aid, the Liberian 
Government asked the United States to send an investigator 
to join the commission. The Department of State was suspi­
cious of the French intentions, but at this moment it did 
not want to challenge France directly. The acting Secretary 
of State, Francis Loomis, wrote to the American Minister in 
Monrovia* "I have to say that this government does not see 
how it could send an uninvited representative along with the 
commission, and would hardly like to ask the French Govern­
ment to let us do so," The following year Alvey Adee, 
then the acting Secretary of State, requested McCormick to 
talk to the Liberian Minister in Paris about the situation, 
"If fitting opportunity offers," added Adee, "you may also 
express in the proper quarter our solicitude that all differ­
ences may be amicably adjusted with appropriate regard to 
the historical rights of L i b e r i a , "^53
While the Franco-Liberian commission was still in the 
process of investigations. Ambassador Sternburg gave the
152Loomis to lyon, January 28, 1904, Ibid,, Vol, 2, 
no, 21,
l^^Adee to McCormick, July 17, 1905» Instructions, 
Vol, 2 5, p. 106,
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Department of State a note charging that Great Britain and 
France were conspiring to make Liberia into a joint pro­
tectorate, According to the note France was to be given 
special commercial privileges in Liberia, and Britain would 
take charge of the Liberian customs. The very next day 
after Root received the German note, he wrote to Ambassador 
McCormick in Paris to "ascertain and report as fully as pos­
sible how far this project is being seriously entertained," 
Root made it clear that he doubted the truthfulness of the 
German charges. He noted that the French Government well 
understood the special relationship between Liberia and the 
United States, and he did not believe France would attempt 
such a policy without saying anything to the American Govern­
ment, ^ 5^ In Paris McCormick found that some individuals in 
the Government had suggested that France make Liberia into a 
protectorate, but in his report to Root he concluded: "After
having carefully investigated the matter, I am unable to 
report that no such negotiations have taken place and that 
no such protectorate is contemplated by France," McCormick 
did find, however, that the Government was determined to make 
additional boundary changes to the benefit of French West 
Africa,^55
^5^Root to McCormick, November 8, I9 0 5, Instructions,
Vol, 2 5, p, 14?, Root to Lyon, November 9» 1905, Instructions, 
Liberia, Vol, 2, no, 65.
^^^McCormick to Root, November 24, 1905, Despatches,
Vol, 125, no, 61,
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It is difficult to determine the goals of France in 
regard to Liberia, but it is certain that by I905 she was 
convinced that she had special interests in the Republic.
When an English rubber company established a branch office 
in Liberia the French expansionist paper L*Europe Coloniale 
expressed concern that this was a challenge to French com­
m e r c e ,  ^ 56 Up until this time there had been almost no 
American investments in the country. In I906 an American 
rubber corporation investigated the possibility of obtain­
ing a concession to obtain natural rubber. In Monrovia the 
French Ambassador objected to the plan, claiming that the 
treaty of 1902 stipulated that "no concession granted by the 
Liberian Government can be valid without the consent and 
concurrence of the French G o v e r n m e n t . T h e  Department of 
State did not reject the validity of the treaty, but it chose 
to disagree with the French interpretation of that document.
Mr. Robert Bacon, the department's expert on treaties, declared 
that according to the agreement the approval of the French 
Government was not required except when "a concession should 
impair the independence of Liberia or should alienate any part 
of its t e r r i t o r y . The matter did not lead to any further
^^^Charles Martel, "Liberie," L*Europe Coloniale, 
December 27, 1905.
157iyon to Root, December 30» 1905» Despatches, Liberia, 
no. 144} January 1, I9 0 6, no. 147.
^^®Robert Bacon to Lyon» February 6 , I9 0 6» Instruc­
tions, Liberia, Vol. 2, no. 6 0.
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disagreement between the United States and France, for the 
American company did not follow through on its attempt to 
get a concession. It was not until after World War I that 
American business interests— led by the Firestone Corporation- 
became important to the small African nation,
In 1907 the French Government coerced Liberia into 
accepting another Franco-Liberian treaty. By this treaty 
Liberia ceded some 2,000 square miles of land to the colony 
of French Guinea, When the President of Liberia went to 
Paris to sign the treaty, he talked to Ambassador Henry White 
about the dissatisfaction of his Government toward the terms 
of the new arrangement. White, following his instructions, 
answered that the American Government sympathized with 
Liberia's situation, but that it was not prepared to inter­
fere in the affair in any way,^^® Few Americans knew what 
was taking place at Paris, The press in the United States 
was almost completely silent about the treaty. President 
Roosevelt did not discuss the matter to any length in his 
correspondence. In one contemporary letter he did mention 
the "fearful deterioration" of the nation, and he added
R. Earle Anderson, Liberia; America's African 
Friend, (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1952), pp, 126-42,
l60white to Root, September 27, 1907» Despatches,
Vol. 226, no, 3532.
196
that "the condition of Liberia today is something with which 
I am obliged practically to deal as President.
Not long after the formation of the Franco-Liberian 
treaty Roosevelt appointed a commission to go to the Liberian 
Republic to investigate the situation there and to make 
recommendations for the American policy of the future. In 
the Congress there was considerable opposition to the funding 
of the commission, but eventually an appropriation bill was 
passed for $39»0 0 0 , In its final report the commission 
recommended that the United States should make Liberia into 
a quasi-protectorate, following the precedent of Roosevelt’s 
policy in the Caribbean, Specifically, the commission sug­
gested that the United States should provide diplomatic sup­
port for any future boundary disputes with Liberia, that she 
should control Liberia's customs until the foreign debt had 
been paid, that she should construct a coaling station near 
Monrovia, and that she should assist in improving the police 
forces, schools and hospitals of L i b e r i a , 1 ^ 3  According to 
the report these measures were necessary because of the
^^^Roosevelt to Ray Stannard Baker, June 3» 1908,
Morison, Letters. Vol. VI, p, 1048,
^^^Congressional Record. Vol. XLIII, part 2, pp, 1077
ff,
l^^U.S, Senate, Affairs in Liberia: Message from the
President of the United States, Transmitting a Letter 
of the State Submitting a Report of the commission which 
visited Liberia in Pursuance of the Provisions of the Defunct 
Act of March 4. 1909, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1910), pp, 32-6, All of these ideas were suggested to the 
Commission by the Liberian Government,
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likelihood of future territorial aggression by Britain and 
France. "In pursuit of their policy of building up a great 
West African Empire," the report declared, "the French have 
been a thorn in the side of Liberia, They have been consis­
tent and persistent in their efforts to increase their 
boundarie s ,
The Roosevelt Administration did not think it wise to 
establish an American protectorate in Africa, but it did 
favor several of the recommendations of the commission. 
Secretary Root, just before leaving office, wrote: "Our
nation rests upon the highest obligations to assist them, 
so far as they need assistance, toward the maintenance of 
a free, orderly and prosperous civil s o c i e t y , C o n g r e s s  
did not see fit to implement many of the recommendations, and 
the report died the death of so many similar studies in 
American history. In I910 France again forced Liberia to 
sign a treaty which increased the size of French West Africa 
and reduced Liberia to its present land area. As earlier, 
the United States did not react with any vigorous anti-French 
policy. But it should be emphasized that this was an age of 
imperialism so far as the European powers were concerned, 
and West Africa was a major area for colonial competition. 
Even if the outside edges of her boundary were carved away.
, pp, i4_5.
l^^Root to Roosevelt, January 18, 1909» quoted in Ibid,,
p. 31.
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Liberia did manage to remain independent, and she and Ethiopia 
were the only two independent nations in Africa by I9IO. 
Liberia was tempting to France, England and Germany, but they 
recognized the historical and sentimental attachment of the 
United States to the Republic, It seems certain that this 
was the only reason that there was no partition of Liberia,1^6
l^^See Roland P, Falkner, chairman of the commission, 
"The United States and Liberia," American Journal of Inter­
national Law, IV (1910), pp, 529
CHAPTER VI 
THE FAR EAST
The Par East was of central concern to the foreign 
policies of both France and the United States throughout the 
nineteenth century.^ The two countries had been commercial 
rivalies, each seeking trade opportunities, and for this 
reason their contact in this part of the world had generally 
been unfriendly.% For example, during the undeclared Franco- 
Chinese War of 1884, the American Secretary of State offered 
mediation to end the conflict. The offer was politely refused, 
but the incident was considered as somewhat of an impertinence 
at the Quai d'Orsay,3 The United States was unhappy with the 
fact that France was building a large colony in Indo-China, 
but despite this, the American Government, as Tyler Dennett 
observed, "never murmured a protest" against French imper­
ialism in South East Asia.^ In a previous chapter it is
^Langer, Imperialism, pp. 16?, 677.
^Dennett, Americans. p. 637»
^Jules Ferry to Sala, Charge in Washington, August 29» 
1884, DDF, Vol. VI, no. 382, pp. 387-8.
^Dennett, Americans. p. 649.
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noted that France was initially unhappy with the situation 
when the United States became her colonial neighbor in the 
Philippines after the war of I898, Shortly thereafter, how­
ever, the greater fear of Germany and Japan made it necessary 
for France to come to terms with American imperialism, Rene^ 
Pinon, an important political writer, expressed a rather 
common conviction in 1904 when he wrote in the Revue des 
Deux Mondes that American power in Asia was necessary "for 
the equilibrium and the security of European possessions 
and interests," Pinon*s conclusion was that he "sincerely" 
hoped for "the success of the Americans in this grand work 
of civilization,"^
In the nineteenth century the American government had 
attempted to gain Asian markets for American commerce through 
use of the principle of equality of commercial treatment for 
all of the industrialized powers. This had been the American 
policy since the early 1840*s when Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster instructed Caleb Cushing to work for "entry of the 
American ships , , , on terms as favorable as those which are 
enjoyed by British merchants,"^ Until the Spanish-American 
war the United States tried to obtain markets in Asia without 
establishing colonies or spheres of influence as had most of
^Rene Pinon, "L*oeuvre des Américains aux Philippines," 
Revue des Deux Mondes, XXIV (November I5 , 1904), p, 411,
^Claude M, Fuess, The Life of Caleb Cushing, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc,, 195l)> Vol, I, pp7 418-20,
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the European powers. All historical data seems to indicate 
that this policy was little motivated by idealistic consi­
derations, and almost all historians agree with Tyler Bennett's 
generalization that "the tap-root of American policy has been 
not philanthropy but the demand for the most-favored-nation 
treatment."? A large number of Americans believed that Asian 
markets offered great wealth and opportunity to the nations 
that would be able to take advantage of the situation,® 
President McKinley echoed this belief in his annual message 
of 1898, He spoke of "our constantly expanding direct trade 
with the farther Orient," and he stated that "it will be our 
aim to subserve our large interests in that quarter by all 
means appropriate to the constant policy of our government,"9 
France attempted to gain commercial access to Asia by 
way of a large colonial empire, France’s goals in the nine­
teenth century were generally limited to the area of South­
eastern Asia, Since the time of Jules Ferry the major moti­
vation for colonization of Indo-China had been the belief 
that Indo-China could be used as a back door to the large 
commercial markets of Southern China, It was a common
?Bennett, Americans, PP, v, 680,
®See Paul Varg, "The Myth of the China Market, I89O- 
1914," American Historical Review, LXXÏII (February, I9 68), 
pp, 7^2-5 8. Alfred Griswold. The Far Eastern Policy of the 
United States (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938), p,
152.
^Message of Dec, 5» 1898, FR, I898, p, xxii.
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conception that the province of Yunan had almost unlimited
trade opportunities,10 It was not until the German lease
of Kiachow in 1895 that France began to seek to extend her
authority into the Chinese empire. After this date France,
working with her ally, Russia, was one of the leading powers
creating spheres of influence in China,H By 1898 France
had accumulated preferential treatment in the three provinces
of Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung, a coaling station in the bay
of Kwangchow for ninety-nine years, a concession for Railroads
into Lunnan, and some participation in the Chinese Eastern
1 ?Railroad in Manchuria, It appeared at this time that France 
was following a policy directly opposed to the continuation 
of the open door and the territorial integrity of China,
In the United States it was generally believed that 
the partition of China was at hand. From the experience of 
colonization in other areas it was feared that this develop­
ment would be in conflict with American interests. In the 
North American Review Charles Conant wrote in 1898 that
^^Warren B, Walsh, "The Yunan %th," Far Eastern Quar­
terly . Vol, II, May, 19^3» pp. 272-86, Jules Ferry, Le 
Tonkin et la Mere-patrie. (Paris, V, Havard, 1890), pp,
80-9 6,
^^Langer, Imperialism, p. 395,
Kwangohow Bay" Encyclopaedia Britanica, 11th edit,, 
Vol, 15-1 6, p, 9 5 7. Stephen Roberts, History of French 
Colonial Policy, 1870-1925, (London: P, S, King, I9 2 9),
p, 431, Auguste Ge'rard. Ma Mission en Chine. 1894-7, (Paris: 
Plon-Nourrit, I9I8 ), pp, I96-9 . Henri Cordier. Histoire 
des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 
(Paris: F^lix Alcan, 1902), Vol, III, pp, 370-2,
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"Russia, Germany and France have seized stations and large 
tracts of territory in China with a view to enforcing their 
restrictive policy of shutting up the markets to their own 
people." He therefore concluded that "the United States 
cannot afford to adhere to a policy of isolation while other 
nations are reaching out for the command of these new markets,"13 
Another writer in the same journal reported that unless the 
United States intervened China would soon be "carved up like 
sirloin of beef, as if there were no vitality in her."l^
Great Britain also wanted to see the preservation of the 
status quo in China, She feared that Germany, France and 
Russia would create large spheres of influence which would 
be harmful to British dominance of the Asian markets. The 
London Times warned in I8 9 8: "There need be no doubt that
France will have her share, and a large one, in what still 
remains to be taken before the Chinese Empire becomes a 
corpse,"I5 In March of that year the British Government 
made overtures to the American Government that the two nations 
should join together in the support of the open door in
China,
13charles A, Conant, "The Economics of Imperialism," 
North American Review, CLXVII (September, I898), PP. 338,
3?5:
1^
Archibald R, Colquhoun, "The Far Eastern Crisis," 
North American Review, CLXVII (November, I898), p, 2 3,
^London Times, March 11, p, 5* The charges were 
answered in Le Temps of that same day,
^^Campbell, Friendship, pp, 19-20, >
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By 1898 Prance was somewhat disillusioned about the 
possibility of commercial benefit in Southeastern Asia, The 
important economist Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu demonstrated that 
the provinces of Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung were three of 
the poorest regions in C h i n a . W i t h  the exposure of the 
"Yunan myth" France’s policy suddenly changed, and she 
became opposed to a further partition of C h i n a , O n  March 19 
Hanotaux told a correspondent that Prance did not have any 
desire to join in any scheme for the disintegration of China. 
Prance could not handle any larger area in Asia than Indo 
China, "God grant," he said, "that we may not be witnessing 
the death of China," The policy of Prance was "to try to 
prop up the Celestial Empire, the ruin of which would cause 
so much conflict,"I9 in a conversation with the British 
Ambassador in Paris Hanotaux claimed that Prance's policy, 
like England's, was "based on the conservation principles 
and the maintenance as long as possible of the integrity of 
the Chinese Empire," A general program of "dismemberment 
rivality" would "very probably create a war between the 
European powers, Hanotaux disliked "the principles of 
spheres of influence in China," but he said that "Prance
^^Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, La renovation de l'Asie. 
(Paris: A, Colin, 1901), pp, 436-56, 439*
^®Robert, Policy, pp. 431-2, Walsh, "%rth," pp, 285-6,
^^New York Herald, Paris edition, March 25, I898 
Washington Post, îfeirch 21, I8 98, p, 1.
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must sustain her claims to consideration in the provinces 
contiguous to Tongking." France wanted railway privileges 
to he "equally balanced," and "the participation of the 
French in the occupation of the administrative ports not 
absolutely ignored,”20
It was in this background that Secretary of State Hay 
and his Asian advisor William W, Rockhill decided to try to 
get the powers to agree to support the principle of equality 
of trading opportunities in the Chinese empire. The famous 
"open door" circular, written by Rockhill, was sent to Britain, 
Germany, France, Russia, Italy and Japan on various dates 
from September 6 to November 21, 1899. The basic idea of 
the document was the request that the powers would maintain 
the most-favored-nation doctrine in the leased territory 
and spheres of influence of China, The note did not call 
for support for the territorial integrity of China, In a 
department memorandum Rockhill wrote that spheres of influence 
"have now been recognized by Great Britain, as well as by 
France, Germany and Russia, and they must be accepted as 
existing f a c t s , I t  should be noted that the United States 
did not even consider any suggestion that commercial equality 
should be applied in the European colonies of Asia, France’s 
policy in Indo China was considered as a matter entirely in
20Monson to Marquess of Salisbury, March 20, I898, BD, 
Vol, 1, no, 33» p. 22,
21
Quoted in Dennis, Adventures, pp, 208-10,
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the hands of France, American trade in Indo China had de­
clined greatly since that area had become a French colony.
Hay and Rockhill wanted to help prevent a similar develop­
ment in the Chinese mainland, but they had no hopes of turn­
ing back the clock,
France was the last of the major powers to be asked 
to subscribe to the open door note. This was because of 
two factors. First, Hay noted that he had "some apprehen­
sion" that France might oppose the declaration and thereby 
make its acceptance more difficult. Secondly, General 
Porter was on vacation, and because of the close relation 
between Porter and Delcasse, Hay believed that it would be 
best not to act until the Ambassador returned to Paris,
The charge d'affaires, Mr, Henry Vignaud, was instructed 
merely to "take appropriate occasion to discretely sound
the French government as to its views on the general sub-
22 / ject," When Porter returned he spoke to Delcasse about
the matter, Delcasse said that France intended to support 
commercial equality in China, and he emphasized that "there 
is apprehension felt by all diplomats in Europe regarding 
the possibility of serious complications in China which may 
some day make it a storm center involving many of the great 
powers,"23 After receiving this encouragement Hay telegraphed
22nay to Vignaud, September 6, 1899# Instructions, 
24, p, 222, FR, no, 664, p, 128,
23porter to Hay, November 10, 1899, Despatches, Vol, 
118, no, 559 Delcasse to Thi^bant, Charge in Washington, 
November 14, 1899. DDF, Vol, XV, no, 301, pp, 521-2,
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Porter to "Informally submit" the proposal to Delcasse and 
to "ask whether France will join,"^^ On November 24 Delcasse 
gave a discourse in the Chamber of Deputies in which he 
warned of the grave economic conditions that would result 
from a partition of China, He affirmed that France would 
therefore support "the maintenance of a China open to the 
free struggle of the capital of the entire world."^5
Despite French encouragement General Porter did not 
immediately present the open door circular to Delcasse^ In 
December Porter reported that he had received information 
that France was about to propose to the powers that they 
agree to a French statement of the open door for China. 
Secretary Hay did not want France to receive the credit for 
the demarche. He instructed Porter to ask for France's 
formal support of the open door. Porter would be able to 
argue that the principle should be considered in its "present 
form" because it had already been accepted by Britain and 
G e r m a n y . I t  was not until December 13» that Porter formally 
asked Delcasse' to support Rockhill's note. Delcasse^ was not 
surprised by the move, but before giving his formal approval 
he asked the French Ambassadors in London and Berlin to find 
out the policy of those two governments. The two diplomats
ph
Hay to Porter, November 21, 1899» PR» 1899» p, 128,
Journal Officiel, November 25» 1899»
Z^ Ha 
pp. 244-5.
^ y to Porter» December 12, 1899» Instructions, 24,
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reported that Germany and Britain would unenthusiastically 
agree to the open door if the other powers would do like­
wise,27 Delcasse'wrote the Charge'd'affaires in Washington 
that the French policy was to support equality of trade 
opportunities in all of China, but he added one reservation 
to Rockhill's note: "I would ignore the meaning of the term
'spheres of influence' employed in the American note, for 
we have never been notified of the creation or definition 
of such spheres."28
On December 16 Delcasse' sent General Porter France's 
formal response to the first open door note. If the other 
nations were willing to co-operate in their "leased terri­
tories" France would reciprocate in her leased areas and grant 
"equal treatment for the citizens and subjects of all nations, 
in matters which concern the tariff, navigation and railroad 
rates," France approved the policy on the condition that 
the other powers would also agree, Delcasse did not include 
any mention of spheres of influence in his r e s p o n s e , 29 He 
orally explained to Porter that.the term should be avoided 
because its use implied special rights. As usual Porter was
27paul Cambon to Delcasse, December 14, 1899» DDF, Vol, 
XVI^, p, 46, note 2, Noailles to Delcasse, December 15» 1899, 
Ibid,, p, 46,
2fi / /
Delcasse to Thiebaut, December 14, 1899» Ibid,, no, 2?,
pp, 46-7,
29Delcasse to Porter» December 16» 1899» DDF» Vol,» 118^, 
no, 29» p. 48; PR, pp, 128-9,
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convinced that France’s policy was in conformity with Amer­
ican interests. He reported to Washington that France "is 
evidently in favor of the open door and equal treatment, 
in the broadest sense throughout C h i n a , "3^
Russia was the power which was most hesitant to agree 
to the open door for China, In Washington the Russian Am­
bassador suggested to the French Ambassador that their two 
countries should jointly oppose the project,31 But to 
Russia’s dismay France at the turn of the century feared 
that a partition of China would be contrary to her inter­
ests,3% Russia did not want to face the powers alone, and 
in February, 1900, Count Mouravieff informed Washington that 
Russia would agree to any action which was acceptable to 
France, Secretary Hay decided to give the "widest signifi­
cance" to this r e p l y , 33 Hay therefore notified each of the 
powers that the open door doctrine had been accepted. To 
Porter he instructed:
You will please inform the Government of France that 
the condition originally attached to the acceptance, 
that all other powers concerned should likewise 
accept the proposals of the United States, having 
been complied with, this government will therefore
3^Porter to Hay, Dec, 16, 1899, Despatches, Vol, 118,
. 567.
^^Thiebaut to Delcasse, Dec, 20, 1899» DDF, Vol, XVI^, 
• 3 2, pp. 51”2 ,
^^Langer, Imperialism, p, 687, 
33Demmett, Hay, pp, 292-3.
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consider the assent give it to France as final and
definitive."34
It is generally pointed out by historians that none of the 
powers had actually given definite support to the open door. 
In the case of France, however, it is clear that the Quai 
d'Orsay was not under any false impression concerning the 
policies of the other powers. The French Government was 
happy, believing that the American move would help prevent 
friction and advance French trade. In hind-sight it seems 
that the Department of State's suspicions of France in 1899 
and 1900 were unjustified. The department did not fully 
understand that France by then had decided that further 
aggrandizement into the Chinese mainland would not give 
advantages commensurate with the cost and dangers involved 
in such a project.
The acceptance of the open door doctrine was of little 
encouragement to China, and in the summer of I900 Chinese 
nationalists rose in revolt in the famous Boxer rebellion. 
Early in the crisis Delcasse^ instructed the French Minister 
in China to maintain close relations with the other powers. 
Delcasse^ believed that "in the circumstances an affirmation 
of solidarity of the grand powers is the best guarantee of 
each nation's interest."35 At first Secretary of State Hay
34}iay to Porter, March 20, I900, Instructions, Vol.
24, p. 2 7 5.
^^Delcasse^to Pichon, June 5» 1900, DDF, XVI^, no.
163, p. 256.
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told Jules Cambon that the United States would not co-operate 
with the powers but was only interested in the protection of 
American interests,Shortly thereafter it became apparent 
that the revolt was more serious than had been initially 
thought, and the American government reversed its independent 
attitude. Hay then told Cambon that "if a military action 
were to become necessary the American forces would join with 
the European forces and would be placed under the same com­
m a n d e r ,  "37 The United States eventually sent 5§000 soldiers 
to combine in the united effort of the powers to maintain 
their position in China,
The French generally favored a stronger reaction to 
the Boxer revolt than did the United States, Le Temps 
declared: "The yellow world must learn, at their expense,
that one does not insult impunitely the rest of the world.
No nation will allow it and least of all France,"3^ Delcasse's 
early reaction was that the situation did not justify a de­
claration of a "regular state of war," but this became French 
policy only after American encouragement.39 in August the 
Chinese Viceroys of Shanghai notified the European powers
^^Cambon to Delcasse^ June 8 , 1900, DDF, XVI^, no, 166, 
p. 257,
37cambon to Delcasse^ June 9, 1900, Ibid,. no, I7 0, 
p, 2 6 1,
3^Le Temps. August I3, I9 00,
39Delcasse to Cambon, June 22, I9OO, Notes, Vol, 4],
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that there would be a general uprising if harm were done 
to the Emperor or Empress at Peking. At first Delcasse^ 
interpreted this as an ultimatum, and he did not want to 
back down to a threat.^0 The American Department of State, 
on the other hand, interpreted the matter as a desire for 
an assurance that the European power would show no "disres­
pect to the imperial personages." The American position 
was that "it seemed better to endeavor to confine our quarrel 
to the disaffected Chinese of the North and not to consolidate 
the whole 400 millions of all China against us."^^ American 
moderation was a factor in influencing the powers to give 
the desired assurance. Typical of the American policy was 
the decision not to participate in the capture of the Taku 
forts, but yet American ships assisted in the bombardment 
of the f o r t s . Prance there was some irritation at 
America's hesitation to follow the French lead. Always Le 
Temps was very critical of McKinley's "mysterious and chang- 
able" policy. The newspaper explained McKinley's actions 
as motivated primarily by the election of 1 9 0 0 , One editor­
ial in Le Temps bitterly charged that the United States was 
not co-operating with the other powers. The writer feared
^^Cambon to Adee, August 19, 1900, Ibid.
^^Memorandum of Conversation with the French Charge' 
d'affaires touching Chinese Matters, August 20, 1900, Ibid.
kp
Le Temps. November 25i 1900.
^3ie Temps. August 5# 1900.
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that this could only "increase the illusions of China and 
deminish the force of the concert." He expressed the hope 
that the sister Republic might learn of her error and gain 
"a more sound and just conception of her duty and power.
The Boxer rebellion reopened the question of a possible 
scramble for concession in China. Hoping to ward off any 
such occurrence Secretary Hay on July 3 issued the second 
open door circular. In addition to the principles of the 
first circular this note asked that the powers should "pre­
serve Chinese territorial and administrative entity." The 
governments of France, Britain and Germany responded favor­
ably to this demarche, and in the case of France the Govern­
ment was pleased with the American action. Fy then French 
officials had decided that the open door might be a means
to stimulate French trade without a great deal of cost or
/
responsibility. Delcasse announced this policy in a speech 
to the Chamber of Deputies. He declared that France would 
continue to be the "mistress of Indo-China" but would not 
be able to take charge of a larger area in Asia. For this 
reason France "has no interest in provoking or seeing the 
break-up of China," "I can affirm," he stated, "that France 
has no wish for war with China, but she cannot evade the duty 
of protecting her citizens and of obtaining for her merchants
^^Le Temps, November 25» 1900.
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the guarantees obtained by o t h e r s . S e c r e t a r y  Hay was 
pleased to learn of France's opposition to a colonization 
of China,
The Boxer rebellion was soon quelched, and in Septem-
/
ber Delcasse took the initiative in supporting negotiations 
between China and the powers. Delcasse'proposed that the 
powers should present a common front to demand reparations 
against China. He suggested that the minimum demands should 
include six points: 1. punishment of the rebels; 2 . perma­
nent interdiction of arms into China; 3* equal indemnities 
for wounded parties; 4. a permanent guard for the Peking 
legation; 5» a dismantling of the Taku fortifications; and 
6 . an occupation of the route between Peking and Tientsin. 
This plan was immediately supported by R u s s i a . ^6 The United 
States tentatively agreed with the principle of a common 
front, but added a number of reservations to the French note 
which generally made the proposals less strengent,^? Delcass/ 
was apparently satisfied with the American position, and he 
interpreted it as an acceptance of the basic principle of
^^The Paris Herald. July 4, 1900, FR, I9OO, p. 313t 
(translation).
^^Delcass^ to the French Representatives in London, 
Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Washington and Tokio. . September 3 0,
1900, DDF, Vol. XVll, no. 321, p. 454. Thiébaut to Hay,
October 4, I900, Notes, Vol. 43. FR, I9OI, Appendix. pp. 26-7,
Thiebaut to Delcasse, October 9» 1900, DDF, Vol.
XVI^, no. 332, p. 470. Hay to Thiebaut, October 10, 1900,
FR, 1901, Appendix, pp. 27-8.
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his suggestion for negotiations, Delcasse telegraphed 
Washington that the details of the French suggestion could 
he later discussed. The important thing, he wrote, was to 
demonstrate that the powers "are animated by the same spirit, 
that they are decided to respect the integrity of China and 
the independence of its government, but that they are none 
the less resolved to obtain the satisfaction to which they 
have a r i g h t , " ^ 8  shortly thereafter Hay again suggested 
that the powers collectively support the open door and the 
territorial entity of C h i n a , D e l c a s s e  quickly endorsed the 
doctrines and wrote: "I do not see any reason not to pro­
claim support for this policy one more time so long as it 
does not retard the opening of the negotiations,^0
The powers presented a joint note for negotiations 
on December 24, and the representatives of the powers met 
with China early the following year. From the beginning 
the negotiations were complicated by the existances of 
European alliances and the conflicting ambitions of those
Delcasse to %iebaut, October 14, 1900, DDF, 16, no, 
336, pp, 474-5 , Thiebaut to Hay, October 17, 1900, FR,
1901, pp, 2 9-30. Thiebaut wrote that Hay was in "absolute 
sympathy" with the French plan and that McKinley was^  anxious 
for the matter to be finished, Thiebaut to Delcasse, October 
18, 1900, DDF, Vol. XV%1, p. 4 7 6, note 2,
^^Hay to Thiebaut, October 19, 1900, FR, I9 0 1, appen­
dix, p, 30. Thiebaut to Delcasse, October 23, 1900, DDF, 
Vol, XVJi, no, 346, pp, 484-5.
^^Delcasse to Thiebaut, October 25, 1900, DDF, Vol, 
XV%1, no, 350, p, 4 9 0, Thiebaut to Hay, October 26, I90 0, 
Notes, Vol. 4 3,
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power b l o c s . I n  his correspondence the American pleni­
potentiary, William W. Rockhill, referred to the situation 
as a ‘'miserable m u d d l e , A m e r i c a n  and French policies 
were occasionally in conflict during the treaty negotiations. 
France indirectly supported Russia's attempt to gain special 
rights in Manchuria through private negotiations with China.53 
The United States opposed the Russian actions and even sent 
Russia a note expressing dislike for private negotiations,5^
On the issue of territorial advantage France's policy was 
generally consistent. She continued to support Hay's open 
door doctrine, but at the same time she stood ready to join 
in a partitive scheme if desired by the other powers, Del­
casse secretly instructed the Ambassador in St, Petersburg 
that France "sought no territorial annexation in China," 
but yet he observed that "if others make conquests France 
will not rest with empty hands,"55
At the Peking Conference the major difference between 
France and the United States was on the size of the indemnity.
5lLanger remarked* "The governments worked together 
in the heat of the crisis, but there was no real heart for 
a European concert." Imperialism, p. 704.
52Rockhill to Hay, April 18, 1901, Hay papers. Box 13 
also Varg, "%th", p. 48.
53d dF, Vol. I^, pp. 177-80, 80-2.
5^Dennis, Adventures, p, 243, John Kelly, A Forgotten 
Conference: The Negotiations at Peking, 1900-190Î1 (Paris*
Librairie Minard, 1963)» P» 131,
55Delcasse to Montebello, February 19, 1901, DDF, Vol.
l2, no. 88, p. 107.
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Secretary Hay and William Rockhill always urged moderation 
with the philosophy that it was not wise "to exercise from 
China an indemnity larger than that which she is able to 
p a y , "56 The United States wanted the sum to be $200,000,000 
while France hoped that the amount would be $333t000,000,
Le Temps expressed irritation that the United States did not 
support the French demand. Hay and McKinley were referred 
to as unrealistic and without a knowledge of the situation 
in C h i n a , 57 The French delegate at the negotiations believed 
that Rockhill was hypocritical on the issue, and that his 
real intention was to improve Chinese-American relations 
by appearing to be g e n e r o u s , 58 in the final protocol the 
amount was only slightly less than the French demand,
Rockhill believed that it was unreasonably high for the 
amount of damage and more than China would be capable of 
p a y i n g . 59 in the later history of the indemnity France 
continued to be less generous than the United States, In 
1907 the United States refunded ten million dollars to the 
Chinese government and another six million in 1921, In 1921
58Thiebaut to Delcasse, November 21, I90 0, DDF, Vol. 
XVI^, no. 385# PP« 536-7 » Rockhill to Hay, May 7» 1901;
May 20, 1901; May 22, 1901, FR, I90I, Appendix on China,
pp. 155, 169, 171-2 ,
^^Le Temps, November 18, I900, December 5» 1900,
5®Beau to Delcasse^ July 1, I901, DDF, Vol, I^, no, 310, 
p. 366. This report includes a long character sketch of 
Rockhill. Beau wrote that Rockhill was capable, but that his 
poor French caused a good deal of "hesitation" in his speech.
^^Varg, Rockhill, p. 4 5,
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the French government did make some refunds, but almost all 
of the money was given to French banks doing business in 
China,
In January, 1902, Japan and Great Britain signed a 
defensive alliance which supported the open door in China 
and the independence of Korea, This treaty was naturally 
looked upon with disfavor by Russia and France, In Wash­
ington Jules Cambon reported that "the United States is 
entirely favorable to the convention and sees in it a 
guarantee for the general peace," Yet he noted that there 
was no danger of Washington joining the treaty because of 
the fact that "it does not conform to the tradition of this 
country to enter into particular alliances,"^1 in February 
the United States protested to both China and Russia for the 
lack of commercial equality in Manchuria, The protest was 
released to the press, Cambon remarked to the Quai d’Orsay 
that the publication of this statement "was an indirect and 
skillful way to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese treaty with­
out signing in behalf of the United S t a t e s , T h e
^®Teichman, China, pp, 70, 110-1, In 1902 the United 
States would have agreed to let China pay the debt in silver, 
but France insisted that there be no departures from the 
treaty, de Margerie to Hay, July 26, 1902, Notes, Vol, XLIV,
^^Cambon to Delcasse, February 14, 1902, DDF, Vol, 11%, 
no. 9 0, p, 103,
^^Cambon to Delcasse, February 25» 1902, DDF, Vol, 11%, 
no, 1 05, p, 122, Cambon noted that the Evening Star, which 
had very close relations with the Department, had indicated 
that Hay’s protest was an indirect approval of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance,
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Russian Ambassador complained to Hay that his government 
feared American support for the recent Par Eastern Alliance, 
Hay denied that this was the policy of the McKinley adminis­
tration, and he claimed that the American protest had not 
been meant for publication and had probably been stolen from 
the department bureau.
France and Russia responded to the Anglo-Japanese 
convention by issuing a joint declaration. The two allies 
stated that they shared the desire for commercial equality 
in China and Korea, and they further declared that in the 
event of aggression against either of the two they would 
"reserve the right to consult in order to search means to 
safeguard those r i g h t s , T h e  French Government was natur­
ally concerned about Washington's response to the Franoo- 
Russian declaration. When Gambon presented the demarche 
to Secretary Hay he received Hay's assurance that the American 
Government accepted the statement as being in harmony with 
American interests, Gambon was satisfied with the response.
He reported to the Quai d'Orsay that the sympathies of both 
Hay and Roosevelt were on the side of Japan and England, 
but he expressed his conviction that the United States would
^^Gambon to Delcasse^ March 3, 1902, DDF, Vol. 11%, no, 
118, pp. 138-40, Vagts, Deutschland, II, p, II78,
^^Texte de la declaration franco-russe. May 20, 1902, 
DDF, Vol. Il2, no, 145, pp. 177-8,
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remain independent of this alliance.Gambon's report 
turned out to be a good perception of the policy of the 
Roosevelt Administration. Always the American gravitation 
was in the direction of the Japanese-British convention, 
but never was there the slightest danger that the United 
States would depart from the tradition of isolation from 
foreign alliances. When George Kennan suggested to Roosevelt 
that the American Government should join the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, Roosevelt wrote him: "Mind you, I personally
agree with you." But Roosevelt added that this was "talking 
academically" because of the "absolute impossibility" of 
getting the approval of such an action from the Senate,
Both the United States and Prance were deeply involved 
in the background of the Russo-Japanese War of 190^-5. The 
two countries were always sympathetic to opposite sides, 
but there was never the slightest possibility that either 
Government would enter the conflict. France had large vested 
interests in the Russian position. In addition to the France- 
Russian alliance, France was committed by the fact that 
nearly a fourth of the French foreign investments were in 
R u s s i a . B e f o r e  the war, Delcasse had hoped for a strong
^Gambon to Delcasse, March 20, 1902, DDF, Vol. 11%, 
no. 146, p. 1 7 8; March 24, 1902, Ibid.. no. I6 3, p. I9 6; 
March 2 6, 1902, Ibid.. no. 1 6 9, pp. 207-9»
^^Roosevelt to Kennan, May 6 , I9 0 5, Morison, Vol. IX,
pp. 1169-7 0.
d^Tardieu, Alliances, p. 28.
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Russia to aid Prance in the European power struggle, and for 
this reason he told Maurice Paleologue in January of 1904 
that his greatest fear was that Russia and Japan would drift
Z O /
into war. About this time Delcasse suggested to Germany 
that if Japan couldn't be persuaded by England to preserve 
peace, the powers would have to intervene to make Japan 
listen to reason. This scheme met with little favor in 
Germany because of the fear that it would antagonize the 
United States.
It is well recognized that even before the war began 
most Americans were anti-Russian.7® This was primarily 
because of the conviction that Russia was trying to restrict 
American trade in Manchuria. In I903 Roosevelt was irritated 
to the extent that he wrote Hay: "If only we were sure
neither Prance nor Germany would join in, I would not in 
the least mind going to extremes with Russia."71 Roosevelt 
believed that Russia had a reactionary and undemocratic form 
of government, but he was convinced that Japan had Pree 
institutions and "lofty ideas" which were "formed after the
^®Maurice Paleologue, Un grand tournant de la politique 
mondiale, 1704-I9 0 6, Paris: Plon, 1934., pp. 2?8-9.
^^Holstein to Bulow, January 17, 1904, Holstein Papers. 
IV, p. 2 7 8.
70 /Rene Pinon, "La guerre russo-japonaise," Revue des 
Deux Mondes. XXI (May 1, 1904), pp. 211-2.
^^Roosevelt to Hay, July 29. 1903. Morison, Roosevelt. 
Ill, no. 2739. p. 523.
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American p a t t e r n , A f t e r  Japan attacked the Russian fleet 
in Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, Roosevelt expressed 
contempt for Russia because she had left her fleet unpro­
tected, 73 The Russian Ambassador in Washington worried 
that Roosevelt might form a type of Rough Riders unit to 
aid Japan,7^ The American Press generally supported Japan's 
position, Paul Reinsch wrote in the North American Review 
that "Japan is fighting our battle,"73 The popular writer, 
George Kennan, declared that Russia had little hope of 
victory because Japan's Government was "based on popular 
education, popular representation, individual freedom, 
enlightened patriotism, order, system, and efficiency,"7& 
More important than public opinion was the fact that Japan 
floated large loans in New York in order to pay for the
7^Stermburg to Bulow, Feb. 6, 1904, GP, XIX^, no,
5978, p, 100, Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt Jr,, Feb, 10, 
1904, Morison, Roosevelt, IV, p, 742,
73jusserand to Delcasse, February I6 , 1904, DDF, Vol, 
IV^, no, 282, p. 366, January 25, 1905, Ibid,, no. 49,
pp, 63-4 ,
7^Jusserand to Delcasse, February 11, 1904, DDF, Vol, 
iv2, no, 2 5 9, p. 341, Edward Zabriskie, American Russian 
Rivalry in the Far East 1 A Study in Diplomacy and Power 
Politics, 1895-1914, (Philadelphia: University of Penn­
sylvania Press, 1946), p, 105,
73paul Reinsch, "Japan and Asiatic Leadership," North 
American Review, CIXXX (January, 1905), p, 56,
76george Kennan, "Russian Views of Kuropatkin and His 
Army," The Outlook, LXXIX (February, 1905), P» 431, Also 
see Review of Reviews, V (January, 1905), pp. 88-90,
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war.77 Also the war resulted in an improvement of trade 
between Japan and the United States.7®
In December, 1904, Roosevelt wrote to his English 
friend. Spring Rice: "If it were not for the attitude of 
England and the United States I think that Germany and 
France would probably have already intervened on Russia's 
side."79 The following year he wrote this same friend;
"As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and 
France in the most polite and discrete fashion that in the 
event of a combination against Japan . . .  I would promptly 
side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary 
on her behalf.®® There is in fact no evidence that this 
threat was ever delivered.®! Roosevelt's admirers such as 
Tyler Dennett accept Roosevelt's account as true, but the 
majority of historians believe that the story was an uncri­
tical exaggeration.®2 in the case of France there was never
77Gotaro Ogawa, Expenditures of the Russo-Japanese War. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 37, 51,
65-8. Zabriskie, Rivalry. p. I0 9. Vagts, Deutschland. II, 
p. 1209. Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 497-8.
7®Ogawa, Expenditures, pp. 201-2.
79Roosevelt to Spring Rice, December 27, 1904, Morison, 
Roosevelt. Vol. IV, p. IO87,
®®Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, I905. Ibid.. p.
1284.
81Alfred Vagts searched the German and American archives, 
Vagts, Deutschland. II, pp. II78-9 .
Op
Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 11-12, 92. The story is 
characteristically rejected in Mowry, Era, p. 184, Bemis, 
Diplomatic History, p. 492, note.
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any reason for serious doubt that the government would 
follow a policy of neutrality. The French Government offi­
cially declared its neutrality only one week after the war 
began, and France never did do anything that was in basic 
violation with her neutral p o l i c y . Also against Roose­
velt's interpretation is the fact that late in 1904 he let 
it be known that he hoped Russia would remain in the Far 
East to counter-balance the growing Japanese p o w e r . 8 4
The American Government early recognized that war 
would create a threat for the continuation of China's 
independence as well as the open door policy. The week 
before the Port Arthur attack Hay asked General Porter to 
consult with Delcasse^about the possibility of "concurrently 
using good offices with Russia and Japan to induce them to 
respect the neutrality of China and in all practical ways 
her administrative entity."85 Delcasse agreed to support 
the American suggestion, but he believed that Manchuria 
should be considered an exception.86 Japan early accepted 
the principle of China's neutrality with the proviso that 
Russia would also do so. Hay therefore asked Porter to
Journal Officiel. February 16, 1904. Also see Amos 
Hershey, The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- 
Japanese War. (New York* The Macmillan Co., 19ob), pp. 
189-90.
8^Jusserand to Delcasse, October 18, 1904, DDF, Vol. 
V^, no. 380, pp. 456-7 , Stermburg to Billow, March 21, 1904, 
GP, Xixl, no. 5992.
®%ay to Porter, January 8, 1904, FR, p. 301.
86porter to Hay, February 13* 1904, FR, 1904, p. 302.
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appeal to Delcasse'to use French influence to help convince 
Russia to accept the proposal. Hay wrote: "Prompt action
by France, as Russia's nearest friend, seems to be most 
desirable,8? Delcasse'"did not give an outright refusal, 
but he did not see any urgency in the situation,®® The 
question was dropped until early in I9 0 5,
In January, I9 0 5, the Roosevelt Administration renewed 
the efforts to gain support for the open door in China, 
Roosevelt and Jusserand had a long discussion of the subject 
just, before a White House diplomatic reception, Roosevelt 
spoke with such enthusiasm that he forgot about the time 
and the reception began late. The President expressed his 
fears that some power or powers might take advantage of the 
situation for the aggrandizement of territorial control, 
Jusserand assured him that France wanted to see the contin­
uation of the status quo. In reporting the conversation to 
the Quai d'Orsay Jusserand asked Delcasse'if this was indeed 
the policy of the French Government in the matter,®9 Delcasse 
approved of Jusserand's statement to Roosevelt,^0 Jusserand 
immediately notified Roosevelt of Delcasse'* s official position.
®?Hay to Porter, February 12, I9 0 4, Instructions, 24,
p. 6 5 7.
®®Porter to Hay, November 17, 1904, Despatches, Vol,
124,
p ®^Jusserand to Delcasse, January 1 5, I9 0 5, DDF, Vol, 
VI^, no, 2 9, pp. 37-8,
90])eicass/ to Jusserand, January I6 , I9 0 5, DDF, Vol, 
VI%, no, 33, p. 4 3.
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and Jusserand reported that Roosevelt was "grateful" to have 
French assurances.9^
Secretary Hay instructed General Porter to seek to 
get the formal support of France for the "broad policy of 
maintaining the integrity of China and the open door in the 
orient whereby quality of commercial opportunity and access 
shall be enjoyed by all nations,"92 porter spoke to Delcasse^ 
about the matter and received the assurance that "France 
desires no concession of territory in China,"93 The conser­
vative paper Le Figaro on February 14 included an article 
by Pierre de Coubertin which recommended the partition of 
China by the European powers,9^ Two days after the article 
appeared Roosevelt wrote in a letter that "there certainly 
do seem to be suspicious indications as to the possible action 
of France,"95 Roosevelt discussed the article with Jusserand 
and on February 18, Jusserand denied that the views of M, 
Courbertin represented the views of the Quai d'Orsay, He 
reminded Roosevelt that France had always before supported
Jusserand to Delcasse'", January 18, I9 0 5» DDF, Vol, 
Vl2, no, 36, p, 4 7,
^^Hay to Porter, Despatches, January 14, I9 0 5, Vol,
124,
93porter to Delcasse^, January I6 , I9 0 5, DDF, Vol. VI^, 
no, 3^f p. 4 3,
9^Porter to Hay, January 18, I9 0 5# Despatches, Vol, 
124, Le Figaro, February 14, I90 5,
9^Roosevelt to Tower, February I6 , 1905, Morison,
Roosevelt, Vol, IV, no, 346?, p, 1121,
96 /
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the continuation of the integrity of China,Delcasse 
assured Jusserand that Prance's official policy was 
"absolutely opposed" to the views expressed in the Figaro 
article,97
Roosevelt was anxious to see peace established in the 
Far East because he believed it would bring stability to 
the area. Especially he did not want Russia's influence in 
Asia to be entirely eliminated. In 1904 Roosevelt attempted 
to send some peace feelers to Russia through the French 
Government, and Delcasse^ gave limited support to those 
efforts,98 Early in 1905 Roosevelt renewed his efforts.
In a series of conversations with Ambassador Jusserand he 
expressed his conviction that it was in the interests of 
Russia to settle at once, before she would be forced to 
accept even worse terms. He suggested that peace could prob­
ably be accepted if Russia would be willing to accept 
Japanese influence in Korea, Japanese ownership of Port 
Arthur, and Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, Roosevelt 
would be willing to use his influence to try to restrain 
the ambitions of Japan if France would do the same in regard
Jusserand to Delcasse^, February 18, 1905, DDF, Vol, 
VI^, no, 102, p, 140,
9?Deicasse^ to Jusserand, February 18, 1905, DDF, Vol, 
Vl2, no, 103, p. 141.
9®Delcasse^ to the Ambassadors in London and St, 
Petersburg, June 21, 1904, DDF, Vol, V^, no, 237. p. 278,
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to R u s s i a , 9 9  i n  March Roosevelt talked to both the ambassa­
dor of Russia and the minister of Japan of the possibility 
of peace, and both told him that their governments intended 
to continue the war rather than give in,^^^ There were 
rumors by a few American journalists that Prance was unfav­
orable at the possibility of peace, Roosevelt told Jusserand 
that he did not place any importance on this "gossip." 
Jusserand assured him that the stories were false,
Roosevelt had real hopes for French aid. He wrote Hay:
"I wish the Japs and Russians could settle it between them­
selves, and I should be delighted to have anyone except 
myself give them a job to settle it. If France will do it, 
it will serve the purpose just as well,"^92
Throughout I905 the Governments of France and the 
United States both believed it was in their national interests 
to see the end to the Russo-Japanese war,1^3 In April
00 /
Jusserand to Delcasse, January 15* 1905* DDF, Vol,
Vl2, no, 2 9* p. 3 8; February 11, 1905* Ibid,. no, 9 0, pp,
109-10; February 21, 1905* Ibid,. no. Ill* p, 152; March 15*
1905* Ibid,. no, 1 51* pp. 196-7 ,
^OOjusserand to Delcasse^, April 1, 1905* Ibid,. no, 216, 
p, 27 6; Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905* Bishop, Roosevelt, 
p. 379.
Jusserand to Delcasse^, April 1, 1905* Ibid,, no,
218, p, 2 7 7.
102Roosevelt to Hay, March 3 0, 1905* Roosevelt papers, 
series 4B,
^®^Tyler Dennett comments: "The French and the American
governments became, in a sense, rivals for the position of 
peacemakers," Dennett, Roosevelt, p, 172,
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Delcasse'tried to convince the Japanese Minister in Paris 
that there could be peace if only Japan would cease to 
demand a territorial cession and an indemnity. The Japanese 
Government indicated no interest in Delcasse*s suggestion, 
Meanwhile Roosevelt continued to encourage Jusserand that 
France should try to persuade Russia to come to terms. Always 
Roosevelt tried to emphasize his fears that Russia would be 
destroyed if she continued the war.105 Late in May at the 
battle of Tsushima the Japanese were completely victorious, 
and it was more clear than ever that Russia's cause was 
hopeless. Shortly thereafter the Japanese Government formally 
asked Roosevelt to invite the two belligerents to meet for 
negotiations,106 The immediate problem was to convince the 
Russian Tsar to accept Roosevelt's good offers. The German 
Kaiser on June 3 advised the Tsar that he should negotiate,107 
Delcasse*s policy was slower and more cautious. He asked 
the French Ambassador if such advice would be well received 
in Russia, The Ambassador reported that many influential
^^^Baron Komura to Takahira, quoted in Dennett, Ibid,, 
pp, 176-7, 174-5 .
Jusserand to Delcasse, May I5 , I905, DDF, Vol, VI^, 
no, 4 3 3».p. 5 0 9; May I6 , I9 0 5, no, 435, p. 511; May 3 0, 1905, 
no, 4 7 1, p, 564,
^^°Dennett, Roosevelt, pp, 215-6,
William II to Nicholas II, June 3, 1905, GP, XIX^, 
no, 6193, pp. 419-22, Bulow to Sternburg, June 3 , 1905,
Ibid,, no, 6312, p, 606,
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people in Russia wanted peace, and he believed that American 
mediation might prove successful.^®®
Faced with the ministerial crisis of June, the French 
Government was not as careful as Germany to indicate support 
for Roosevelt's peace moves. On June 6 Roosevelt asked 
Jusserand to find out the intentions of Delcasse^ in regard 
to the war, and he again asked for the support of France in 
counseling Russia to accept the good offices of the United 
S t a t e s . I t  was at this very time that Delcasse was forced 
to resign because of his militant Morocco policy, Maurice 
Rouvier, the new acting foreign Minister, notified Jusserand 
that he could tell Roosevelt that he had "our complete con­
currence in regard to his efforts to re-establish the peace."11® 
Roosevelt prepared telegrams to send to both Russia and Japan 
to express the American desire for peace. Before sending 
the messages Roosevelt consulted with Jusserand, and Jusserand 
made several suggestions in working which would not do damage 
to the Russian susceptibilities. Roosevelt made use of those 
suggestions.Ill Jusserand had confidence in Roosevelt and
^^^Boutiron to Delcasse'", June 3, 19051 DDF, Vol. VI^, 
no. 486, pp. 579-80.
Jusserand to Delcasse, June 6, 1905i DDF, Vol. VI^, 
no. 5 0 2, pp. 595-6.
^^^Rouvier to Jusserand, June 9, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII^, 
no. 1 9, p. 1 7.
IllJusserand to Rouvier, June 8, 1905, Ibid.. no. 13, 
p. 12. Jusserand in this dispatch asked for more information 
about French policy in regard to the war.
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urged the Quai d*Orsay to cooperate with the American efforts. 
All French diplomats did not share in this viewpoint. The 
French Ambassador in Tokyo was apprehensive about an American 
bias in the negotiations. He believed that "it is fortunate 
that St, Petersburg keeps her guard against the Americans 
and English who are too openly anti-Russian and pro-Japan-
ese,"^^2
In Washington Jusserand attempted to encourage both 
the Russian and the Japanese representatives to find an 
acceptable compromise. He complained to the Foreign Office 
that if he were kept better informed about the details of 
French foreign policy he could use the information to a 
good advantage, 113 Rouvier advised Jusserand to be extremely 
careful in his actions and statements. He warned: "An
intervention which is too direct might retard the negotia­
tions, and also our desire for good relations with our ally 
Russia make it necessary for us to be very cautious,
But Roosevelt was more pleased with Jusserand*s efforts, 
and Jusserand was happy to report that the President had 
expressed to him his "sincere thanks,"115 Roosevelt
ll^Hamand to Rouvier, June 11, I9 0 5» DDF, Vol, VII^, 
no, 35f P» 3^ '»
113Jusserand to Rouvier, June 10, I9 0 5» DDF, Vol.
VIlZ, no, 2 7, pp, 27-8.
ll^Rouvier to Jusserand, June 10, I9 0 5» Ibid., no, 3 0,
p. 30,
115Jusserand to Rouvier, June 15. I9 0 5, DDF, Vol,
VII^, no, 6 3, p, 7 1.
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consulted with Jusserand almost every day in June, and 
he placed a great deal of confidence in the advice of the 
French Ambassador. Roosevelt wrote: "My relations with
Jusserand are such that I can always go to him freely, tell 
him what I have been asked to do, and then say that I will 
either do it or not."^^^
Russia eventually agreed to peace negotiations, and 
on August 10 the negotiations formally opened at Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire, At this crucial moment Roosevelt especially 
hoped to have Prance's support. He wrote Jusserand asking 
that France use her influence to persuade Russia to make 
small territorial concessions and to pay a small indemnity. 
Roosevelt promised to attempt to "get the Japanese to be 
moderate about the money."11? Even after receiving this 
telegram Rouvier wrote to the French Ambassador in St, 
Petersburg to tell the Russian Government that "France hopes 
for peace and is ready to undertake any diplomatic action 
which the Russian Government might judge useful in achieving 
this g o a l . "118 The next day after receiving Roosevelt's 
appeal, Rouvier forwarded the appeal to St. Petersburg and 
instructed the French Ambassador to show it to the Russian
^^^Roosevelt to Reid, August 3# 1905, Morison, 
Roosevelt, IV, p. I29 8,
ll?Roosevelt to Jusserand, August 21, I9 0 5, Morison, 
Roosevelt. IV, p. I308.
ll®Rouvier to Bompart, August 21, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII^,
no. 364, p. 435.
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Foreign Minister in strict confidence,^19 After less than 
two weeks of negotiations it seemed that the two powers 
could not reach a compromise, and the Tsar told the French 
Ambassador that he would refuse an indemnity even if this 
meant a continuation of w a r , 120 Rouvier instructed the 
minister to continue to speak in behalf of a negotiated 
peace and to emphasize to the Tsar that "it was in his 
interests not to offend the active sympathies of the President
of the United S t a t e s ,121
Just before the signing of the peace treaty Roosevelt 
again appealed to France for support. In his diary, Maurice 
Paleologue, an influential official in the Quai d'Orsay, 
wrote of the fate of this last appeal, Paleologue recorded: 
"Rouvier, lost in admiration of such bold and artful frankness, 
gave me immediate instructions to draft a telegram exerting 
Nicholas II to take Roosevelt's advice," Paleologue drafted 
the note but discouraged Rouvier from sending it. He 
reminded Rouvier of one of Delcasse*s earlier maxims: "Sooner
or later, the Russians will have to submit to humiliating 
peace; but they would never forgive us for having encouraged
^^^DDF,^ Vol, VIl2, p, 445, note 1; M, Desports de la 
Fosse, charge d'affaires in Washington to Rouvier, August 22, 
1905, Ibid,, no, 3 70, pp. 443-5 .
^^^Rouvier to Bompart, August 23» 1905» DDF, Vol, VII^, 
no, 373» p. 449,
IZlRouvier to Bompart, August 24, I9 0 5, Ibid,. no, 374, 
pp. 450-1 ; August 24, 1905» Ibid,. no, 3?6, pp, 452-3.
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them to do so.” Rouvier reconsidered and decided to tear 
up the note. At the incident he philosophized: "Before
long European finances will be completely dominated by the 
Americans, and they'll control diplomacy through f i n a n c e . " ^ 2 2  
Rouvier on August 29 wrote the Ambassador in Russia that 
he should continue to encourage a peace settlement, but 
Rouvier did not make any reference to an indemnity or a ter­
ritorial concession.123 Later that day the Quai d'Orsay was 
pleased to learn of the peace treaty. Rouvier immediately 
sent "eloquent telegrams" of congratulations to the govern­
ments of Russia, Prance and the United S t a t e s . 1 2 4
In his Autobiography Roosevelt wrote that he had asked 
France to help him in achieving peace but that France had 
not been co-operative,125 in a contemporary letter he wrote 
that Delcasse'"really wished to prevent peace between Japan 
and Russia, or at least its coming through American efforts."125 
In several letters Roosevelt indicated that the German Kaiser 
was the only European leader to support his peace efforts."127
122 /Paleologue, Tournantj pp. 277-9.
123Rouvier to Bompart, August 29» DDF, Vol. VIl2, no. 
390, pp. 480-1.
^^^Paleologue, Tournant, p. 279.
125Roosevelt, Autobiography. p. 586.
*1 p Z
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905» Morison, 
Roosevelt, V, p. 6 3.
127Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I906, Morison, Roose­
velt. V, p. 2 51.
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But it is clear that France did actually support those 
efforts. Always the French Government was convinced that 
it was in her interests to see a restoration of peace in the 
Far East, Of course France did not want to harm the Pranoo- 
Russian alliance by wounding Russian pride or by urging 
Russia to pay an indemnity. For this reason the French 
Government kept its diplomatic activity relatively secret,128 
There is no evidence that Roosevelt really became angry at 
French policy in the matter, Roosevelt at times did become 
mildly irritated that he did not receive more overt support 
from France, but this did not have any real affect on Franco- 
American relations.
In France Roosevelt's success was received with a 
great deal of favor, especially by peace groups. The Paris 
Peace Committee, for example, in its annual meeting of I906 
expressed its gratitude to the "peacemaking President of the 
Great American Republic," The committee invited Roosevelt 
to visit France in order to "bring liberty to Europe" in the 
same way in which "Lafayette had carried liberty to the new 
w o r l d , "129 The city council of St-Gervais agreed unanimously
Rouvier to Jusserand, June 10, I9 05, DDF, Vol, VII^, 
p. 30» Germany of course warned the United States that 
France hoped to gain an advantage as a result of the war. 
Tower to Roosevelt, July 13» 1905» in Dennett, Roosevelt,
pp. 233-5.
l^^Resolution of February 22, I906, in Despatches,
Vol, 125.
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to send congratulations to Roosevelt.^^0 The French Parlia­
mentary Group of International Arbitration and Qoncilation 
sent him a first edition of Sully's memoirs with an appro­
priate note of praise, 131
Not long after the Portsmouth treaty the relations 
between the United States and Japan became so bad that the 
two countries almost reached the breaking point. Earlier 
Rene^ Pinon speculated that with Russia removed there would 
be a likelihood of a great geographical rivalry in Japanese- 
American relations,13% At the same time Franco-Japanese 
relations sharply improved so that these two countries in 
May, 1907, signed a mutual defensive agreement. There was 
some speculation that this agreement would worsen relations 
between France and the United States, Andre Tardieu, writing 
several years later, denied that this was the case, Tardieu 
interpreted the Franco-Japanese agreement as one of a "series 
of understanding" which included the Franco-Russian alliance 
and the Entente Cordiale, The policy of France, he wrote, 
was to see that "the balance of power in the Pacific remains 
what it is today," Because of this he concluded that "the 
relations of France with the United States cannot, under 
present circumstances, suffer anything from our policy in
^^®Sent September 5» 1905, Despatches, Vol, 125,
^3%orison, Roosevelt, V, p, 103, note 1,
^^^Rene^ Pinon, "La guerre russo-japonaise," Revue des 
Deux Mondes. May 1, 1904, Vol, XXI, pp, 211-2,
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Asia, This policy favors the elements of stability, and 
the American efforts should tend to multiply t h e m ,"^33
On May 28, M, Stephen Pichon, the Foreign Minister, 
asked if the United States would like to have French good 
offices in the effort to improve Japanese-American diplo­
matic relations,13^ The Roosevelt Administration immediately 
responded that the French offer was greatly appreciated but 
that it would have to be refused,^35 This minor diplomatic 
incident would have had absolutely no importance except for 
the fact that it reached the American press. The Washington 
Post feared that the publicity would do harm to American- 
Japanese relations, and the paper therefore reproached the 
French demarche, "One has the impression here ;" one article 
declared, "that France has not acted from disinterested 
motives in making this unexpected and unwanted o f f e r ,"136 
Roosevelt became greatly irritated about the matter. He 
wrote Jusserand that neither he nor Secretary of State Root 
had given the French note to the press, and he concluded 
therefore that the source of information had to be the Quai 
d*Orsay, In his report to the Foreign Ministry Jusserand
133
Tardieu, Alliances, pp, 234, 291,
^^^Pichon to Jusserand, May 28, 1907# DDF, Vol, X^, 
p, 46, note 1,
135Jusserand to Pichon, June 3, 1907» DDF, Vol, X^, 
p, 46, note 1,
13^Washington Post. June 7, 1907,
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assumed that Roosevelt's accusation was correct, and he 
complained that this grave indiscretion could have a lasting 
harm on Franco-American relations.^37 m . Pichon denied that 
the American press had learned of the matter in Paris, and 
the true source of information was never k n o w n , A s  it 
turned out the incident did not seem to add to the crisis 
in the relations between Japan and the United States.^39 
Throughout the period the United States and France 
participated in the struggle for power and influence in the 
Far East. As normal in international relations, the policy 
of each government was determined by its own conception of 
what was in its national interest, France's policy was 
generally one of territorial expansion and consolidation 
of her Asian empire, while the policy of the United States, 
except for the Philippines, was one of commercial expansion. 
These goals did not present any basic clash because both 
nations primarily wanted s t a b i l i t y . F o r  this reason the 
two powers were able to co-operate in supporting the integrity
Jusserand to Pichon, June 14, 1907, DDF, Vol, X^, 
no. 2 7, pp. 45-8.
^5®Ibid., note 1, p. 47.
139»phe next year M. Pichon told White that the Root- 
Takahira agreement "brought about a feeling of security in 
that direction which had not existed for a long time." 
Henry White to Root, January 8, 1909, Root Papers, box 15.
^^®This was emphasized in Coolidge, Power, p. 191; 
and Rene Wallier, Lc viengtieme siecle politique. 1901,
pp. 27-8.
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of China and in seeking an end to the Russo-Japanese war. 
America's policy was more influenced by idealistic consider­
ations, but this fact did not have any real implications 
for Franco-American relations. The two powers were sus­
picious of one another, but neither had any real fears that 
the other was a threat to its vital interests. Ambassador 
Jusserand reported a conversation with Roosevelt in which 
the President expressed his desire to maintain France as a 
neighbor in the Far East. Jusserand noted in his report 
of the conversation: "The actual situation makes it in our
interests to maintain the domination of America in the 
Philippines, because without the United States, this colony 
would surely be prey to a rival who would be dangerous for
us." 1^1
l^ljusserand to Rouvier, June 11, 1905» DDF, Vol. VII^, 
no. 41, pp. 45-7.
CHAPTER VII 
THE MOROCCAN CRISIS— I
In the years between 1898 and 190? Franco-American 
relations were more crucially important during the Moroccan 
crisis than in any other single event. President Roosevelt 
intervened more directly into this conflict than any American 
President had intervened in a European rivalry since the War 
of 1812. Throughout the controversy the Roosevelt Adminis­
tration was one-sided in favor of the French position, but 
this policy was based on Roosevelt's conception of the Amer­
ican national interest. He was convinced that it was in 
the American interest to encourage a peaceful solution, and 
secondary to this, he hoped to influence a settlement that 
would be conducive to the growth of American trade in North 
Africa. Although American policy was not the most significant 
factor of the crisis, it has often been underestimated by 
European historians. Andre^Tardieu was entirely correct 
when he wrote: "A power of the rank and strength of the
United States could not take part in such a conflict without 
its action making itself almost immediately felt."l
^Andr^ Tardieu, La France et les alliances, (Paris: 
F. Alcan, 1910), p. 292.
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At thé turn of the century Morocco was a typical under­
developed nation in which the vast majority of the people 
lived in poverty and ignorance. This situation was compli­
cated by the large groups of nomadic tribes often at war 
with one another. Also, superstition and extreme religious 
asceticism did not encourage progressive social change and 
industrialization. The government, isolated in the small 
village of Fez, had a reputation for both corruption and 
inefficiency. Nominal leadership was vested in a hereditary 
Sultan, but effective power was traditionally in the hands 
of the Grand Vizier, Abdu-l-Aziz, who became Sultan in 1894 
at the age of thirteen, was especially weak and unable to 
control his ministers,2 By the year 1900 the country had 
fallen into almost total anarchy, and independence was 
maintained only because it was guaranteed by the world powers 
in the International Madrid Conference of 1880, The guar­
antee for autonomy was based on the right of the most favored 
nation clause for the fourteen nations represented at the 
Conference,3
The Roosevelt Administration first had experience with 
the Moroccan situation in the well-known Perdicaris-Raisuli
2por a lively popular description see Barbara Tuchman, 
"Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead," American Heritage, 
(August, 1959)t Vol. X, pp, 18-21, 98-101, Francis Charmes, 
"Chronique de la Quinzaine," Revue des deux Mondes, Vol, XXI, 
(June 15, 1904), pp, 755-958, '
^For the treaty see PR, 1880, pp, 914-20,
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affair. Ion Perdicaris was a wealthy American who lived in 
a country villa just three miles outside of Tangier. On 
May 18, 1904, he and his British stepson were kidnapped by 
one of the last of the Barbary Pirates, a scoundrel by the 
name of Sherif Mulai Ahmed ibn-Muhammed er Raisuli. This 
event was a part of a struggle between Raisuli and the Fez 
Government, In kidnapping a foreigner, Raisuli hoped to 
dramatize the Sultan's lack of authority and at the same 
time to gain local prestige and a large ransom,
American diplomacy in the matter was swift and noisy.
On May 19. Samuel J, Gummere, the United States Consul- 
General of Tangier, telegraphed to the State Department: 
"Situation serious. Request man-of-war to enforce demands,"^ 
Roosevelt immediately ordered to Tangier the entire South 
Atlantic Squadron, four warships which were about to coal 
in the Canaries. Gummere, attempting to determine the best
course of action, conferred daily with the British and
/
French Ministers, Arthur Nicolson and Paul Saint-Rene
Taillandier. The three diplomats advised the Government of
Morocco to give in to the demands of Raisuli if possible.
At the same time the French Minister, who had earlier exper­
ienced similar situations, sent two members of a powerful 
Moslem Holy family to find Raisuli and attempt to mediate 
Perdicaris' release.5 The two emissaries found that Raisuli
^Gummere to Hay, May 19, 1904, FR, 1904, p. 496. 
^Porter to Hay, May 30, 1904, FR, 1904, pp. 307-8,
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was not in a conciliatory mood. In return for the release 
he demanded a number of extreme conditions including a 
ransom of $70 ,000 and his own appointment as governor in 
two Moroccan provinces. He threatened to put Perdicaris to 
death if these demands were not met. The Moroccan Foreign 
Minister, Mohammed Torres, made it all too clear that the 
conditions were unnegotiable to the Fez Government,
The Quai d*Orsay was anxious to help find a satisfactory 
solution to the Perdicaris crisis, Delcasse^ had as one of 
his major goals to bring Morocco quietly into the French 
sphere of influence in North Africa, He was thus unhappy 
with the international publicity created by the kidnapping. 
This incident was only about a month after Delcasse'had 
concluded the Entente Cordiale, an agreement with England 
which promised diplomatic support for the special interests 
of France in Morocco and secretly envisaged the eventual 
partition of the country between France and Spain,^ Delcasse' 
was no doubt delighted when the United States requested the 
good offices of France in the mediation between Raisuli and 
the Fez Government,? This was a subtle indication that the 
American Government did not look with disfavor upon the 
Entente Cordiale,
^For the agreement see DDF, IV^, no, 389, pp, 533-4, 
Fay, War, I, p, 164,
?Hay to Porter, May 28, 1904, PR, 1904, p, 307.
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When the Republican National Convention met in June of 
that year, President Roosevelt, always an astute politician, 
recognized that the Perdicaris affair could be used to a 
political advantage. He believed that a firm patriotic 
expression of American dignity in the world could create 
enthusiasm in an otherwise dead convention. In collaboration 
with Secretary Hay he wrote an ultimatum to the Moroccan 
Government: "This Government wants Perdicaris alive or
Raisuli dead," When party leader Joe Cannon read the tele­
gram to the convention it aroused a roar of approval and 
excitement. Cannon did not read the part of the message 
which gave the instructions: "But do not land marines or
seize customs without department's specific instructions,"®
It was years later that the historian Tyler Dennett revealed 
for the first time that Roosevelt and Hay had learned earlier 
that Perdicaris had renounced his American citizenship during 
the Civil War.9
While the Chicago Convention was in progress the 
Sherifian Government, with the aid of France, was able to 
come to terms with Raisuli, Morocco was forced to pay a 
large ransom and to give certain political rights to the 
Riffian bandits. Also, Morocco paid $4,000 to the United
®Hay to Gummere, June 22, 1904, FR, 1904, p, 50 3,
9nay. p. 402, Still Roosevelt was entirely non-political 
on June 15 when he wrote Hay that the United States should 
"demand the death of those who harm him if he is harmed,"
Quoted in Tuchman, "Perdicaris," p, 99»
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States for expenses incurred during the kidnapping, American 
diplomatists believed that France had assisted in finding a 
satisfactory conclusion in the affair. It seems that Hay 
expressed his true conviction when he instructed General 
Porter: "Please make known to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs the President's deep appreciation of the kindly and 
efficient cooperation of the French Government in the Perdi­
caris case."10 When Gummere expressed thanks to the French 
Minister in Tangier, he took the opportunity to suggest that 
France should take some action in behalf of the security of 
foreigners.il There is no evidence that Gummere had instruc­
tions to express this request, but in so doing the American 
Consul-General gave indirect recognition of French authority 
in Morocco.
Largely as a result of the Perdicaris episode the 
American Government decided to strengthen its position in 
Morocco. Early in I905 Congress, encouraged by Roosevelt, 
indicated interest in changing the Tangier Consulate into 
a legation. It was believed that this change would encourage 
commerce and add to American prestige in the Moslem world.
Hay to Porter, June 25» 1904, Instructions, Vol. XXIV, 
p. 9 . Roosevelt personally thanked Jusserand for French help. 
Delcasse'to Ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg, June 21, 
1904, DDF, V2, no. 237, p. 2?8.
llsaint-Rene^ Taillandier to Delcasse^ July 2, 1904,
Livre Jaune : Affaires de Maroc, 190I-I9 0 5, (Paris: Imprimerie
Rationale, 19ÙbJ, p. 174.
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From the beginning the French Government was hostile to 
this proposal, Delcasse^believed that such a move would 
encourage other powers to increase their interests in Morocco 
and make it more difficult to increase French authority.
He therefore instructed Jusserand to try to convince Roose­
velt that a Consulate was satisfactory for the supervision 
of a trade of only two and one-half million f r a n c s , T h e  
very day, however, that Delcasse sent this telegram the 
American Congress voted to create a legation,^3 Jusserand 
did not believe it wise to express French dissatisfaction 
with the change. Rather he suggested to Hay that it was 
important to choose a "moderate and reasonable" Minister, 
and he also said that his Government hoped that the appointee 
would be instructed to keep in close contact with the French 
Legation, Hay gave his assurances that this was in conformity 
with the policy of the American Government,
French interests in North Africa had a long history.
The seizure of Algeria in I830 created the problem of main­
taining protection along the unstable Moroccan border, and 
this was Prance's principle concern for Morocco throughout
12 / o
Delcasse to Jusserand, March 5» 1905» DDF, VI^, no,
1 2 5» pp. I70-I, Taillandier wrote Delcasse''condemning the
proposal in even stronger terms and no doubt this influenced
Delcasse, Ibid,, no, 108, pp, 145-7.
Jusserand to Delcasse^ March 5» 1905, DDF, VI^, no,
1 2 6, p, 171.
l^Jusserand to Delcasse^ March 7» 1905, Ibid,. no, I3I, 
p. 176,
24?
the nineteenth century. At the Madrid Conference Prance
did not claim any special interests in the country other
than those interests given to all of the represented powers.
Toward the end of the century France became dissatisfied
with the status of Morocco, and especially Delcasse hoped
to consolidate all of North Africa into the French sphere
of influence. After the humiliation of the Fashoda fiasco 
/
Delcasse achieved a small amount of compensation in annexing 
the Tuat Oasis in Eastern Morocco. In 1904 Delcasse^ informed 
the Fez Government that France hoped to establish closer 
relations between the two nations in order to develop the 
Moroccan economy and to prevent aggression by a foreign 
power. Delcasse'" hoped that his policy of "peaceful pene­
tration" would not alarm Germany and England. In the Chamber 
of Deputies he declared that the problem was to "establish 
the preponderance of France in Morocco, thereby to augment 
her power in the Mediterranean, not by alienating, but 
rather by conciliating the powers whose position in the 
Mediterranean brings them to our a t t e n t i o n . F r o m  the 
British standpoint this was achieved when Delcasse concluded 
the Entente Cordiale.
Early in 1905 the German Government decided that it
^^Delcass/ to Taillandier, May 9, 1904, DDF, V^, no. 
Ill, p. 125.
^^Speech of Nov. 10, 1904, quoted in Porter, Delcasse^
p. 163.
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was time to act if she were to prevent an aggrandizement 
of French influence. Kaiser William II, Chancellor Bernhard
II
von Bulow, and especially the mysterious adviser behind the 
scenes, Friedrich von Holstein, each believed that a strong 
bluff was all that would be necessary to convince France to 
depart from Delcasse's policy of expansionism. It was assumed 
that England would not be willing to join in a continental 
war in defense of French colonialism. The German leaders 
hoped to weaken the Entente Cordiale, an agreement which in 
Germany created a great fear of encirclement. Germany had 
nothing to fear from the Franco-Russian Alliance for Russia's 
disasterous war in the Far East eliminated any possibility 
of her coming to the aid of France. Following a large French 
loan to Morocco, Saint-Rene^ Taillandier was sent to Fez in 
January, 1905* to supervise a proposed reform of the Moroccan 
police force, France claimed that this would benefit all the 
powers by adding security to Moroccan trade; Moroccan indepen­
dence would not be violated, and thus the reform was in 
keeping with the provisions of the Madrid C o n f e r e n c e . ^7 
Germany, however, was not satisfied. She claimed that uni­
lateral French supervision of reform was inconsistent with 
the principle of the open door. Bulow demanded that such a 
policy change necessitated the calling of another interna­
tional conference.
?The proposed reform is explained by Delcasse in a 
letter to the French Ambassadors, June 7» 1905* DDF, VII^, 
no. 1, p. 1.
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Delcasse^, secure in the Entente Cordiale, was deter­
mined not to back down to German demands. He offered to 
engage in bilateral negotiations with Germany but refused 
to consent to a conference. Theodore Roosevelt did not be­
lieve that a conference was necessary. As a result of the 
Venezuelan controversy of 1902 he had a greater fear of 
German imperialism than of French imperialism. Roosevelt 
believed that French colonialism in North Africa was another 
example of Europeans taking Western Civilization to a back­
ward people. Because American interests in Morocco were 
not great, the political future of that small country was 
not of great concern to him. He was, however, concerned 
about the anxiety and fears of William II. To Ambassador 
Jusserand he reported that he had received information that 
the "present great preoccupation of the German Emperor is 
the Franco-British rapprochement which he believes is 
directed against h i m . "18
The German Government had hopes that Roosevelt could 
be persuaded to support the idea of a conference. The United 
States was a logical choice because in 1905 all of the other 
major powers were allied to either France or Germany. Bulow 
had earlier written William that Roosevelt was "a great 
admirer of Your Majesty" and because of this the two countries
1 Q y _
Jusserand to Delcasse, Feb. 11, I9 0 5, DDF, VI^, no. 
9 0 , p. 110.
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could march "hand in h a n d , "^9 The German strategy was to 
argue that Germany was supporting the principle of the open 
door in Morocco, just as the United States had done in the 
Far East. On February 25 Bulow instructed Ambassador Stern- 
burg to warn the President that France and Spain were a "poli­
tical unity" which was trying to partition Morocco between 
the two and to prohibit her markets from the rest of the 
world. The Governments of Germany and the United States 
should together support the Sultan in his struggle to main­
tain independence and the open door.20 When Sternburg made 
this appeal, Roosevelt answered that American interests did 
not justify such a policy on the part of his Government,
He did express his confidence in the "peaceful intentions" 
of Germany, and he promised to instruct the American Minister 
in Tangier to maintain "close contact" with his German col­
league, 21 In keeping with this promise Secretary Hay instruct­
ed Gummere to work with Germany "so far as you can do so 
without causing friction with F r a n c e , "22
^Bulow to William, August 31» 1904, GP, XIXII, no, 
6264, p, 5 3 6. William added an annotation: "Very flattering
to me,"
2°Bu1ow to Sternburg, Feb, 25, 1905» GP, XX, no, 6558, 
pp, 256-8,
21sternburg to Bulow, March 7, I9 0 5, Ibid,. no, 6559, 
pp, 258-9 . Roosevelt's account is in his letter to Reid, 
April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p, 468, Morison, V, p, 231.
22Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p, 310,
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The real beginning date for the Moroccan crisis was 
March 31» 1905. On this day Kaiser William II landed in 
Tangier and delivered a spectacular speech. It is now 
recognized that the speech was made at the insistance of 
Bulow and Holstein. The Kaiser himself was reluctant to go 
to Tangier, and in fact, he tried to use the roughness of 
the sea as an excuse for not landing. Once in Tangier, 
however, he gave the appearance of purpose and confidence. 
Before the Sultan and an enthusiastic Muslim audience he 
declared: "It is to the Sultan in his position of an inde­
pendent Sovereign that I am paying my visit today. I hope 
that under the Sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco 
will remain open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations 
on the basis of absolute e q u a l i t y , T h i s  was a clear 
threat that Germany would not stand aside while France made 
Morocco into a French dependency.
The day after the Tangier speech President Roosevelt 
and Ambassador Jusserand had one of their usual friendly 
chats. Roosevelt voiced the opinion that he did not believe 
the Emperor "at bottom" wanted war but that "it was possible 
to fear that his acts and words might cause one."'^^ Both
Z^Quoted in Stuart, French Foreign Policy, pp. 167-8. 
In regard to the Kaiser’s position on the open door Gummere 
is reported to have said, "This is just exactly what we also 
want." Quoted in Dennis, Adventures, p. ^88.
^^Jusserand to Delcasse'", April 1, 1905» DDF, VI^, no.
218, p. 277.
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men agreed that the American reaction to the Tangier speech 
was unfavorable to Germany, Roosevelt remarked that the 
dominant sentiment in the Navy department was "sharply 
Anti-German," After the conversation Jusserand reported to 
his Foreign Office that "in the present situation the Federal 
Government intends to remain outside all political develop­
ments which might result from European rivalries concerning 
Morocco,25 The conversation had been somewhat hurried for 
Roosevelt was busy making last-minute preparation for his 
hunting trip to the Colorado Mountains, a location far away 
from the governmental cares of Washington,
A week later, while Roosevelt was in Colorado and Hay 
was sick in Europe, Sternburg delivered a second appeal to 
William Howard Taft, who was left in charge of American 
diplomacy. This message, written by Bulow, argued that 
Germany "is obligated to think of her national dignity" for 
"as soon as France discovers that Germany will meekly submit 
to her bullying, we are sure that she will become more 
aggressive," In backing the open door in Morocco, the 
German Government was working not only for her own interests 
but "for those of all the commercial nations of the world," 
The note insisted that there must be a conference of the 
concerned powers to determine the fate of Morocco, The
^Jusserand to Delcasse, April 3, I9 0 5, DDF, VI^, 
no, 227, pp, 289-90, Both this and the previous report 
are concerned with the same interview.
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United States, as a participant of the Madrid Conference, 
should use her influence on France in support of such a 
conference. 26 Secretary of War Taft was noncommittal, saying 
only that he would forward the message to the President.^7 
The German press that day expressed the hope for German- 
American co-operation in the Moroccan dispute because of the 
assumption that "American commerce and navigation would be 
equally menaced if the Mediterranean trade were to be exclu­
sively under the control of France and E n g l a n d . ^8
Secretary Taft, like Roosevelt, had a great deal of 
confidence in Jusserand. On April 7 the two men had a long 
conversation concerning the German demand for a conference. 
Jusserand argued that the German fears were entirely unneces­
sary because France, as a result of the Madrid Conference, 
was already committed by treaty to the principle of equality 
of trade in Morocco. His hope was that the United States 
"would abstain from all action that could indicate suspicion 
and thus make the French task more difficult." Taft responded 
that although the power to define policy was exclusively in 
the hands of the President, he did believe it was safe to 
say that "the United States has only a weak interest in the
Z^Bulow to Sternburg, April 3, I9 05, GP, XIX^, no, 6302, 
pp. 593-5» Roosevelt to Reid, Ap. 28, I9 0 6, Bishop, I, p. 668,
2?Sternburg to Bulow, April 6 , I903, GP, XIX^, no. 6304, 
p. 579.
2^Reported by M, Bihourd, French Ambassador in Berlin, 
to Delcasse, DDF, VI^, no. 239» PP» 303-4.
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question of the open door in Morocco and does not consider 
it to be of equal importance to the same question in the 
Far East,29 In a later conversation Taft went even farther 
in encouraging Jusserand that the United States did not 
intend to depart from the "tradition of isolation from Euro­
pean rivalries," "I am convinced," declared Taft, "that I 
do not go too far in saying that if there is an invitation 
for us to attend a Conference on Morocco, we will refuse
to attend."39
The German Government on April 13 formally appealed 
to Roosevelt for the third time. This appeal charged that 
France will "continue her aggressive policy in Morocco, 
aimed at all non-French interests, if she feels sure that 
England will stand by her and eventually show herself ready 
to back her up by force of arms,"3^ Meanwhile Delcasse'had 
managed to gain the diplomatic support of both England and 
Spain in a combined opposition to a new conference, "In 
these conditions," wrote Delcasse to Jusserand, "it is very 
unlikely that Germany will get very far," He instructed 
Jusserand to maintain his "effective opposition" to the
29Jusserand to D^elcass^, April ?, 1905» DDF, Vl2, no, 
246, p, 310, Delcasse instructed Jusserand to say that France 
intended to maintain the open door in Morocco, Delcasse'' to 
Jusserand, Ibid,, April 7, 1905» no, 251, p. 314,
39jusserand to Delcasse', April 14, 1905» Ibid,. no,
229, pp, 363-4 ,
3^Sternburg to Bulow, April 15» 1905, GP, XX^, note 3, 
p, 341, Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I90 6, Bishop, I, p, 469,
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German project, Jusserand was to continue to assure Taft 
that the United States was to he given complete commercial 
equality in Morocco, and he was to argue that the background 
of the Madrid Conference had no analogy to the contemporary 
situation.32
Roosevelt's policy was clear at this early stage in 
the dispute. He well knew that Delcasse'hoped to turn 
Morocco into a French protectorate, but this did not upset 
him. He was persuaded that American interests in North 
Africa were very small, especially when compared to his 
hopes for the Far East. Roosevelt did not want to offend 
either England, France or Germany, but more important, he 
believed that there was the constant possibility of a European 
war— a contingency which could not help but be destructive 
to American interests. He therefore hoped to encourage 
conciliation and to remain flexible on the question of the 
fate of Morocco. Roosevelt was sufficiently concerned to 
take out time from his bear hunt to write several letters.
To Sternburg he wrote : "Dear Speck . . . .  I dislike taking
a position in any matter unless I fully intend to back it 
up, and our interests in Morocco are not sufficiently great 
to make me feel justified in engaging our Government in the 
matter."33 in a longer letter to Taft he wrotes
^^Delcasse to Jusserand, April 13, 1905» DDF, VI^, no, 
285, pp. 350-1.
33Roosevelt to Sternburg, April 20, 1905, Morison, V,
pp. 234-5. Bishop, I, pp. 471-3.
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Dear Will: I think you are keeping the lid on in
great shape! . . . .  The Kaiser's pipe-dream this 
week takes the form of Morocco. I do not feel 
that as a Government we should interfere in the 
Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we 
have no real interests in Morocco. I do not care 
to take sides between France and Germany in the 
matter.
At the same time if I can find out what Germany 
wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, 
and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better 
state of feeling between England and Germany.
Each nation is working itself up to a condition 
of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer 
fear of the other . . . .  Fortunately, you and I 
play the diplomatic game exactly alike, and I 
should advise your being absolutely.frank with 
both Speck and the British p e o p l e .
Following these instructions, Taft spoke to the British 
Ambassador in the attempt to obtain the British position.
Taft expressed the concern of Roosevelt for the maintenance 
of peace even if he "does not care a cent about Morocco.
The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Henry Lansdowne, did not 
have much confidence in Roosevelt's ability to conduct serious 
diplomacy. He instructed Ambassador Durand to firmly refuse 
the offer of the good offices of the United States and to 
insist that the goals of France were "conciliatory and moder­
ate." There was no need for a conference unless Germany was 
determined to take advantage of what was at most a diplomatic 
oversight in order to make mischief or to disturb the status 
quo by demanding cession of a Moorish Port." Lansdowne
^^Roosevelt to Taft, April 20, 1905i Morison, V, 
pp. 232-3. Bishop, I, pp. 471-3 .
^^Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, I9 0 5, BD, III, no. 82, 
p p .  67-8.
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emphasized that the British Ambassador was "to say nothing 
which could be interpreted as an invitation to the President 
to act as mediator between us and Germany."3^ It is inter­
esting that on April 25 and again on May 13 the Kaiser wrote 
Roosevelt that England could be easily persuaded to cease 
her opposition to an international conference if he "would 
give her a hint to do so."37
On May 11 when Roosevelt returned from the Colorado 
Mountains he found that both Sternburg and Jusserand were 
deeply concerned that war was p o s s i b l e . 3® Roosevelt kept 
in daily contact with both Ambassadors, and especially with 
Jusserand, in an attempt to help find some solution to the 
crisis. Jusserand was always a strong partisan of the 
French position. He assured the President that none of the 
interested parties expressed any desire for a conference.
In talking to Jusserand Roosevelt almost always took the 
side of France just as Taft had done. On June 4 he announced 
that he decided that so long as France opposed the calling 
of a conference the American Government would not accept 
any invitation to participate in one. Roosevelt asked that 
this informal promise be kept out of the French Yellow Book.
3^Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, BD, III, no. 8 3,
p. 68.
37Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I906, Bishop, I, p. 469.
^^Roosevelt's version in his letter to Reid, Ibid.. 
p. 469,
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"I have not been invited to a Conference," he.explained,
"and I would not want to give the impression of saying no 
in advance just to be disagreeable to G e r m a n y . "39
Delcasse^ was extremely happy to receive Roosevelt’s 
commitment to refuse to attend any conference not acceptable 
to France. Although Jusserand emphasized that this infor­
mation was confidential, Delcass/ immediately sent the news 
to the French Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London and St. 
Petersburg.^0 The very next day Paul Gambon was able to 
use the information in his diplomacy with the London Foreign 
Office, On that day the Sultan of Morocco appealed to the 
powers to support a Moroccan Conference. This appeal was 
more difficult to ignore than the German appeal, and Lord 
Lansdowne asked the advice of the French Ambassador.
Cambon showed Lansdowne the secret message containing 
Roosevelt’s promise, and he suggested to Lansdowne that he 
advise the Sultan that it was in Morocco’s interests to 
place her confidence in France and Britain. Lansdowne agreed 
with this course of action. He said that the news from 
Washington would be of aid in opposing a conference.
39Jusserand to Delcasse, June 4, 1905, DDF, VI^, no. 
4 9 2, pp. 586-7 . The only evidence for the statement is the 
report of Jusserand. Jusserand is generally dependable in 
his reports, and the story agrees with the facts.
^^Ibid.. note 2, p. 587.
^^Paul Cambon to Delcasse^ June 5, 1905, DDF, VI^, no,
497, p. 592.
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At this stage in the crisis several British journalists, 
who were not familiar with Roosevelt's promise to Jusserand, 
wrote that Roosevelt was pro-German and under the influence 
of the Kaiser. This was the kind of story that upset Roose­
velt, To his English friend. Spring Rice, he vehemently 
denied that there was any basis to this interpretation. He 
explained that his policy was to treat all nations with 
"peacefulness and righteousness," It was "ridiculous" that 
he could be influenced by a man of su h "violent and often 
wholly irrational zigzags," Roosevelt concluded; "If the 
Kaiser ever causes trouble it will be from jumpiness and 
not because of long-thought-out and deliberate purpose,
To Jusserand he indicated that he would be uneasy if the 
Kaiser were to have power in Morocco, "No Maritime power, 
and least of all the United States," said Roosevelt, "can 
look with indifference upon the threat of a German establish­
ment at the entrance of the Mediterranean with the power 
to obstruct the straits of Gibraltar,"^3 Senator Lodge 
mentioned to Henry Adams that some Englishmen believed that 
Roosevelt was "under the Kaiser's spell," Adams replied:
"For Heaven's sake, let them think so. The President's
li,o
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, May 3 1, I9 0 5, quoted in 
Dennet, Adventures, pp, 89-91*
Jusserand to Delcasse, May 21, 1905, DDF, VI^,
no, 435, p. 512,
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influence with the Kaiser is one of the strongest weapons 
we have in a really perilous condition.
In early June an impasse had been reached between France 
and Germany, and it seemed that neither side was willing to 
budge. Then unexpectedly Premier Maurice Rouvier decided 
that Delcasse's uncompromising policy was leading France to 
war. On June 6 Rouvier and Delcasse debated their differences 
in the presence of the Council of Ministers and Emile Loubet, 
the President of the Republic. Delcasse based his case on 
two points: First, Germany was bluffing, and second, in the
case of war England would come to France's defense. Rouvier 
claimed to have information that Germany was willing to go 
to war, and he denied that that was any clear evidence of 
England's willingness to join in a continental war.^^ The 
French army, still shaken by the Dryfus affair, was unpre­
pared to fight the superior Prussian forces. After a dis­
cussion which lasted about thirty minutes the ministers 
unanimously supported Rouvier, and Delcasse was left with
^^Lodge to Roosevelt, July 25, 1905, Lodge, Letters, 
II, pp. 170-1 .
^^The truth is not clear. Cambon had reported that 
Lansdowne had made definite offers of aid, but Lansdowne 
denied this. Cambon to Delcasse', Rîay 29, 1905, DDF, VI, no. 
465, P» 558. Lansdowne to Bertie, May 31, I9 0 5, BD, II, 
p. 77' The question is discussed in Fay, Origins. I. pp. 
195-9 , and Keith Eubank, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomat.
(Norman: Universi^ of Oklahoma Press, i9 60), pp. 207-8.
The policy of Rouvier is defended in such nationalist French 
historians as Tardieu, Alliances, pp. 212-4, and Jacques 
Bainville, La troisième république, I87O-I9 3 5, (Paris, 
Arth&me Fayard, 1935), P» 529»
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no choice hut to give his resignation. Thus Delcasse^'s 
ministry, which is the longest in the history of the Third 
Republic, came to an abrupt end.^^ German leaders were 
very happy when they learned of this development. Bulow 
wrote that the most critical period of the Moroccan crisis
had ended.^7 Holstein recorded in his diary: "Our cleverest
LlRand most dangerous enemy has fallen." William congratulated 
the French Ambassador for the departure of the man who "was 
leading France to a catastrophe."^9
American opinion generally looked upon the fall of 
Delcasse as a hopeful sign for the prospects of peace.
The Nation criticized Delcasse'as a "visionary of a new 
European balance" and charged that his "mind was not upon 
a diplomatic settlement of the dispute, but upon humiliating 
Germany."50 Roosevelt also expressed the opinion that Delcasse' 
was not sufficiently conciliatory.51 Delcasse's fall, how­
ever, did not immediately mean that France was ready to 
adapt a policy of appeasement. Rouvier, taking charge of
^^A detailed eye-witness account is given by Joseph 
Chaumie, the Minister of Justice, in DDF, VI^, annex, pp. 601-4.
p. 5 2.
51
^^Bulow to Tattenback, June 7, I9 0 5, GP, XX^, p. 4l8. 
^^Holstein Papers. Vol. IV, June 1 6, I9 0 5, p, 342. 
Bihourd to Rouvier, June 12, I9 0 5, DDP2, VI, no. 44,
50The Nation, July 20, I9 0 5, Vol. 81, p. 4?.
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, I905, Morison, Vol.
V, no. 3710, p. 63.
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the Quai d*Orsay for an interim period, informed the French 
Foreign Service that "the Government of the Republic is 
invariably attached to a loyal and firm p o l i c y . E a r l i e r  
he had told a German representative that popular opinion 
would prevent France from appearing to back down to a German 
threat,53 Britain notified the French Government that she 
remained convinced that a Conference was "wholly unworthy 
of support, most ill-advised and contrary to the interests
of Morocco,"5^
On June 7 Roosevelt invited Ambassador Jusserand to 
meet with him to discuss the significance of Rouvier's 
taking charge of French diplomacy. At the meeting Jusserand 
said that he had not received any specific instructions from 
Rouvier, but he was convinced that the French Government 
would not cease its opposition to a Moroccan Conference, 
Roosevelt repeated his determination to support the French 
position, adding that the French interpretation of the most 
favored nation clause was "entirely just." He asked that he 
be immediately informed if the Quai d'Orsay were to change 
its policy, "I would not," he emphasized, "want to reject 
the idea of a conference and then find that we were opposed
52
DDF, VII, no, 1, page 1, note 1,
Miquel's memorandum of a conversation with Rouvier, 
May 30, 1905, GP, XX^, pp, 393-8,
^^Lord Lansdowne to Paul Cambon, June 8, I9 0 5. DDF, VII^, 
no, 5 0 3» pp. 599-600,
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to Germany only as a result of my personal o p i n i o n , T h e  
next day Roosevelt informed Sternburg that the United States 
would refuse to participate in any Moroccan Conference be­
cause public opinion was opposed to involvement in European 
conflicts. 56 Only two days after the fall of Delcasse it 
appeared that Germany was faced with the combined opposition 
of France, Britain and the United States.
Jean Jules Jusserand took pride in the fact that he 
was an experienced and skillful diplomatist. It constantly 
offended him that the Foreign Office did not regularly supply 
him with the details of foreign policy. In every other despatch 
in his correspondence with both Delcasse'^  and Rouvier he com­
plained that a lack of information made his job more diffi­
cult. A week after Rouvier was in charge of the Quai d*Orsay 
Jusserand sent him a long letter explaining why it was 
necessary that the American Ambassador be kept well-informed. 
France could obtain "a great utility" by the fact that 
President Roosevelt was determined to play a major role in 
world affairs. Although France had the confidence of the 
President, "we risk the lose of this confidence which I 
cultivate with the greatest of care," "The world is
56Jusserand to Rouvier, June 8, I905, no, 8, pp. 7-8, 
no. 14, p. 1 3. These are two reports of the same conversation. 
Rouvier the next day informed Jusserand that France would 
remain opposed to a conference. June 9 , I9 0 3, DDF, VII^, no.
2 0, p. 17.
^^Sternburg to Bulow, June 8, I9 05, Dugsdale, Vol. Ill, 
p. 23O; GP, XX, no. 6696, p. 421,
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shrinking," concluded Jusserand, "all nations are now neigh­
bors, and especially this is true for the American Republic 
whose power grows greater each day."5?
Although Jusserand was somewhat vain at times, he was 
correct in claiming that he had the confidence of Roosevelt.
In matters of French diplomacy Roosevelt relied on his per­
sonal contact with Jusserand, and he almost completely ignored 
the Ambassador in Paris. Robert S. McCormick was actually 
a very capable diplomatist, and he was sensitive to the fact 
that he was seldom contacted in regard to serious matters.
"In the absence of such information," he once complained to 
Root, "I have refrained from discussing the Moroccan question, 
even in a general way, lest I might say something not in 
keeping with the interest and policy of our own Government. 
During the Moroccan crisis Roosevelt also did not often 
consult with the anti-German John Hay, but in the first 
half of 1905 Roosevelt worked largely as his own Secretary 
of State. After Hay's death on July 1 Roosevelt placed much 
more confidence in the successor Elihu Root.59 tq Sternburg
57Jusserand to Rouvier, June 11, I905, DDF, VII^, no.
41, pp. 45-7 .
5%cCormick to Root, Oct. 5, I9 0 5» Despatches, Vol. 125» 
no. 4 9. Also Oct. 4, no. 55» Jusserand mentioned that Roose­
velt had little faith in McCormick. Jusserand to Rouvier,
June 2 5, 19 0 5. DDF, VIl2, no. 124, p. 135.
59According to Root's biographer "there was nothing for 
Root to do but to carry on with the details and to exercise 
his usual restraining influence on Roosevelt. Jessup, Root, 
II, p. 5 6. Beale writes: "Much of the detail Root handled.
At the critical points, however, Roosevelt made the decisions 
and did the negotiations. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 320.
265
Roosevelt wrote: "Root's political views and mine are in
complete accord; I beg you to give Root your fullest,confi­
dence and to speak with him as if you were talking to me,"^® 
On June 11 Sternburg gave Roosevelt a memorandum which 
claimed that England had offered France an offensive and 
defensive alliance. Also the memorandum charged that France 
had offered to give Germany a zone of influence in Morocco 
in exchange for the abandonment of a conference settlement.
The German Government had refused this proposal only because 
of her desire for all nations to have the advantage of the 
open door in Morocco. "If you could give a hint now in 
London and Paris," the note concluded, "your influence could 
prevent England from joining a Franco-German war started by 
the aggressive policy of France in M o r o c c o . A f t e r  a long 
conversation with Sternburg Roosevelt rather suddenly reversed 
his earlier policy in the matter, and he promised to advise 
the French Government in favor of accepting the Sultan's 
invitation for an International Moroccan C o n f e r e n c e . it 
appears that Roosevelt did not completely reject the German
Sternburg to Bulow, November 3, 1905t GP, XXI^, p. 9»
^^Bishop, Vol. I, pp. 4?6, Morison, Vol. V, pp. 235-7* 
There is no documentary evidence that Britain had actually 
offered an offensive and defensive alliance, and Britain 
learned of the charge only through Roosevelt, Cambridge History 
of British Foreign Policy. Vol. Ill, pp. 3^2-3.
^^Roosevelt to Sternburg, April 20, 1905, Morison, V, 
pp. 234-5* Bishop, I. pp. 471-3 .
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charges, hut this does not seem to he the hasic reason for 
his change of policy. He later wrote that the decision was 
hased on three points: first, "it really did look like there
might he a war," and this would he "a real calamity for 
civilization;" second, since there was already a war in the 
Far East "a new conflict might result in what would literally 
he a world-conflagration;" and third, a war should he pre­
vented "for the sake of France."^3 Secretary Hay disagreed 
with Roosevelt's change of policy, and he argued that the 
United States should continue to support France in her 
opposition to a conference.
President Roosevelt, in accordance with his promise to 
Sternhurg, hegan to suggest to Jusserand that the conference 
idea should he considered hy France. On June 14 he told 
Jusserand that the acceptance of a conference was not a 
greater evil than the granting of a sphere of influence to 
Germany. A Moroccan Conference did not have to indicate 
anything serious', for it was possible to design the agenda 
in accordance with French goals. Perhaps there was "only one 
chance in three that William really had the intentions which 
he manifested, hut this chance that his menace might he 
serious meant that the stakes were so high that it was
^^Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I9 0 6, Morison, V, p. 237, 
Bishop, I, p. 477.
^^Sternhurg to Bulow, June 17, 1905, Dugsdale, III,
p. 231.
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necessary to act with prudence," Still Roosevelt concluded 
that this was only an observation and that the United States 
would continue to support the French decision one way or 
another. Jusserand left the White House at 11 P.M., and 
he was met by five reporters who learned n o t h i n g . I n  
subsequent conversations with Jusserand Roosevelt repeated 
the same basic idea. "It would cause me anguish," he 
declared, "if France were to suffer a m i s f o r t u n e . T o  
save the peace it was necessary to placate the "incommensur­
able vanity" of the Emperor. There were "honorable conces­
sions which one can make to avoid a conflict, and in this 
case I would not hesitate."&7 In contrast to the President, 
Secretary Hay calmly told Jusserand that he did not believe 
Germany would be willing to go to war for the sake of
Morocco.
It was at this general time that France became more 
open to the possibility of a Moroccan Conference, On June 14
Jusserand to Rouvier, June 15, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 62, 
pp. 688-70, Rouvier denied that France had offered Germany 
a zone of influence in exchange for a conference. Rouvier
to Jusserand, June 15, 1905, Ibid,. no. 66, p. 72.
Jusserand to Rouvier, June 22, 1905, DDF, VII, no.
101, p. 105.
^7Jusserand to Rouvier, June 19, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 8 5, 
p. 9 0. A copy of this despatch is in the Roosevelt collection.
Series I. Roosevelt’s account of the conversation is in his
letter to Reid, Bishop, I, p. 478.
Jusserand to Rouvier, June 22, I905, DDF, VII, no.
101, p. 105.
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Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador, spoke to Rouvier of 
the idea of prior Franco-German discussions in the event 
that a Conference were called. Rouvier indicated that he 
would have to give the proposal reflection, but significantly 
he did not indicate any opposition to the German Ambassador’s 
suggestion.^9 Shortly thereafter the Council of Ministers 
agreed unanimously that "it was necessary to do all that was 
compatible with honor to avoid war" because Frenchmen "would 
not understand why there was a war over Morocco and not over 
Alsace and Lorraine." One Minister suggested that France 
could "gain time" by agreeing to go to a Conference and then 
postponing it indefinitely.On June 21 Rouvier gave the 
German Ambassador a note which stated that France was ready 
to "seriously consider" participating in a Conference pro­
vided that there would be an earlier "exchange of views" to 
determine the exact agenda. Rouvier continued to argue that 
a "direct accord" between Germany and France would be the 
simplest and fastest procedure to settle the matter,
Rouvier instructed Jusserand to tell Roosevelt that 
the American advice had influenced France’s decision to
^^Department Note written by Mr. George Louis, June 14, 
1905, Ibid., no. 5 4, p. 6 0.
f^Memorandum of the meeting by Mr. Chaumie, Ibid.. 
note 4, pp. 61-2 .
f^Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, I905, DDF, VII, no. 93,
pp. 97-100.
269
accept a conference. "Tell him," cabled Rouvier, "that his 
council has an exceptional authority, not only because of 
his high office, but also because of his character, his spirit 
of justice and his clear understanding of France's highest 
interests."72 is not clear, however, if this message 
represented the conviction of Rouvier, or if, on the other 
hand, it was diplomatic flattery designed to gain Roosevelt’s 
sympathy. It is certain that Rouvier began to reconsider 
his position on the conference before Roosevelt began to 
urge Jusserand that a conference would be one way to let.the 
Kaiser "save face." But Rouvier did not make the final deci­
sion to give in until after Roosevelt's encouragement. Cer­
tainly Roosevelt's viewpoint was one of several influential 
factors, for it was impossible for Prance to ignore the 
thinking of the leader of one of the major powers of the 
world. Howard K. Beale, however, overstates the matter 
when he writes: "The French attitude, apparently influenced
by the Presidential suggestion, became immediately concilia­
tory. "73
The German Government, despite Prince Radolin's sug­
gestion, did not find that the proposal for a detailed 
agenda was satisfactory. Bulow argued that the extent of
7^Rouvier to Jusserand, June 23, 1905, Ibid.. no, 112, 
pp. 117-9. These words are even more flattering in French.
73seale, Roosevelt, p. 316.
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the necessary reforms should he decided by the Conference 
after it met,?^ Roosevelt and Jusserand discussed the 
possible means which might be employed to encourage Germany 
to agree to a pre-conference agenda, Roosevelt suggested 
that one helpful action was "to flatter the excessive vanity 
of the Emperor." Then the two men together composed a 
telegram with this purpose in mind, and Roosevelt sent it 
as if he alone had written it,75 The message said of the 
Kaiser that "he stands as the leader among the Sovereigns 
of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and 
it is not only of the utmost importance for his own people, 
but of the utmost importance for all mankind that his power 
and leadership for good should be unimpaired," In obtaining 
from France the concession of a conference the Emperor "has 
won a great triumph ; he has obtained what his opponents in 
England and France said he never would obtain, and what I 
myself did not believe he could obtain," The message con­
cluded with an encouragement: "The result is a striking
tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I
earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as 
the triumph it is,"7^
7^Bu1ow to Radolin, June 25, I9 0 5, GP, XX^, no. 6?42,
p. 4 7 9.
75Jusserand to Rouvier, June 25» 1905, DDF, VII, no,
124, pp,134-5 .
7^Roosevelt to Sternburg, June 25» 1905» Bishop, I, 
pp, 483-5» Morison, V, pp, 339-40, Sternburg to Bulow, June 
2 7, 1905» GP, XX2, no, 6742, pp, 479-80,
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Shortly thereafter Roosevelt decided that a further 
French concession was necessary. In the presence of Jusse­
rand he drew up a proposed formula for a solution: "The
two Governments will agree to go to the conference without 
a preliminary program and discuss all questions concerning 
Morocco, except when either is honor bound by a previous 
agreement with another power,"77 Jusserand said that this 
seemed to be a workable solution if Germany would go along, 
but he added that he would have to consult with his Govern­
ment before making any commitment, Rouvier immediately 
wrote that the proposed solution was not acceptable because 
it "would no doubt be interpreted in a different sense by 
France and Germany."7^ Germany just as rapidly agreed to 
Roosevelt's plan, as indeed it was very similar to the earlier 
German expression. In the German response, written by Stern­
burg, there appeared the words: "The Emperor has requested
me to tell you that in case during the coming conference 
differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, 
he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which 
you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical,"79
77Jusserand to Rouvier, June 27, 1905* DDF, VII, no, 137, 
pp, 156-7 , Sternburg to Bulow, June 27, 1905, GP, XX*, no, 
6743, p, 480, Roosevelt's summary in Roosevelt to Reid, April 
28, 19 0 6, Bishop, I, p, 485,
78Rouvier to Jusserand, June 28, 1905, DDF, VII, no, 149,
p. 1 7 3.
79sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, I9 0 5, Morison, V, 
pp, 240-1, GP, XX, part 2, no, 6744, pp, 481-2,
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Actually the Emperor had not been this definite for Bulow 
had instructed Sternburg to tell Roosevelt that he (Bulow) 
would "urge the Kaiser to accept the suggestions of Roose­
velt."^0
The moderate policy of France prevailed, and on July 10 
both she and Germany announced that they had come to an 
agreement which was substantially the plan outlined by 
Roosevelt.81 It is possible that the alleged promise of 
William that he would follow Roosevelt's lead might have 
had some influence in encouraging the French Government to 
agree to an agenda. It is true that Roosevelt, as almost 
always, informed Jusserand of the latest German message. 
Jusserand obtained this information just before the meeting 
of the Council of Ministers when it was decided to come to 
terms with Germany.82 Just after the Franco-German agree­
ment Jusserand wrote Roosevelt that "the agreement arrived 
at is in substance the one we had considered and the accep­
tation of which you did so very much to secure." The crisis,
®^Bulow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, quoted in Beale, 
Roosevelt, p. 325»
8lThe agreement gave a "recognition of the situation 
created for France in Morocco by the contiguity of a vast 
extent of Algeria and the Shereefian Empire and by the spe­
cial relations resulting therefore between the two adjacent 
countries." In McCormick to Adee, July 12, 1905, Despatches, 
Vol. 124, no. 22.
Qp
°^Beale is rather definite that the alleged promise 
was of importance in influencing the Council to compromise, 
but Beale does not have documentary evidence that this is 
true. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 318.
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he added» had been grave for "there was a point where more 
yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France 
felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible 
great events."83 Roosevelt himself believed that he had 
played a major role in the pre-conference negotiations,
"This is a dead secret," he wrote to Lodge, "not a word of 
it has got out into the papers; but I became the intermediary 
between Germany when they seemed to have gotten into an
impasse,"84
Before the conference met there remained several 
disagreements between Prance and Germany, and Roosevelt 
helped mediate two minor difficulties. The German Govern­
ment objected to the French selection of Mr, Paul Revoil 
as a delegate, Berlin charged to Roosevelt that Revoil had 
earlier been removed from office by Premier Combes because 
Combes feared his warlike policy, Roosevelt immediately 
notified Jusserand that he had received an alarm "from our 
friend, whom I need not name, " Jusserand answered: "I
am afraid that our fiery friend acts once more upon perfectly 
false information," Revoil "has been, from the first, in 
favor of an understanding with Germany concerning Morocco,"
Jusserand to Roosevelt, July 11, 1905f Bishop, I, 
p. 488. Morison, V, p, 242,
®^Roosevelt to Lodge, July 11, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, 
IV, no, 1272, p, 3595* Lodge, Letters. Vol. II, pp, 166-7*
G^Roosevelt to Jusserand, July 25, 1905, DDF, VII,
p, 1287,
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and he was chosen because "he knows the question well and 
is very conciliatory."86 Roosevelt gave this information 
to Sternburg, and the German Government ceased to oppose 
the French appointment, A second area of controversy was 
the location for the conference. The Kaiser preferred 
Tangier, and France argued in favor of a town in Spain or 
Switzerland. Jusserand wrote to Roosevelt that Tangier 
"would be a very bad choice, being a hot bed of intrigue, 
with each legation having its clientele."87 Roosevelt 
argued this position to Germany. Finally it was agreed 
that the conference would take place in Algeciras, Spain, 
an obscure village on the northern shore of the Bay of 
Gibraltar.
France was naturally anxious to have the assurance of 
the diplomatic support of the United States at the Algeciras 
Conference. Rouvier instructed Jusserand to attempt to 
obtain from Secretary Root the assurance that the American 
delegate would "follow the lead of his French colleague."88 
Jusserand, however, believed that it was wiser to use the 
indirect approach. "We have a better chance," he answered 
Rouvier, "to obtain the President's support if we indicate
Jusserand to Roosevelt, July 26, 1905» Notes, Vol. 46, 
87Jusserand to Roosevelt, July 28, 1905, Ibid.
OQ
Rouvier to Jusserand, July 10, 1905» DDF, VII, no.
217, p. 260, note 1 .
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simply that we appreciate his good will rather than if we 
ask for a formal promise of support,"^9 Rouvier agreed 
to let Jusserand act as he felt best, and Jusserand continued 
in his attempt to influence the President through a subtle 
appeal to his prejudices and sentiments. Always he empha­
sized to Roosevelt that "France was a proud nation and would 
fight if pushed too far," Jusserand explained to Rouvier: 
"This is the way to maintain the respect which Roosevelt has 
for our nation," Whenever possible he repeated one of Roose­
velt's favorite cliches: "Justice first and then peace based
on justice."90
While choosing an American delegate for Algeciras it 
was clear that the Roosevelt Administration did not intend 
to be entirely unbiased in the Moroccan conflict. Lodge 
sent Roosevelt some advise in the matter, "The local dispute 
in Morocco," he wrote, "is a matter of indifference to us, 
but it is of very great importance to us to give France all 
the help that we can," For the appointment he suggested 
Joseph Choate and discounted General Porter only because 
"his friendship for France is well known," Whoever was the 
delegate "must keep on the best terms with the German delegate, 
and yet when it comes to action support France to the extent
®9jusserand to Rouvier, July 13, 1905, DDF, VII, no, 
217, p. 2 6 0,
99jusserand to Rouvier, July 28, I9 0 5, Ibid,. no, 155,
pp, 178-9 .
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of his power."91 Roosevelt was in agreement with Lodge's 
suggestions, and he asked Choate to represent the United 
States at Algeciras. "Many delicate matters will come up," 
he wrote Choate, "for while I want to stand by Prance I want 
at the same time to strive to keep on fairly good terms with 
G e r m a n y . "92 But Choate refused the appointment, for he 
preferred to devote his time to the preparation of the Hague 
Conference of the next year.
As a second choice Roosevelt selected his friend Henry 
White, a veteran diplomat who was serving as Ambassador to 
Rome. To V/hite he wrote: "My sympathies have at bottom
been with France and I suppose will continue so. Still I 
want to keep an even k e e l . "93 Secretary Root also wanted 
the American delegate to favor the French position. "We 
regard," he instructed White, "as a favorable condition for 
the peace of the world, and therefore, the best interest of 
the United States, the continued entente cordiale between 
France and England, and we do not wish to contribute towards
91Lodge to Roosevelt, August 14, 1905, Lodge, Letters. 
II, p. 172. Bunau-Varilla later claimed to have persuaded 
Lodge that war was inevitable unless the United States 
supported France. There is no evidence whether the story 
is true or false. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 3I8.
9^Roosevelt to Choate, August I6 , 1905, Morison, IV, 
p. 1302.
^^Roosevelt to White, August 23, 1905, Morison, IV,
no. 3640, p. 1313.
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any entanglement between these two countries."9^ These 
instructions were in accord with the views of White, who 
was pro-British as a result of his long service in London,
The French Government was therefore delighted with his 
selection, Jusserand went so far as to report that the 
decision for White was made "uniquely in the thought of being 
agreeable to us,"9^ As White's assistant Roosevelt selected 
the Moroccan Minister Samuel Gummere, Premier Rouvier was 
convinced that "the selection of Mr. Gummere will be useful 
because of his close friendship with Mr, Nicolson,"^^
Early in 1906 many French leaders were disappointed 
that the United States was not more outspoken in behalf of 
the position of France, Andre Tardieu in Le Temps complained 
that the Americans were "absolutely independent" in policy 
and that they believed themselves to have "superior rights 
of those of any other European power,"97 Rouvier indicated 
to Jusserand that he had received information that the United 
States' delegate was to vote for the internationalization of 
the Moroccan police force, a situation which would take away
9^Root to White, November 28, 1905» Root Mms,
Jusserand to Rouvier, December 3» 1905, DDF, VIII, 
p, 249, note 4,
^^Rouvier to the French Ambassadors, Dec, 2, 1905, DDF,
VIII, no. 183, p. 249,
9?le Temps. January 5, 1906,
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from effective French control.Secretary of State Root 
informed Jusserand that this story was "completely false,"
The American delegate would be instructed to support any 
arrangement consistent with the open door, the special rights 
of France in Morocco and for the other powers only those 
rights necessary for ordinary commerce. At the same time 
he would be told to show a preference for the positions 
supported by the Anglo-French entente. Root added that this 
last point would be easy for White because this was his 
"natural disposition,"99
Several French newspapers expressed confidence that 
the United States would support France in the conference. 
Ambassador Jusserand was fearful that this sort of publicity 
would have an adverse effect on American policy, "It is 
absolutely necessary," he lectured Rouvier, "that we be very 
circumspect in all that we say concerning the probable role 
of the United States at Algeciras," To "mix in European 
difficulties" was contrary to the American tradition, and 
the public would be upset if it believed that the Roosevelt 
Administration was departing from a policy of isolationism.
By appointing Henry White the President "has given us a very
98Rouvier to Jusserand, January 9, 1906, DDF, VIII, 
no, 367, p. 488,
99Jusserand to Rouvier, January 12, I9 0 6, DDF, VIII, no, 
394, pp, 519-2 0, Sir Nicolson and other British leaders ex­
pressed the concern that the United States was not firmly be­
hind France and England, Paul Gambon did not share these 
fears, Gambon to Rouvier, January 6 , I9 0 6, DDF, VIII, no.
342, p, 459.
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special gesture of his good will and friendship.” Jusserand 
concluded his despatch with a plea for silence: "If we let
the public or the diplomatic world believe that we count on 
a marked action by the United States in our favor, we will 
render in advance such an action impossible."100
With or without publicity there were a number of 
influential people in the United States who believed that 
involvement in the Algeciras Conference was contrary to the 
isolationist tradition. Senator Bacon of Georgia charged in 
the Senate that Roosevelt was departing from "the time honored 
principle" that "we will in no manner intermeddle with those 
things which concern the international politics of Europe, 
but that we will confine ourselves to our own affairs."
This conference, unlike the earlier one in Madrid, was not 
called for reasons of trade but because of a colonial con­
flict between Prance and Germany. Bacon also argued that 
the President should seek the advice of the Senate in all 
stages of the treaty making process and that the Senate 
"should not be limited to saying yes or no." Senator Spooner 
of Wisconsin and Senator Lodge took the side of the President 
in what turned out to be a rather lively debate. The latter 
argued that the United States was not getting involved in a 
Franco-German dispute and that it was in the American interest
^^^Jusserand to Rouvier, January 10, 1906, DDF, VIII,
no. 380, pp. 501-2 .
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to support the open door in M o r o c c o . ^01 on January 20 Ambassa­
dor Jusserand referred to this isolationist spirit when he 
spoke to the Daughters of the American Revolution in Boston 
at the commemoration of the second centennial of the birth 
of Benjamin Franklin. "This great man," he declared, "is 
one who would have approved of the participation of the United 
States at the Algeciras Conference because from 1?83 he sup­
ported the sending of a Minister to M o r o c c o . "102
Peace advocates throughout the world hoped that the 
Moroccan crisis might be settled through arbitration at the 
Hague. This sentiment was especially strong in Britain and 
in the United States. Both the French and the German Govern­
ments were opposed to such a solution. The French Govern­
ment believed that a judicial precedent was "the most dan­
gerous possible suggestion."103 President Roosevelt under­
stood enough about European Realpolitik to know that a Hague 
settlement was not possible in the situation. Despite all 
discouragement Carl Schurz and Andrew Carnegie continued to
Congressional Record. February 6 , I9 0 6, Vol. 40, 
part 3» pp. 2125-2148. On January 6 Bacon had introduced a 
resolution for the President to make available to the Senate 
the diplomatic correspondence relating to the conference. 
Lodge said that the matter was secret, and there were two 
executive sessions of three hours each. Ibid.. Vol. 40, 
part 1, pp. 831-2 , pp. 946-8. Bacon's resolution was passed 
the next year.
l^^Le Temps. January 20, I9 0 6.
lO^Paul Carabon to Rouvier, June 22, I9 0 5, DDF, VII, 
no. 108, pp. 111-3 ,
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express hope for arbitration, Roosevelt was amused at this 
conception of European politics. He wrote to a friend that 
"Schurz's advice is absolutely worthless, for he does not 
know anything about existing facts, and in addition his judg­
ment is wretchedly poor,"10^
American Jews hoped to take advantage of the Algeciras 
Conference in order to protest alleged conditions of anti- 
Semitism in Morocco, Mr, Jacob Schiff, an influential New 
York banker, sent Root a letter protesting the fact that 
there was discrimination against Moroccan Jews. The idea 
appealed to Roosevelt from both a political and a moral 
standpoint, and he instructed White to look into the matter, 
Lewis Einstein, the American secretary at Algeciras, went 
to Tangier to investigate the charges, and he found that 
the Jews of Morocco feared that a charge of anti-Semitism, 
if made public, would worsen rather than improve the situa­
tion, 1^5 The French Government was firmly opposed to the 
introduction of the Jewish question into the conference 
program, for it was believed that such a complication would 
create additional opportunities for Germany to cause trouble. 
When Jusserand expressed this French position to Secretary 
Root, the latter is reported to have answered, "You have
^^^Roosevelt to Oscar Straus, February 2?, I906, Morison, 
V, no, 3835, p, 168,
lO^Lewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, I968), p, 10, White to Root, January 
3 0, 1906, FR, 1906, II, pp, 1471-6 ,
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no reason for anxiety,"106 The Jewish issue, in accordance 
with French desires, was never again brought up by the 
American government. The various diplomatists at Algeciras 
praised the American President for his humanitarian idealism, 
and Einstein observed that "the mischief which Mr, Schiff's 
excellent intention might have led to was safely buried with 
flowers, *'107
Jusserand to Rouvier, January 12, I9 0 6, DDF, VIII, 
no, 3 9 6, p, 5 2 0, A department annotation added that it "was 
interests of all to avoid complicating the work of the con­
ference," Note 1, p, 5 2 0,
lO^Einstein, Diplomat, p, 11,
CHAPTER VIII 
THE MOROCCAN CRI8IS--II
The International Moroccan Conference formally began 
on January 16, I9 06, in the Hotel de Ville of Algeciras. At 
the first meeting the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, was unanimously elected as the President 
of the Conference. It was agreed that the topics for dis­
cussion would be the restoration of order, the organization 
of the police force, the creation of revenue for public 
expenses and the improvement of Moroccan ports. The French 
delegate diplomatically proposed that all reform should 
be based on the triple principles of the sovereignty of the 
Sultan, the integrity of Morocco and the open door in foreign 
trade. This was a brilliant tactic of propaganda which caused 
some embarrassment to the German delegates.^ The Algeciras 
diplomats well understood that the most important fact at 
the conference was the existence of various European agree­
ments and alliances. The represented powers were grouped 
into three blocks: first, there was Germany and Austria-
Hungary ; second, there was Britain, France, Spain and Russia;
^Ibid.. p. 2 0.
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and third, the more or less neutral group including the 
United States, Italy and the six smaller nations. The 
Government of Morocco had almost no role in arriving at 
the final settlement at Algeciras,
From the beginning of the conference Henry White, as 
expected, kept in close contact with the French and British 
delegates. On January 23 he spoke to Revoil of "his good 
will and sympathy which the cause and attitude of France, 
in these circumstances, inspired in him," Revoil, realizing 
the potential influence of the United States, recorded in 
his journal* "I took care to greatly praise the President 
and to tell him how much we appreciated his attitude.
A few days later White said he was in complete agreement 
with the French position and that he hoped to see "an arrange­
ment in which France was not sacrificed,"3 The daily jour­
nal of Revoil reveals that throughout the conference the 
American and French delegates had a similar friendly conver­
sation almost every evening.
The most difficult issue at Algeciras was the organ­
ization and control of the police force at the Moroccan ports. 
The French position was that the police should be supervised 
by France with the aid of Spain, Roosevelt favored this kind 
of settlement because he was convinced that "the interests of
2paul Revoil, Journal tenu pendant la conference d'Alge­
ciras , DDF, 1X2, p, 8y2.
3%bid., January 28, 1906, p. 877*
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France and Spain in Morocco were greater than those of the 
other powers."^ As everyone expected Germany rejected this 
idea, and the Wilhelmstrasse announced that it was necessary 
for the police to be controlled either by an international 
body, by the Sultan of Morocco or by a small power such as 
Switzerland, In Washington Jusserand argued in favor of the 
French proposal in a conversation with Root, "With our know­
ledge of the Arabs and because of our experience with Moslem 
colonies," he said, "we are the only European power who can 
offer Morocco an arrangement perfectly efficient and yet 
independent," Root was in sympathy with the French plan, 
but he said that the American Government was not ready to 
completely reject all German suggestions. He said that the 
American delegate would be instructed to oppose the idea 
for supervision by an international body but to be open to 
the other two German proposals,5 At this stage of the nego­
tiations the Roosevelt Administration did not want to become 
deeply involved in the crisis, Roosevelt wrote to his friend 
Ambassador Meyer: "I do not know that I can do anything if
the circumstances become strained at Algeciras, and of course 
I want to keep out of it if I possibly can,
^Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, V, p, 242, 
Bishop, I, p, 489,
5jusserand to Rouvier, January 24, 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 41, p, 70, In this letter Jusserand, as so often, complains 
of his lack of knowledge of French instructions at Algeciras.
^Roosevelt to Meyer, February 1, 1906, Morison, V,
no, 3806, p, 145,
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Henry White was a more outspoken partisan of the French 
position than was either Roosevelt or Root. To the German 
delegate White argued that Germany should be willing to 
give in on the control of the police because the French had 
agreed to the principle of the open door.7 "I believe," he 
states, "that France can not go beyond that because public 
opinion makes further French compromise impossible." In 
reporting the conversation to Revoil, White concluded, "I 
do not think that I have served you so badly."& Jusserand 
reported to the Quai d'Orsay that Roosevelt and Root actually 
shared these views of White, but he cautioned: "In theory
they are quasi indifferent to the question and absolutely 
impartial, and we must not do anything to take away this 
appearance."9 Roosevelt assured Jusserand that if there 
was an opportunity he would communicate directly with the 
German Emperor, and he urged that it was esential that the 
Emperor not suspect that his actions were French i n s p i r e d . 10 
Likewise White cautioned the French delegate at Algeciras
^Radowitz to Bulow, GP, XXI^, February 5f 1906, no. 
6 9 8 4 ,  p .  141.
^Revoil to Rouvier, February 6, 1906, DDF, IX^, no. 
128, pp. 185-7. Also the Journal of Revoil, Ibid., February 
4, p. 887; February 7, P* 889.
^Jusserand to Rouvier, February 10, I9 0 6, DDF, IX%, 
no. 151, p. 211.
lOjussorand to Rouvier, February 11, I906, Ibid.. no.
162, p. 227.
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that it was in the interests of Prance to speak of the role
11of Roosevelt as little as possible.
The French Government recognized that Washington was 
suspicious of possible German ambitions for colonies in 
South America. Many diplomatists in the Quai d'Orsay be­
lieved that these suspicions could be used to the French 
advantage. Premier Rouvier therefore instructed Jusserand 
to warn Roosevelt that the Kaiser hoped to acquire special 
rights in the port of Mogador because he hoped to use the 
port as a coaling station which would make it possible to 
turn Brazil into a German c o l o n y . O n  several occasions 
Jusserand quietly passed on this information to Roosevelt 
and Root. Later in a conversation Secretary Root pointed to 
a world globe and expressed the observation that Mogador 
would be an excellent stepping stone between Germany and 
Brazil. Jusserand reported that Root had spoken as if this 
had been his own idea, and he boasted that it was actually 
the result of a skillful use of psychology.^3
Early in February the situation appeared more critical 
than at any time since before the conference had been agreed 
upon. The Berlin leaders were unwilling to compromise further.
^^Revoil to Rouvier, February 15» 1906, Ibid.. no. 196, 
p. 277.
l^Rouvier to Jusserand, March 2, 1906, DDF, IX^, no.
331, p. 447.
Jusserand to Bourgeois, April 2, I906, DDF, IX^, no.
598, pp. 780-1.
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The French public was almost unanimously in favor of a firm 
p o l i c y . I n  London the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward 
Grey, told the German Ambassador that "if France were to be 
attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out 
of the agreement which our predecessors had recently con­
cluded with the French Government, public opinion in England 
would be strongly moved in favor of F r a n c e . "15 Several in 
Algeciras, including Sir Nicolson, believed that the confer­
ence had become useless and should be adjourned. On February 
6 White notified Root that France would see the conference 
fail before she would yield any further,1^ A few days later 
he telegraphed: "satisfied conference is likely to fail
unless Germany can be got to accept French position in prin­
ciple."^?
Fearing that a deadlock might well lead to war, Roose­
velt decided to once again intervene in the crisis. He asked 
White to determine the greatest concessions which France 
would be willing to accept. After talking to Revoil and 
others. White outlined a plan which he believed France could 
be persuaded to accept.Secretary Root and Roosevelt made
l^Carroll, Public Opinion, p. 230.
^^Metternich to Bulow, February 8 , I906, GP, XXI^, p. 49.
^^White to Root, February 6 , I9 06, White Mms.
^?White to Root, February 11, I9 0 6, Ibid.
^®White to Root, February I6 , I906, White papers. White'
proposal did not include the open door as a definite point.
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some modifications, and then they communicated the proposal 
to William II. This American plan, as it was later called, 
envisioned five points. First, the Sultan was to have the 
"organization and maintenance" of the Moroccan police forces. 
Second, money for the police was to be obtained from an 
international bank which would have a "small preference" 
for French shares. Third, French and Spanish officers would 
have the duties of "instruction, discipline, pay and assis­
tance" for the police forces in the eight principle ports. 
Fourth, the Government of Italy would have the right of 
"inspection and verification" to assure that France and 
Spain did not abuse their mandate. Finally, there would 
be "full assurances" that there would be equality of trading 
rights for all of the powers. Root argued in a personal 
letter to the Kaiser that this plan had been "carefully 
framed" so as to make "concessions from the French position 
as easy as possible," The letter concluded with the admoni­
tion that Roosevelt "thinks it is fair, and earnestly hopes 
that it may receive the Emperor's approval,"19
The German Kaiser promptly rejected the idea of only 
French and Spanish officers. He wrote Root that "this would 
place the police forces entirely into their hands, and the 
police organization would be tantamount to a France-Spanish
19
Root to William, February 19, 1906, Bishop, I, 
pp, 489-91, Morison, V, p, 243, Root's letter actually 
combined points three and four.
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double mandate and mean a monopoly of these two countries."
He indicated that Germany would agree only to an arrangement 
which included officers selected from all the powers.20 
Roosevelt and Root were upset by this response. Root told 
Sternburg that if this "American proposition" was modified 
to comply with the Emperor's demands, it would have no 
possible chance of acceptance by Prance.21 In a private 
letter Roosevelt complained that William had promised earlier 
to follow his advice in such a situation, but added Roose­
velt: "I never expected the Kaiser to keep this one, and
he has not,"22
The French Government was also not in complete accord 
with the American plan. Still Rouvier early expressed the 
hope that Roosevelt's latest actions would have a positive 
resuit.23 The Quai d'Orsay at this time was primarily 
opposed to an Italian inspection of the settlement. Rouvier 
instructed Jusserand to express thanks to the President for 
his efforts without expressing approval for the American
Bulow to Sternburg, February 21, I9 0 6, GP, XXjl, 
no. 7020, p. 183. Sternburg to Roosevelt, February 22, I9 0 6, 
Bishop, I, pp. 491-3 , Morison, V, p. 244.
^^Sternburg to Bulow, GP, X X I M a r c h  2, I9 0 6, no.
7038, p. 213.
22Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, Morison, V, no. 
3837, p. 169.
^^Rouvier to Revoil, February 21, I906, DDF, IX^,
no. 247, p. 342.
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plan.24 Shortly thereafter the French Ambassador mentioned 
to Roosevelt that he had "serious doubts" that his govern­
ment would be willing to accept an Italian inspection. 
Roosevelt characteristically stated: "Don't tell me that
your government does not want the plan. I don't want to 
hear that." Jusserand, seeing that it was useless to insist, 
replied: "Since you ask. I'll be quiet."^5
Even without the agreement of France, Roosevelt decided 
to push the Kaiser to accept his proposal. "I cannot bring 
myself to feel," he wrote directly to William, "that I ought 
to ask France to make further concessions than the arrange­
ment suggested." Roosevelt argued that if Germany accepted 
the American plan the burden of proof would then be placed 
on France. The American plan was in conformity with the 
principle of equality of trade, the German reason for the 
conference in the first place. American opinion would be 
unfavorable to Germany "if the conference should fail because 
of Germany's insisting upon pressing France beyond the measure 
of concession described in this proposed arrangement." In 
addition to these arguments, Roosevelt made it a point to 
remind the Emperor that in June of the preceding year he had 
promised to follow the suggestions of the American President
^^Rouvier to Jusserand, February 26, 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 3 6 1, pp. 377-8.
Jusserand to Rouvier, March 5» 1906, DDF, IX^, no.
361, pp. 484-5.
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in the case of a d i f f i c u l t y . The tone of this message was 
much firmer than the earlier one sent by Root. Jusserand 
was satisfied and wrote to Paris that the note was "as strong 
as possible."27
While Roosevelt was making his appeal to William others 
in Algeciras were also searching for a workable compromise.
On March 8 Germany’s ally, Austria-Hungary, offered a plan 
which envisioned French officers in four ports, Spanish 
officers in three ports and one port with either Dutch or 
Swiss officers. As in the American plan the foreign officers 
were to be inspected by an Italian observation force. Several 
historians have exaggerated the difference between the 
American and the Austrian plan, and it should be noted that 
the only differences were one port and a separation rather 
than a combination type of organization. The heated contro­
versy concerning these minor matters brings to mind Bertrand 
Russell's characterization of the Moroccan dispute as a 
"childish absurdity,"28 but it seems that Germany supported 
the Austrian plan with the belief that a separation of the 
ports would make it more difficult for France to dominate the
2^Roosevelt to William, March 7, 1906, Bishop, I, 
pp. ^93“5f Morison, V, pp. 245-6.
^7Jusserand to Rouvier, March 9, 1906, DDF, 1x2, 
404, p. 536.
2®Bertrand Russell, Atlantic Monthly. March. 1917. 
p. 371.
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weaker power of Spain, Germany's support for the Austrian 
plan meant that the Wilhelmstrasse had ceased to hope for 
a sphere of influence in Morocco, There is the slight 
possibility, but without any evidence, that Roosevelt’s 
appeal of March 7 might have influenced the appearance of 
the Austrian plan.
The Kaiser's alleged promise to Roosevelt caused some 
embarrassment within the German Government, Bulow violently 
criticized Sternburg for making the promise much more defin­
ite than it had been meant to be, but it was nevertheless 
recognized that a promise, even if a mistake, had been 
delivered to the President,^9 In an effort to smooth over 
the difficulty William politely wrote to Roosevelt: "I can
only assure you, Mr, President that I am gladly willing to 
take your advice as a basis of an understanding," He then 
argued that the basic principles were the same in the plans 
of Austria and the United States, "I have therefore caused 
my representatives at Algeciras to be instructed to consent 
in principle to the proposition of Austria-Hungary,"30 
Roosevelt, however, was not impressed. To Sternburg he 
denounced the Austrian plan as "absurd because it favors
Z^Bulow to Sternburg, March 12, I9 0 6, quoted in Beale, 
Roosevelt, p, 326,
^^Bulow to Sternburg, March 12, I9 0 6, GP, XXI^, no, 
7093, pp. 276-8, William to Roosevelt, March 13, Bishop,
I, pp. 493-7 , Morison, V, pp, 246-7,
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the very idea the conference has been trying to eliminate, 
namely partition into spheres of i n f l u e n c e , B o t h  
Roosevelt and Root expressed a similar point of view to 
J u s s e r a n d , 3 2  it is important to note that the opposition 
to spheres of influence was entirely an American idea. The 
French opposed the Austrian plan because of the limitations 
on French control but not because of opposition to a divi­
sion of Moroccan ports.
Because of Roosevelt's complete frankness to Jusserand, 
the French Foreign Service was kept informed concerning 
confidential matters of American diplomacy. On occasion this 
created embarrassment. In March it was learned that at 
Algeciras there had been some leakage of the Kaiser's alleged 
promise to Roosevelt, Both Roosevelt and Jusserand feared 
that if this news reached the ears of William II it would 
"wound his pride" and thus retard the negotiations,33 As 
it turned out this was a false alarm, Revoil had been 
informed of the promise by the Quai d'Orsay, and he reported 
that with the exception of the British delegate he had kept 
the information strictly secret,34 %% appeared impossible
^^Sternburg to Bulow, March 14, 1906, GP, XXI^, no, 
7102, pp. 285-7.
32Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 15, DDF, IX^, no. 433»
p. 567.
33jusserand to Rouvier, March 9» 1906, Ibid., no. 403, 
p. 535.
^^Revoil to Rouvier, March 10, I906, DDF, IX^, note 2,
p. 535.
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for the German delegates to learn of Roosevelt's close 
connections with France, This incident gave Jusserand the 
opportunity to lecture Rouvier to he more,careful with con­
fidential information,35
At the high point of the crisis the Rouvier Government 
was challenged in the Chamber of Deputies and received a 
vote of non-confidence. The point at issue was Rouvier*s 
application of the act of 1905 which separated Church and 
State, After resigning, Rouvier said that he did not regret 
leaving the Premiership for ‘it relieved him of a burden 
which had begun to weigh heavily," He expressed the hope 
that his successor would be able to find a solution to the 
Moroccan question.3^ On March 13 a new ministry was formed 
under Mr, Jean Sarrien with the philosopher Leon Bourgeois 
as Foreign Secretary, Roosevelt asked Jusserand if the fall 
of the Rouvier Government would have any impact on French 
policy at the Algeciras Conference, Jusserand replied that 
"it would not make the least modification" because Rouvier's 
Moroccan policy was approved by all France,37
Jusserand to Rouvier, March 12, Ibid,, no, 433,
p. 567,
^^London Times, March 8, I90 6,
37Jusserand to Rouvier, March 9, 1906, DDF, IX^, no, 
404, p, 536, Rouvier notified the foreign service that the 
Government's fall had nothing to do with foreign affairs, 
and French foreign policy would remain unchanged. Circular 
Memorandum of Rouvier, March 8 , I9 0 6, DDF, IX~, no, 388,
p. 519.
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Shortly after the change in the French Government, the 
United States increased its efforts to get Germany to give 
up support for the Austrian plan. In a second personal 
letter to the German Emperor Root argued that the division ■ 
of ports implied a creation of spheres of influences which 
presented the opportunity of "a potential partition" of 
Morocco. The Austrian plan was therefore wrong in princi­
ple and destructive of the declared purpose of both Germany 
and the United States." The American Government would be 
willing to agree to any solution acceptable to the majority, 
but added Root: "If we had sufficient interest in Morocco 
to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on 
our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement."3^ 
Root's message seemed to have the desired effect, and two 
days later Bulow notified Washington that Germany would be 
willing to accept any proposal which "would contain this 
mixed system and an inspector general." Bulow concluded 
that "the immediate removal of misunderstanding is far more 
important to Germany than the whole Morocco affair."39
It is not clear whether Germany ceased to oppose the
 ^Root to William, March 17, I9 0 6, Morison, V, pp.
447-8 ; Bishop. I, pp. 497-9 * Sternburg to Bulow, March 18, 
19 0 6, GP, XXll, ppe 300-4, no, 7112-3. Jusserand wrote that 
this was an "admirable" message, "firm and favorable to French 
interests." Jusserand to Bulow, March 19, DDF, 1X2, pp, 637-8.
^^Sternburg to Roosevelt, March I9 , 1906, Bishop, I, 
pp. 499-5 0 0. Morison, V, p. 248, Bulow to Radowitz, March 17, 
GP, XXll, no. 7110, pp. 298-9 .
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American plan because of Root's arguments or because of the 
desire for closer relations with the United States, Roose­
velt gave his own explanation: "I had previously informed
Speck, in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persisted 
in rejecting our proposals and a break up ensued, I should 
feel obliged to publish the entire o o r r e s p o n d e n c e . " 4 0  There 
is in fact no evidence that this threat was delivered, and 
the most likely explanation is that it is one of several 
exaggerations of Roosevelt in later telling of his actions. 
Sternburg did not report such a threat, but he did complain 
that "the French Ambassador has a strong hold on the Presi­
dent and influential leaders." Also he reported to the 
Wilhelmstrasse that American opinion was generally opposed 
to the German position at Algeciras.^2 More significant than 
this, however, is the fact that Germany did not make a great 
concession when she agreed to cease her opposition to the 
American plan. The more significant German concession was 
the acceptance of the Austrian plan, and this change took 
place well before the alleged threat of Roosevelt,
^^Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I9 0 6, Bishop, I, p. 50O» 
Morison, V, p. 249.
41Roosevelt's admirers such as Thayer, Beale and Ein­
stein accept the story at face value. Of, Beale, Roosevelt, 
pp. 229-3 0» Einstein, Diplomat. p. 22, Thayer also recorded 
that Roosevelt told Germany that to declare war against France 
would be a "crime against humanity." Dennis could find no 
evidence that this statement had been made, Dennis. Adven­
tures, p. 495»
hp
Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, pp. 328-9.
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Most American diplomats, including Henry White, believed 
that Germany's acceptance of the American plan meant that the 
Moroccan dispute had ended, Sternburg found the President in 
"very high spirits." Roosevelt said: "Inform his Majesty
the Emperor of my heartiest congratulations on this epoch- 
making success at Algeciras.Likewise to Jusserand Roose­
velt cautioned that France must "abstain from a noisy cele­
bration of v i ct o r y . J u s s e r a n d  was satisfied with the 
American plan, and it seems that he had given Roosevelt the 
impression that the French Government would go along with 
it.^^ The truth, however, was that Jusserand was the only 
important French diplomatist to favor the proposal.^6 The 
Quai d’Orsay was opposed to the American idea of combined 
Franco-Spanish officers in all of the ports. Secretary 
Bourgeois believed that this arrangement would create future 
difficulties between France and Spain, and he, for obvious 
reasons, had no sympathy with the American opposition to 
spheres of influence. Bourgeois therefore instructed Jusse­
rand to attempt to get Roosevelt to stop his support for the
^^Sternburg to the Foreign Office, March 21, 1906, 
Dugsdale, III, p. 248.
^^Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 21, 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 5 12, p. 670.
Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 12, I9 06, Ibid.. no.
5 1 3, p. 611.
^^Revoil made a strong attack against the American 
plan. Revoil to Bourgeois, March 21, I9 0 6, DDF, IX^, no.
5 0 2, pp. 659-6 0.
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American plan. He claimed that at the exact time that 
Roosevelt had made his latest appeal to the Kaiser the 
governments of France and Germany had almost decided on 
a compromise which both could accept. The latest move of 
Roosevelt had therefore "thrown complications into the 
negotiations,"4?
France's problem was to reject the American position 
without wounding the pride of Roosevelt. Jusserand did not 
look forward to telling the President of the position of his 
government. On March 23 Jusserand and Roosevelt met acciden­
tally while both men were taking morning walks. The first 
words of Roosevelt were: "Well, is there any news about
Algeciras?" Jusserand answered that the Quai d'Orsay had 
found it impossible to accept the system of mixed police 
officers in all of the ports. Roosevelt was visibly unhappy, 
and he complained that France should have earlier notified 
him of this objection.^® Later that day Jusserand met with 
Roosevelt and Root in the White House to discuss the mis­
understanding. Jusserand, as instructed by Secretary Bourgeois, 
emphasized that the French Government was grateful to Roosevelt
Bourgeois to Jusserand, March 22, 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 5 1 6, pp. 675"6. Bourgeois repeated his story that France 
and Germany were ready to come to terms just when Roosevelt 
intervened. Bourgeois to Jusserand, March 24, I906, DDF,
IXf, no. 5 3 8, pp. 701-2 .
Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23, 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 2 5 7» p« 689. A member of the Foreign Office added an 
annotation to the side of Roosevelt's complaint: "How could
we, if we did not know the proposition in advance." p. 683, 
note 3.
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for his attempts to find a peaceful settlement. "Expressions 
of gratitude are always a pleasure," responded Roosevelt,
"but I would have been more pleased if I had succeeded."
Root said that the principle point of the American policy 
was that the police should be controlled by France and 
Spain; the details of this principle were not important. 
Roosevelt agreed but added that it would be impossible for 
him to ask Germany to make further concessions.^9 After 
this conversation the United States did not again intervene 
in the Moroccan dispute.
The Pranco-American misunderstanding created a certain 
amount of irritation between Jusserand and Bourgeois. 
Jusserand was angry that he had not been notified in advance 
with the details of the French Moroccan policy. In a lengthy 
despatch to Bourgeois he quoted Roosevelt as having stated 
with some bitterness: "Your people have been less frank
with me than I have been with you."^® Jusserand complained: 
"I go and try to erase the memory, but unfortunately the 
President has a good memory." He argued that the Foreign 
Office should have kept him better informed of French policy 
because with Roosevelt "one can never anticipate the hour
^9Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23* Ibid., no. 529» p. 69I,
^®A member of the French diplomatic service added the 
annotation: "But no, the President had left us ignorant of
the fact that he planned to make a proposition on the ques­
tion of partition." DDF, 1X2, note 3» P» 700. Jusserand 
quoted this statement of Roosevelt in several reports, and 
he agreed with the criticism.
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when he can be useful." When Roosevelt sees an opportunity 
"he does not waste time with preliminaries, but he acts as 
best he can according to whatever information he happens to 
possess." Jusserand concluded his rebuke by emphasizing 
that Roosevelt had shown his good will to Prance in spite 
of the large German vote in the United S t a t e s . I n  reply 
to this message Bourgeois cabled: "If the President insists
on the point you can remind him that he did not depend on 
us in producing the misunderstanding." Still he was in 
complete agreement with Jusserand that "it is necessary that 
Mr. Roosevelt should have the impression that we have complete 
confidence in his intentions as well as in his ability."5% 
Several circumstances were responsible for the mis­
understanding concerning the separation of Moroccan ports.
At first the point had not come up because the American plan 
did not specify the details of the organization of the French 
and Spanish police officers. The Rouvier Government had 
objected to the American proposal only because of the policy 
of the Italian inspector, and Roosevelt was quick to agree 
to support a program with an inspector from another country.
He said that he had chosen Italy only because of its location
Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 25» 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 553, pp. 723-5.
^^Bourgeois to Jusserand, March 24, Ibid., no. 538,
pp. 701-2 .
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in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n .53 When Germany announced its support 
for the Austrian proposal, the United States immediately 
attacked the plan on the basis of the idea that the princi­
ple of the open door was not compatible with spheres of 
influence. Encouraged by the French Ambassador, Roosevelt 
did not believe that he was acting contrary to French 
interests, even though he well knew that France was not 
against French spheres of influence. Roosevelt did not have 
any way of knowing that at the very time of his diplomatic 
efforts the governments of France and Germany were on the 
verge of a settlement. In addition. Bourgeois, despite his 
later Nobel Peace Prize, was a firmer advocate of French 
imperialism than had been Rouvier, and this leadership 
change in the Quai d'Orsay took place at the most crucial 
point in Roosevelt's efforts.
At Algeciras the French Government began to advocate 
a modified form of the Austrian plan. Bourgeois suggested 
as "a last concession” that there be French police officers 
at Rabat, Mazagan, Safi and Mogador, Spanish officers at 
Tetuan and Larache, and a combination of Franco-Spanish 
officers at Tangier and Casablanca.5^ Henry White supported
^^Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 18, I9 0 6, DDF, IX^, 
no. 471, p. 621.
^^Bourgeois to Revoil, March 21, I9 0 6, DDF, IX^, no. 
5 0 7. pp. 66^-5 . Bourgeois to Gambon, March 22, I9 0 6, Ibid.. 
no. 51 »^ pp. 672-3 . Paul Gambon had earlier advised this 
plan. Gambon to Bourgeois, March 15. 1906, Ibid.. no. 449, 
pp. 585-6 .
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the French in this proposal. He complained to Revoil that his 
government had asked him to support the American plan, and 
he expressed the hope that the Roosevelt Administration 
would drop the project,55 On March 23 Tardieu published 
an article in le Temps which indicated that Roosevelt had 
proposed a combination of French and Spanish police officers 
in all of the Moroccan ports, Jusserand was angry that this 
information had become public because Roosevelt had asked 
that his diplomatic activities remain secret from the Amer­
ican public, "This indiscretion," complained Jusserand to 
Bourgeois, "will make it more difficult to obtain the future 
co-operation of Roosevelt,"5&
After the United States ceased to oppose the creation 
of spheres of influence the powers were able to come to an 
agreement. The final Algeciras treaty was based on a division 
of ports along the lines of the French plan— French officers 
in four ports, Spanish officers in two ports and a Franco- 
Spanish combination of officers in two ports. There was to 
be a Swiss inspector general to see that the agreement was 
r e s p e c t e d , 57 i n  a final vote only Germany, Austria-Hungary 
and Morocco voted against the arrangement. The United States,
^^Revoil's Journal, March 22, 1906, DDF, IX^, p, 951, 
^^Jussi
528, p ,  690,
erand to Bourgeois, March 23, I906, Ibid,. no.
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despite her earlier opposition to the separation of ports, 
voted with the majority. The treaty recognized that France 
and Spain had special rights in Morocco, and for this reason 
it is generally interpreted as a French victory. Germany, 
however, had obtained a guarantee for the continuation of 
the open door and Moroccan independence, the stated reasons 
for the calling of the conference. Also the fact that there 
had been a conference at all was a type of diplomatic triumph 
for Germany.
After the conference everyone politely complimented 
Roosevelt for his part in the arrival of a peaceful solution. 
Bourgeois said that the French Government recognized "the 
signal aid rendered by the President in arriving at a just 
solution of the differences between France and Germany with 
reference to Morocco— ni vainquer ni v a i n c u . In a long 
letter White wrote to Roosevelt that the treaty "with the 
exception of a Swiss instead of an Italian inspector, was 
exactly the proposal you made." White further claimed that 
America's influence had helped France resist the Austrian 
plan and that "the French owe the whole eight ports on which 
they have laid such particular stress to your good offices."59
57por the treaty see "General Act of the Algeciras 
International Conference," Ibid.. no. 63I, pp. 823-53*
5%cCormick to Root, April 6 , I9 0 6, Despatches, Vol. 125*
^^Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 332. Beale uncriti­
cally accepts this letter as a valid interpretation of Roose­
velt's role at Algeciras.
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White's analysis, however, is lacking in several areas. The 
Algeciras treaty had more in common with the Austrian plan 
than with the American plan. From France’s point of view 
the difference between the final arrangement and the Austrian 
plan was that France was given the joint supervision of the 
police of two more ports than in the formula of Austria, 
and White's statement that France owed eight ports to Roose­
velt is simply not true.
The ratification of the Algeciras treaty brought Amer­
ican isolationism to the surface. There was enough opposition 
in the Senate to make it doubtful that the treaty would go 
into effect. President Roosevelt supported the agreement 
in the name of American trade. In his sixth annual message 
he declared that it "confers upon us equal commercial rights 
with all European countries and does not entail upon us a 
single obligation of any kind, and I earnestly hope it will 
be speedily ratified," A failure at ratification would mean 
that the United States would lose her commercial position in 
Morocco "at a time when we are everywhere seeking new markets 
and outlets for t r a d e , R o o s e v e l t  wrote one isolationist 
Senator a personal letter explaining that the treaty "gives 
us the open door, and we explicitly disdain in the treaty 
any responsibility for interferring in any shape or way to 
keep order; that is the treaty simply gives us the open door
^^Messages and Papers, Vol, XV, p, 7063,
306
and does not impose any obligations whatever upon us."^l 
Likewise Secretary Root wrote the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that the Algeciras convention 
"merely modifies and extends the provisions of the treaty 
of 1880 in accordance with the requirements of the present 
day," Root claimed that "we have carefully avoided any 
entanglement in European a f f a i r s . "&2 The New York Times 
and Senator Lodge were also influential supporters of the 
Algeciras treaty. The Senate, after much debate, gave its 
approval to the arrangement on December 3, 1906,
There are a number of interpretative questions inherent 
in a study of American-French diplomacy during the Moroccan 
crisis. Was America's role in the matter significant? To 
what extent did the Roosevelt Administration support the 
French position in the dispute? Was Roosevelt's policy 
motivated by a concern for France or by a determination to 
support a certain concept of the national interest of the 
United States? Was the French government skillful in its 
diplomacy with America? Finally, and especially important 
for this study, did the Moroccan crisis have a permanent 
effect on Franco-American relations? These questions, of 
course, are difficult, interrelated and complex.
^^Roosevelt to Senator Eugene Hale, June 27, 1906, 
Morison, V, no, 3960, p, 318,
Root to Senator Cullom, June 25• 1906, quoted in 
Jussup. Root, Vol, II, pp, 59-60,
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Theodore Roosevelt was not a man to underestimate his 
own significance. He seemed to have no doubt but that his 
diplomatic efforts were a deciding factor throughout the 
Moroccan crisis. Roosevelt did not want future generations 
to be ignorant of his part in the controversy. For this 
reason he sent his friend Whitelaw Reid a famous "confiden­
tial letter, which included his more important correspondence 
relating to the Moroccan crisis. In this letter, which is 
a major primary source, he explained how he influenced Prance 
and Germany to agree to a peaceful c o m p r o m i s e . " I n  this 
Algeciras matter," he wrote in another letter to Reid, "You 
will notice that while I was suave and pleasant with the 
Emperor, yet when it was necessary at the end I stood him 
on his head with great d e c i s i o n .A c co r di n g to Roosevelt's 
own interpretation he persuaded both France and Germany to 
accept a conference and was largely responsible for the final 
terms of the agreement.
The fact that Roosevelt was often "adolescent" should 
not be allowed to obscure the fact that he was the legitimate
^^Roosevelt to Reid, April 28,1906, Morison, V, pp. 
23O-5I; Bishop, I, pp. 469-505» All secondary works heavily 
rely on this important document. It is important to note 
that although the interpretations of Roosevelt are to be 
taken with caution, there is no evidence that Roosevelt 
tampered with the correspondence.
^^Roosevelt to Reid, June 27, 1906, Morison, V, no.
3961, p. 319.
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leader of one of the major world powers in his d a y , ^5 The 
diplomatic correspondence of Prance, Germany and Britain 
reveals that Roosevelt was taken seriously by the European 
powers. The powers recognized the economic and military 
strength of the United States, and for this reason they 
were anxious to improve their relations with Roosevelt,
Each of the powers believed that Roosevelt could have an 
influence on the diplomacy of the other powers. As it 
turned out Holstein and Bulow overestimated Roosevelt's 
ability to influence British policy,&& Likewise France at 
times was disappointed to find that Roosevelt was limited 
in his ability to persuade the Kaiser to c o m p r o m i s e , ^7 
During the conference Henry White noted that "any opinion 
we expressed (which I did privately very often) was listened 
to with serious attention and often a d o p t e d , S i r  Edward 
Grey, who was not an admirer of Roosevelt, later wrote in 
his autobiography I "Roosevelt believed, and from what he 
told me had reason to believe, that the part he took
^^The adolescent character of Roosevelt is emphasized 
in Pringle, Roosevelt, p, 273.
Bulow to the Kaiser, April 4, I9 0 5» Bulow*s Letters, 
pp, 12I-3, Holstein to Bulow, January, I9 0 6, Holstein Papers, 
IV, no, 9 1 9. p. 379.
^^France relied more on Roosevelt than on Nicolas II 
in the attempt to influence the Kaiser. The French Ambassador
in St, Petersburg once tried to enlist the aid of Nicolas and
minimized Roosevelt's importance, Bompard to Rouvier, February, 
12, 1906, DDF, ixl, no, 292, p, 403.
^^Twenty-Five Years. Vol, I, pp. 121-2,
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influenced a peaceful solution. This is of interest and 
should be recognized,
In evaluating the significance of the United States 
in the crisis it is necessary to make a clear distinction 
between several events. There seems to be little doubt but 
that Roosevelt had an important influence on the decision 
of the French Government to accept a conference.Still 
it must be recognized that Rouvier from the beginning was 
more conciliatory than had been Delcasse^ Roosevelt's 
compromise concerning the program of the conference was 
also significant. During the time of the conference, however, 
the role of the United States appeals to be less significant 
than during the year of I905, Roosevelt did manage to embarrass 
the Kaiser because of the alleged promise, but it appears 
equally clear that William did not suddenly become concilia­
tory because of a threat by Roosevelt, The American opposi­
tion to spheres of influence did not impress the powers, and 
spheres of influence were clearly a part of the final treaty.
It is significant that neither Roosevelt nor his admirers 
say anything about French opposition to the American plan
^^White to Roosevelt, quoted in Nevins, White, p. 281.
/ Andre Tardieu, La conference d'Alsesiras, (Paris:
Felix Alcan, 1908), p. 5, note 2.
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after it was agreed to by G e r m a n y ,71 They imply that the 
American proposal was incorporated into the final treaty, 
and it has been demonstrated earlier in this study that the 
Algeciras agreement had little in common with the American 
plan. When the entire Algeciras conference is considered, 
it seems clear that Einstein overstates the matter in writings 
"Much of the merit of saving Europe from vast disaster was 
due to the diplomacy of Theodore R o o s e v e l t , "72
Almost all historians have recognized that the pre­
ponderance of American support was on the side of Prance,73 
There is no doubt but that the American press of I905 and 
1906 was pre-French and anti-German,7^ The Nation, for 
example, described the policy of Rouvier as "an admirable 
example of straight-forward, considerate, and enlightened 
diplomacy."73 The governments of Britain and France well
7 In Roosevelt's account the controversy is over when 
Roosevelt receives Germany's agreement to the American plan 
on March 19, Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, 
pp. 499-5 0 1, Morison, V, pp. 248-250, Howard K, Beale follows 
this interpretation and says not a word of French opposition 
to the American plan even though he used the Diplomatiques 
Français. Beale, Roosevelt, pp, 327-32,
7^Einstein, Diplomat, p, 8,
73The historian Harbaugh interprets this as a result 
of pro-British sentiment, William Harbaugh, The Life and Times 
of Theodore Roosevelt. (New York: Collier Books, I96I), p, 276,
7^White, Opinion, pp, 261-2, Schieber, Sentiment, 
pp, 198-2 03. Jusserand to Rouvier, June 28, I9 05, DDF, VII^, 
no, 1 55, p, 180,
73The Nation. I906,
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recognized that the United States was not entirely neutral 
during the Moroccan dispute, "It was felt all through the 
Algeciras Conference," wrote Sir Grey, "that American influ­
ence was not being used against France and us."7^ It is 
possible, however, to overemphasize the extent to which the 
Roosevelt Administration supported France, The support was 
never unlimited or unconditional, and it was always stronger 
in rhetoric than in actual diplomatic action.
When there is an examination of the men in power in 
the United States, it is interesting to note the great 
sympathy in behalf of Prance as opposed to Germany, Secre­
tary of State Hay was violently anti-German, and he did not 
try to hide the fact that he hoped for a strengthened Anglo- 
French entente.77 Ambassador Sternburg reported to his 
government that he hoped that sickness "may induce Mr, Hay 
to think about retiring,"78 Secretary Root was less emotion­
ally committed than Hay, but his prejudices were also on the 
side of France, Root believed that France had legitimate 
interests in Morocco "which ought to be specially safe­
guarded," although he did not want the United States "to
7^Grey to Roosevelt, December 2, 1906, quoted in George 
Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin co,,
1937), p.
77Nevins, White, pp, 267-8, Gelber, Friendship, p,
255» Jusserand to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, DDF, VII^, no. 124, 
pp. 134-5,
7^Sternburg to Bulow, June 17, 1905, Dugsdale, Documents. 
Ill, p. 232,
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become the advocate of these special claims."79 At the 
conference itself Henry White was a supporter of the French 
view.80 His assistant Lewis Einstein was also very critical 
of the Wilhelmstrasse.81 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, although 
at times hostile to France, was a partisan of the French 
cause at Algeciras. "I am very anxious that we should do 
all we can to draw France toward us," Lodge wrote during 
the crisis, "for France ought to be with us and England—  
in our zone and our combination. It is the sound arrangement 
economically and politically. It would be an evil day for 
us if Germany were to crush F r a n c e .
In American politics, of course, final authority to 
define foreign policy is in the hands of the President.
It is clear that on the whole Roosevelt's sympathies were 
pro-French. In his letter to Reid he wrotej "With Speck 
I was on close terms; with Jusserand, who is one of the best 
men I have ever met, and whose country was in the right on 
this issue, I was on even closer terras,"83 Ambassador 
Jusserand never doubted but that Roosevelt wished to support
7^Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 320.
80
Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, BD, III, no. 251,
pp. 231-2 .
^Einstein, Diplomat, pp. 17-18.
82
p. 1 6 2.
®^Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I906, Bishop, I, p. 4?8,
Morison, V, p. 236.
8I1
Lodge to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905» Lodge, Letters. II,
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the French position, and the evidence indicates that Roose­
velt was, as he always said, frank when he spoke to the 
French Ambassador. "The President," reported Jusserand,
"has refused all the advances of William to do or say any­
thing that would put him on the side of Germany in the 
Moroccan question, but, on the contrary, it is our case 
that he wants to d e f e n d . "84 Roosevelt was always distrustful 
of the German Emperor. This was largely because of Roosevelt's 
memories of Germany's actions in the Spanish-American War 
and the Venezuelan dispute. But also this was increased 
because of the Kaiser's personality and nonpredictable 
actions. "Nothing could persuade me," wrote Roosevelt,
"to follow the lead of or enter into close alliance with a 
man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of 
action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to 
his friends or steadfastly hostile to an e n e m y . "83
In the particular of the opposition to the creation 
of spheres of influence in Morocco the American government 
did not support the French position. This American move 
toward the end of the conference was resented by both French 
and British diplomatists. Sir Edward Grey described the
Qjt
Jusserand to Rouvier, June 28, 1905» DDF, VII, no. 
155» P» 180. The Roosevelt collection contains copies of 
this and several other of Jusserand's letters to the French 
foreign office.
®^Roosevelt to Lodge, Dfey 15, I905, Lodge, Letters.
Vol. II, p. 123.
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American plan as "an unworkable proposal which introduces an 
unfortunate complication," and he expressed the hope that 
Roosevelt would stop his intervention because "there were 
already too many peacemakers at work,"®^ Roosevelt opposed 
spheres of influence because he believed that this policy was 
in the interest of American commerce, but when he learned 
that his action was contrary to French policy, he swiftly 
ceased to push the matter. Jusserand believed that if Roose­
velt had known the French policy he would have acted in 
conformity with that policy.Roosevelt had no great fears 
of French colonialism, and he was not against Morocco becoming 
a protectorate of France, Several writers have suggested 
that Roosevelt was ignorant of French goals in North Africa, 
but there is no reason to think that Roosevelt did not under­
stand the broad outlines of French imperialism,®® These 
broad outlines were obvious from a general observation of 
French expansion. In a later analysis Roosevelt explained 
that Germany "was supporting the Sultan of Morocco in his
Grey to Sir E. Goschen, March 21, I9 0 6, BD, III, 
no. 371» p. 315» Grey to Sir de Bunsen, March 21, I9 0 6,
Ibid., no, 372, p. 316,
Jusserand to Bourgeois, April 4, I9 0 6, DDF, IX^, 
no. 6 0 9, pp. 794-5.
00
Of course Roosevelt did not know of the secret aspects 
of the Entente Cordiale, but I do not agree with Tansill that 
he would have changed his policy if he had obtained this in­
formation. Tansill, p. 12. Nevins, White, p. 278.
Einstein did remark that White was "very much in the dark" 
concerning the secret negotiations. Einstein, Diplomat, p. 9 .
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resistance to French aggression." The conference "was 
faced with the delicate task of reconciling French claims 
to paramountcy with the German demand for the open door."®^
The major goal of Roosevelt was to prevent a war which 
would upset the balance of power in the Far East and perhaps 
involve the United States.9^ The fact that there was such 
a war just eight years later seems to suggest that war was 
in the realm of the possible. Those who criticize the inter­
vention of Roosevelt do so on the basis that his intervention 
was not in the national interest. According to the historian 
Samuel Flagg Bemis: "It was risky business, and the United
States had nothing to gain from it. That Roosevelt prevented 
a European war is to be doubted; the crisis had passed when 
Delcasse resigned in June, 1905.*'^  ^ Bemis' analysis is 
faulty in two major areas. First, if war was possible,
America had much to gain from the encouragement of a peace­
ful settlement. Secondly, the crisis continued after Delcasse*s 
fall, and in early I906 the situation was almost as serious 
as it had been before the calling of a conference. John Blum 
is undoubtedly correct when he writes that Roosevelt wanted
Oq
E. Alexander Powell, Yonder Lies Adventure. (New York: 
the Macmillan Co.), pp. 315-6.
9®This is well recognized. CF. Osgood, Interest, p. 6 9, 
Gelber, Friendship, p. I9 6,
^^Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United 
States, (New York: Host, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965),
p. 585.
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a peaceful settlement of the Moroccan problem because "in 
the peaceful settlement of the status quo of Europe, he 
realized, the United States had a large c o n c e r n . "92
Roosevelt always believed that war was entirely possi­
ble in 1905 and I906, During the crisis he wrote: "The
trouble is that with Russia out of the way as she now is, 
Germany firmly believes that she can whip both Prance and 
England."93 After the conference Roosevelt wrote: "It
really did look like there might be a war and I felt honor 
bound to prevent war if I could."9^ Henry White and most 
of Roosevelt's advisers also believed that there was a true 
possibility for war.95 Today most historians in hindsight 
minimize the likelihood of a war as a result of the Moroccan 
dispute, 96 Yet this dispute was the first real hint of a
^ Blum, Conservative. p. 133» Also see Pringle, Roose­
velt. pp. 266-7 s Lawrence E. Gelfand in his preface to 
Einatein, Diplomat, p. XVII.
^^Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, I9 0 6, Royal Cortissoz,
The Life of Whitelaw Reid, (New York: Charles Schribner's
Sons, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 329-30.
gif ,
Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 4?7, 
Morison, V, p. 2 3 5.
95cf. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 307, Einstein, Diplomat, 
p. 20. From Paris McCormick reported that Rouvier would "act 
with the caution of a financier, while making no political 
sacrifices of a humiliating character to France." McCormick 
to Root, October 5, 1905, Despatches. Vol. 125, no. 49.
9^Taylor, Struggle. p. 441. Norman Rich writes: "At
no stage of the Moroccan affair was a military solution ever 
advocated or seriously contemplated by the German leaders 
primarily responsible for Germany's Moroccan policy," Rich, 
Holstein, p. 745.
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European war since I871, and wars have been known to begin 
even when the possibilities were remote. Moreover, several 
influential Germans, including Holstein and Schlieffen, were 
in favor of a preventive war against Prance,9? If the Emperor 
did not want war, neither was he willing for Germany to suffer 
humiliation, 98 German policy during this period was erratic 
and lacked "the unity and purpose of the Bismark system,"99 
and the greatest threat to European peace was Germany's
almost paranoiac fear of e n c i r c l e m e n t , ^^0 short, it
seems that the situation was sufficiently dangerous to justi­
fy a limited intervention on the part of the American Govern­
ment,
The French Secretary at Algeciras, Robert de Billy, 
presented an interesting economic interpretation of American 
participation in the crisis, "The Algeciras Conference," 
according to de Billy, "has given the United States the 
occasion to show once again her care to support European 
peace," The policy of Roosevelt had been "to maintain
97craig, Politics, pp, 257» 283-5, Holstein was 
forced to resign on April 4, I906, as a result of his 
extreme Moroccan policy,
98b u1o w , Memoirs. Vol, II, p, 211,
99Ramond Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904-6," 
American Historical Review. (XXXIII, January, 1928), pp, 
278-9 » Rich, Holstein, p, 744,
^^^wiiiiam later said* "The encirclement continues 
quietly its unalterable progress," Miquel to Bulow, October 
9 , 1907, GP, XXV, pp. 47-8 ,
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American neutrality, but at the same time to let it be known 
that a rupture in the European status quo would be profoundly 
regretted by the American people." De Billy believed that 
German economic power was a rival to the United States, while 
"France does not present a threat to any of American inter­
ests." It was for this reason that Roosevelt and White had 
"searched to find ways to harmonize the special interests 
of Prance with the general interests of the other powers." 
According to de Billy's interpretation, the United States 
wanted peace and stability in the international order be­
cause this would encourage foreign trade and enhance American 
wealth.101 Likewise André Tardieu was convinced that Roose­
velt had attempted "to maintain the European balance of 
power, while opposing any attempt at one-sided domination."102 
Roosevelt was pro-French in the dispute "because he thought 
that the balance of power, which was necessary for world 
peace, was not menaced by France but rather by Germany."103 
In placing the weight of American support on the side 
of France the Roosevelt Administration was careful not to 
antagonize Germany, This caution was the principle reason
^°^Report of Robert de Billy, May 1, I906, DDF, IX%,
pp. 988-900.
102rpardieu, Alliances, p. 293* It should be noted that 
Tardieu himself feared that Germany threatened to upset the 
balance of power, and he assumed that Roosevelt shared his 
fear.
^^^Tardieu, Algesiras. pp. 461-2.
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that Roosevelt waited so long before deciding to intervene 
in the dispute. Roosevelt always tried to say the proper 
thing about Germany in his public statements and in his 
German correspondence. earnest wish," he wrote to
Sternburg, "is that we use as much as possible the four 
years which stand before me in office to improve the relations 
between our countries. I believe in the German people."1®^
The German Government realized that the United States gen­
erally supported the French position in the controversy, and 
at times German leaders were irritated by this fact. Holstein 
once wrote Bulow that Germany should cease to communicate 
with Washington because "a thorough understanding of the 
problem is lacking there."195 Bulow answered: "You are
right about Washington. Only I don't want to disturb our 
relations there."1®^ Despite this, after the conference 
was over the American Government had largely succeeded in 
its attempt not to worsen German-American relations. In 
the Reichstag Bulow declared: "We have reason to be grate­
ful to America for its attitude at the Conference of Alge- 
ciras. America took, by reason of its less important
^®^Sternburg to the Foreign Office, March 21, 1905,
GP, XIX, no. 6295. p. 583.
^®%olstein to Bulow, March 25. 1906, Holstein Papers. 
Vol. IV, no, 945, pp. 402-3.
^®^Bulow to Holstein, March 25, I906, Ibid.. no, 403,
p. 946.
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interests an attitude of reserve. It maintained its neutral 
position throughout. *107
During the Moroccan crisis French diplomacy toward 
the United States was at times rather clumsy. This was 
primarily because there were other more pressing matters for 
France to consider, but the Quai d'Orsay should have been 
more careful with confidential informatibn obtained from 
Roosevelt, The greatest Franco-American difficulty resulted 
from Roosevelt's opposition to a creation of Moroccan spheres 
of influence. This misunderstanding was due in part to the 
failure of the French Foreign Office to pay enough attention 
to Washington. French diplomacy, however, was certainly as 
skillful as that of England and Germany. Sternburg's mis­
representation of the Kaiser's promise to follow Roosevelt’s 
lead was a very undiplomatic move. The British Government 
made the mistake of sending to Washington an Ambassador who 
was always disliked by Roosevelt. "If Durand had been worth 
anything," wrote Roosevelt, "England might have helped me a 
little . . . but he . . .  is simply entirely incompetent for 
a work of delicacy and importance."^®® Those close to the 
White House noticed that after speaking with Durand the 
President was always in a "bad disposition.
lOfSpeech of November 14, I9 0 6, Bulow, Memoirs, II, 
pp. 223-4. Scott, Root, p. 208,
l®®Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, I9 0 6, Morison, V, p. 25I.
^®9jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23, 1906, DDF, IX^, 
no. 5 2 8, p. 69O; March 24, 1906, Ibid.. no. 537» pp. 699-701. 
Sternburg to Bulow, May I3 , I9 0 5, Grt, XX?, no. 6852.
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Diplomacy is always a work which involves personal 
relations, and this was especially true in the case of 
Theodore Roosevelt, a man who looked upon nations as if 
they were enlarged individuals, A very important feature 
of Franco-American relations during the crisis was the per­
sonal friendship of President Roosevelt and Jean Jules Jusse- 
rand. Following the conference Roosevelt wrote Jusserand 
that he would have not intervened in the crisis "if I had 
not possessed entire confidence alike in your unfailing 
soundness of judgment and in your high integrity of personal 
conduct."110 In contrast to his correspondence with William, 
Roosevelt seems to have always expressed his true convictions 
in his communications with Jusserand, To Reid Roosevelt 
wrote: "Jusserand was a man of such excellent judgment, so
sound and cool headed, and of so high a standard of personal 
and professional honor that I could trust him completely, " H I  
Although hypothetical questions are not in the realm of his­
tory, it seems probable that America's policy at Algeciras 
would have been less pro-French without the efforts of the 
skillful French Ambassador,
As a result of the Moroccan controversy France, Britain 
and Russia were drawn closer together, and the next year the
ll^Roosevelt to Jusserand, April 25, 1906, Morison, V, 
no, 3898, pp, 220-1, Bishop, I, p, 504,
lllRoosevelt to Reid, April 28, I906, Morison, V, p,
235; Bishop, I, p, 481,
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three powers concluded the Triple Entente, In addition, the 
crisis had the effect of pushing the United States closer to 
this power block and farther away from the Triple Alliance, 
Senator Lodge expressed a common American sentiment when he 
wrote : "You know how I have always believed France was our
natural ally , , , , The Kaiser has done more in a month 
to drive her toward us than twenty years of effort,
It is clear the Franco-American relations were closer 
as a result of the Moroccan crisis, but it is a mistake to 
exaggerate the extent to which this is true, Roosevelt had 
not been an uncritical supporter of all French goals. Es­
pecially the misunderstanding about spheres of influence 
caused Roosevelt to lose his enthusiasm for the French cause. 
After this incident he complained of "a certain furtiveness 
and lack of frankness in the French handling of their case," 
To Henry White he wrote: "Until the conference met I felt
that France was behaving better than Germany, but toward ' 
the end it seemed to me that neither one was straightfor­
ward, Despite this, two years after the conference
Roosevelt wrote to Jusserand: "As for the Moorish business.
112
Of, Pringle, Roosevelt, p, 273. Charles Tansill, 
America Goes to War. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co,, 1938),
p, 13» Schieber, Sentiment, pp, 198-201,
113•'^ Lodge to Roosevelt, July 8, I9 0 3, Lodge, Letters, 
Yol, II, p, 164,
^^^Roosevelt to White, April 30» 1906, Morison, V,
p. 252,
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I wish to Heaven, not in your interest, but in the interest 
of all civilized mankind, that France could take all Morocco 
under its exclusive charge,"113 The motivation for this 
statement was not love for French imperialism, but Roosevelt 
realized that the Algeciras Conference had failed to eliminate 
the Moroccan issue as a potential source of European conflict.
ll^Roosevelt to Jusserand, August 3, 1908, Morison, 
VI, p. 1148, Jusserand to Pichon, November 28, I906, DDF, 
X, no, 317» pp. 500-1,
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION
The years between I898 and 190? are extremely impor­
tant in the study of international diplomacy. This was a 
time of rapid colonial expansion, which was accompanied by 
the formation of new military alliances and the strengthening 
of older ones. Also, during these years the United States 
made her appearance as a major military force in the world. 
Before the 1880's the United States had never been considered 
an important power in the international community, but by 
the end of the Spanish-American. War there was a widespread 
recognition of the new reality.^ In I906 Archibald Coolidge, 
in The United States as a World Power, argued that the 
American Republic would never again be able to return to a 
policy of isolation from the world's problems,% Only two 
years later the future French Prime Minister, Andr^ Tardieu, 
wrote that the United States "has a policy of world importance 
whether she wishes it or not,"3
Isee May, Democracy, pp, 4-5, 
^Coolidge, World Power, pp, 15, 373* 
3Tardieu, Notes, p, 267,
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America's rather sudden entrance into the international 
arena was received with ambivalence in France, Certainly, 
during the Spanish-American War the French people were 
hostile to the American policy, and the annexation of the 
Philippines was looked upon as the worst type of hypocrisy. 
Some hostility continued after the war. In I905 Henry Hauser 
wrote that "bne hears nothing spoken of in the press, at 
meetings, in Parliament, except the American p e r i l , B u t  
during the war there was never any possibility of a French 
intervention, and following the conflict, the French Govern­
ment-planning on continued expansion and not entirely for­
getting about revanche— did what it could to obtain the 
diplomatic support of the American Government, Both Gabriel 
Hanotaux and Théophile Delcasse considered the establishment 
of better American relations as a major goal. The United 
States, somewhat isolated by two oceans, did'not have any 
real fears about a direct threat from another power, and for 
this reason there was not any anxiety about France's policy 
toward America. Certainly many Americans, including James 
Hyde, Henry White and Horace Porter, strongly desired close 
Franco-American relations, but their motivation was not based 
on any belief that France's support was really useful.
The United States did not challenge or oppose French 
imperialism except in the cases of Liberia and South America,
^enri Hauser, L'impérialisme américain, (Paris 1 Pages 
Libres, I9 0 5), p. 108, See also Vagts, Deutschland, Vol. I, 
pp. 3 45, 353-6, 365-7.
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In regard to Liberia, the motivation was sentimental. The 
American commitment to the small African nation was always 
limited. If France had decided to annex the country, it is 
not likely that the American Government would have used 
force to oppose the action. The American public, during 
these years, was never excited about Liberia's plight. In 
Washington there was little desire to increase American 
interests in Africa, and there was no serious consideration 
for the establishment of a African sphere of influence in 
that small country. In the case of South America, the United 
States was more determined. By the turn of the century the 
Monroe Doctrine was a kind of American creed, and there was 
the widespread conviction that South America was not open 
to further colonization. This was well recognized in Paris, 
and although the Monroe Doctrine was very unpopular, the 
French Government was very careful to respect the principles 
of the doctrine during the conflict with Venezuela, Of course, 
the American Government never challenged France's claim for 
the small colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French 
Guiana, This was a subject which was never discussed in 
diplomatic correspondence.
Both the United States and France had important interests 
in the Far East, and both nations had great expectations for 
financial returns from involvement in that region of the 
world. Although France and the United States were colonial 
neighbors after I8 9 8, the diplomatic relations of the two
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countries were seldom involved directly in the struggle for 
Asian influence, France was happy with America's open door 
doctrine, for she believed that this was an opportunity to 
capture a part of China's market without the expense of 
colonialism. In general, the French favored a firmer policy 
toward China than did the United States, During the Boxer 
rebellion, France was convinced that any sign of weakness 
would encourage later revolts against European imperialism. 
There were no serious conflicts of interest between France 
and the United States in Asia, and the French Government 
sympathized with Roosevelt's efforts to negotiate the Russo- 
Japanese War before Japan could upset the balance of power. 
The Taft Administration's policy of dollar diplomacy was a 
modification of the earlier American policy in Asia, and it 
was very unpopular in France,5 Only with a great deal of 
reluctance did the French Government agree to participate 
in the united loans to China,^ With the Chinese Revolution, 
the United States was one of the first of the powers to 
recognize the new Republic, The French Government was much 
slower in granting recognition, despite American suggestions 
that she should do so,?
5see C, F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China, (New 
York: The Macmillan Co,, 1933), pp. 295-6,
^White to Knox, June 18, 1909, Despatches, Yol, 1445, 
no, 5315-322, Bacon to Knox, January 19, 1910, Despatches, 
Yol, 4 4 7, no, 5315-683.
?Wtyron T, Herrick to Knox, July 25, 1912, Despatches,
Yol, 893, no, 00-1396,
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During the Roosevelt Administration it was recognized 
that Franco-American relations had recovered from the un­
friendly situation of the Spanish-American War. In the I90I 
edition of the yearbook, Vingtième Siecle Politique. Rene 
Wallier, the editor, wrote that an unofficial entente had 
been formed between France and the United States.® In I905 
Andrew Carnegie wrote an article, "An Anglo-French-American 
Understanding," in which he maintained that "no other three 
nations are so entirely complementary in aims and destiny."9 
Archibald Coolidge in The United States as a World Power 
argued that Franco-American relations had never been better. 
"So far as we can judgC;" he concluded, "there is no reason 
why they should not continue to be e x c e l l e n t . T h e  more 
recent historian, Charles Callan Tansill, believed that 
"the cordial relations which President Roosevelt established 
with France and England continued until the outbreak of the 
World War, and there is little doubt of their influence in 
preparing the American mind for intervention against Germany 
in 1917» Probably this statement implies too much, but
®Le Vingtième Siècle Politique, edited by Rene Wallier, 
(Paris I Bibliotheque-Charpentier, 1901), pp. 27-8.
^Andrew Carnegie, "An Anglo-French-American Understand­
ing," North American Review. CIXXXI (September, 1905)» p. 517.
lOcoolidge, World Power, pp. 188-9.
llcharles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War. (Boston* 
Little, Brown and Co., 1938), pp. 13-31»
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it is clear that by the time Roosevelt left the White House, 
the American position was somewhat pro-French.
The Moroccan conflict was the major diplomatic crisis
during the years between I898 and 190?, and this conflict
was the most important single event which involved Franco-
American relations during the years. At the high point of
the crisis, Maurice PalWologue, recorded his thoughts in
his daily journal1
"Something new and unexpected has happened— something 
which seems to indicate important developments in 
world politics. For the first time in her history 
the United States is intervening in a European affair. 
Until now it has maintained an isolation from the 
problems of the old world as a national dogma.
The American policy was pro-French at the Algeciras Confer­
ence, but the diplomatic support for France was definitely 
limited. Roosevelt angered the French Government when he 
proposed a settlement which would not have divided Morocco 
into spheres of influence. Roosevelt was primarily concerned 
with the avoidance of a war, and secondary to this he hoped 
to stimulate American trade in North Africa, so long as this 
could be done without great risk or cost.
America's brief involvement in European problems did 
not continue long after the Algeciras Conference. After the 
crisis had passed. President Roosevelt was primarily occupied 
by the conflict with Japan, Relations with France and Europe
IP !Maurice Paleologue, Un grand tournant de la politique 
mondiale, 1904-1909. (Paris 1 Pion, 1934), June 16, I9 0 5» 
pp. 224-5.
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took a secondary position, Americans were of course concerned 
about the possibility of a European War, Ambassador Henry 
White closely observed and reported developments during 
the Bosnian crisis of 1909, but he did not participate in 
the affair in any way,^^ This isolation from European 
conflicts really continued until the beginning of World 
War I, At the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, the American 
Government avoided a repetition of the intervention of six 
years earlier,Secretary of State Philander Knox informed 
Ambassador Jusserand that the United States would not parti­
cipate in a conference, but would agree to any settlement 
"provided that our commercial and other advantages secured 
to us under our existing treaties are p r e s e r v e d , "13
During the years between 1898 and 190?, there were a 
large number of factors which influenced Franco-American 
relations. Cultural and economic considerations were impor­
tant, Public opinion always had a subtile influence, and 
the impact of individual diplomats should not be minimized. 
More than anything else, however, both France and the United 
States formulated their foreign policies around broad concep­
tions of national interest. Increasingly there was a
13see Nevins, White, p, 283, Nevins quotes from White's 
despatches at great length, even though the reports of the 
crisis have little relation to White's diplomacy,
l^Adee to Bacon, October 9, 1911, Instructions, Vol. 285, 
no, 611,8131/29.
l^Knox to Bacon, December l6, 1911, Instructions, Vol. 
285, no, 881,00/475.
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compatibility of interests between the two countries. Despite 
minor conflicts, the government of neither power seriously 
considered the possibility that the policies of the other 
government would offer a real challenge to its vital inter­
ests and security. Each government realized that there 
was always the possibility of such a challenge from another 
power. This is the reason why Franco-American relations 
were friendly early in the twentieth century, and this also 
explains why, despite some disagreements, good relations 
have continued until the present day.
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